Charles B. Davison

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the jury's rejection of his insanity defence was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the case from Molodowic.

The Court held that the jury was faced with conflicting expert evidence, statements from the appellant, and circumstantial evidence that could reasonably be interpreted as showing he knew his acts were morally wrong.

The jury's finding that the appellant had not made out his defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving the defence of provocation with the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no air of reality supporting the objective components of the test for the defence of provocation.

Justice Fish dissented, finding that a reasonable jury could have been left with a reasonable doubt on the issue.

The appellant, an inmate in a maximum security institution, was threatened by a fellow inmate who was a member of a violent gang.

Anticipating an attack, the appellant concealed homemade weapons in his clothing.

When the fellow inmate attacked him with a knife, the appellant defended himself and killed the attacker.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of murder based on self-defence, and of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, finding he possessed the weapons for deterrence and defence.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction on the weapons charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that while a defensive purpose does not automatically mandate an acquittal, in these specific circumstances where the attack was imminent and unavoidable, the possession was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.