Marie Deschamps

The complainant workers suffered from chronic pain and received a fixed compensation award from the Workers' Compensation Board.

They appealed to the Board's Review Division, arguing the policy was discriminatory under the Human Rights Code.

The Review Officer concluded the policy was not discriminatory.

Instead of seeking judicial review, the complainants filed new complaints with the Human Rights Tribunal.

The Tribunal refused to dismiss the complaints under s. 27(1)(f) of the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Tribunal's decision was patently unreasonable because it ignored the principles of finality and the rule against collateral attack, effectively allowing the relitigation of an issue already decided by a decision-maker with concurrent jurisdiction.

The appellant, a private investigator hired by the defence, attempted to discover the identity of a confidential police informant.

He was charged with obstruction of justice and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted him on all counts.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on all counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence is not bound by informer privilege and may independently investigate an informant's identity, such investigation must be lawful.

The Court ordered a new trial on the obstruction of justice and the first extortion count (against the police officer) due to errors of law by the trial judge, but restored the acquittal on the second extortion count (against the associates) as it was based on factual findings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the police had subjective and objective reasonable grounds to believe the occupants of the vehicle possessed illegal firearms.

Consequently, the arrest and subsequent search incident to arrest were lawful, and there was no violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The appellant was charged with possessing child pornography between 1999 and 2006.

He claimed he collected the materials to create an artistic exhibition about child exploitation.

The trial judge acquitted him based on the pre-2005 artistic merit defence and the post-2005 legitimate purpose defence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law by applying the artistic merit defence to materials lacking artistic merit, and by using a purely subjective test for 'legitimate purpose'.

However, the Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction by making its own factual findings to substitute a conviction instead of ordering a new trial.

The appellants sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent posted an article on his website containing hyperlinks to other websites with allegedly defamatory information about the appellants.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a hyperlink, by itself, is content-neutral and merely refers to other content without repeating it.

Therefore, creating a hyperlink does not constitute publication of the defamatory material to which it links.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder after her spouse was found with a gunshot wound to the head.

The trial judge found that the police had systematically violated the appellant's Charter rights, including conducting warrantless searches of her home, detaining her without advising her of the reasons or her right to counsel, and violating her right to silence.

The trial judge excluded all evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding that the physical evidence should not have been excluded because it was discoverable and the police had not deliberately acted abusively.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its view of the police conduct for the trial judge's and in placing undue weight on the discoverability of the evidence.

The accused was acquitted at trial of two counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in law by taking a piecemeal approach to the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not fail to consider the evidence as a whole.

The Court clarified that a trial judge's assessment of evidence only constitutes an error of law allowing a Crown appeal from an acquittal in limited circumstances, such as when a reasonable doubt is tainted by a legal error.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision granting a constitutional exemption to Insite, a safe injection facility in Vancouver, from federal drug possession and trafficking laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is valid federal criminal legislation that applies to provincial health facilities, the federal Minister of Health's refusal to grant an exemption under section 56 of the Act violated the claimants' section 7 Charter rights.

The Court found the Minister's decision was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in its effects, as it denied life-saving medical care to vulnerable individuals without a corresponding benefit to public safety.

The Court ordered the Minister to grant the exemption forthwith.

The Crown appealed from a sentencing decision declining to impose a $4.7 million fine on an offender convicted of customs fraud involving the same amount.

The Supreme Court held that under s. 734(2) of the Criminal Code, a fine may be imposed only where the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the offender is able to pay it.

Past receipt of illegally obtained funds may support an inference of present ability to pay, but it does not shift a formal evidentiary or persuasive burden to the offender, nor does it compel the sentencing judge to draw that inference.

On the record, the sentencing judge made no reviewable error in concluding she was not satisfied that the offender could pay the fine.

The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes.

The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability.

Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims.

The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability.

Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a planned robbery and relied on this to infer the accused's presence at the crime scene.

The Court of Appeal partially based its decision on R. v. Beaudry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The majority held that Beaudry does not apply to mistakes as to the substance of evidence, which are governed by R. v. Lohrer.

Furthermore, the majority found the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, as she did not rely on the existence of a planned robbery to infer the accused's presence at the scene.

The appellant, a status Indian living part-time off-reserve, earned interest income on term deposits at a caisse populaire located on a reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the income and refused to apply the tax exemption under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Applying the connecting factors approach from Bastien Estate, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the interest income was situated on a reserve because the contract was entered into on a reserve with an institution carrying on business there, and the income was payable there.

The appeal was allowed, and the income was declared exempt from taxation.

The appellant, a status Indian, earned interest income on term deposits at a caisse populaire located on a reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the income as taxable, and the lower courts upheld the assessment on the basis that the caisse generated its revenues in the 'commercial mainstream' off the reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the connecting factors approach from Williams.

The Court held that the location of the debtor, the place of payment, the residence of the payee, and the source of the invested capital all pointed to the reserve.

The fact that the financial institution generated its revenues in the commercial mainstream was legally irrelevant to the location of the appellant's interest income.

The income was therefore exempt from taxation under section 87 of the Indian Act.

The claimants, who were members of a Métis settlement in Alberta, registered as status Indians to obtain medical benefits.

Consequently, their membership in the Métis settlement was revoked pursuant to the Metis Settlements Act, which precludes status Indians from settlement membership.

The claimants challenged their exclusion under ss. 15, 2(d), and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Metis Settlements Act is a genuinely ameliorative program protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter, as its object is to enhance and preserve Métis identity, culture, and self-governance through a dedicated land base.

The exclusion of status Indians serves this object.

The Court also dismissed the s. 2(d) and s. 7 claims, concluding the legislation is constitutional.

The tax debtor owed tax to the federal government.

The Minister of National Revenue issued requirements to pay to the appellant bank, seeking to intercept funds from cheques drawn by the tax debtor on his trust account and deposited into a joint account held by the tax debtor and a third party.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was not liable to make a payment to the tax debtor personally.

When the bank received the cheques for deposit into the joint account, it acted as a collecting bank for the joint account holders, not as an agent for the payee.

Therefore, the requirements to pay under s. 224(1) of the Income Tax Act were not triggered.

The parties separated and consented to an accounting and valuation of their assets under the Manitoba Family Property Act.

Before the valuation, the husband made an assignment in bankruptcy and was subsequently discharged.

The valuation later confirmed the wife was entitled to an equalization payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the equalization claim was a debt provable in bankruptcy and that the husband was released from the claim upon his discharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving.

The Crown and the appellant entered into a plea agreement for a lesser charge of careless driving.

However, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Criminal Justice Division subsequently repudiated the agreement, concluding it was contrary to the interests of justice.

The appellant alleged this repudiation breached her s. 7 Charter rights as an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repudiation of a plea agreement is an act of prosecutorial discretion, reviewable only for abuse of process.

Finding no evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or trial unfairness, the Court dismissed the appeal.

During a murder investigation, police obtained a warrant to search a rooming house and found a sawed-off shotgun in the appellant's rented room.

The appellant was charged with weapons offences and argued the search violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant for the appellant's room.

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting his 12-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's pre-trial statements and that Crown counsel's conduct rendered the trial unfair.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider a miscarriage of justice not raised in the Notice of Appeal, the trial's shortcomings did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's reasons did not show improper use of statements, and Crown counsel's questions did not cross the threshold of impermissible leading questions.