Marie Deschamps

Criminal appeal addressing admissibility of similar fact evidence tied to the accused's prior sexual assault conviction.

The Court accepted the dissenting appellate reasons and held the trial judge made no reviewable error in admitting the similar fact evidence.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, stayed count No. 1, and restored convictions on the remaining counts.

The Court held that under s. 16(3) of the Canada Evidence Act, an adult witness with mental disabilities is competent if they can communicate evidence and promise to tell the truth.

Requiring abstract understanding of truth-telling obligations was rejected.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appeal concerned whether retail Internet service providers, when providing end-users with Internet access to requested programming, carry on broadcasting undertakings under the Broadcasting Act.

The court held that the statutory terms, read in light of the Act’s language and policy objectives, do not capture entities that merely provide a transmission mode without selecting, originating, or packaging content.

Prior authorities on transmission and conduit functions were treated as consistent with this interpretation, while precedent involving content control by cable licensees was distinguished.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming that access-providing Internet service providers are not broadcasting undertakings in this context.

The appellant sought to block disclosure of portions of drug submission records requested under federal access to information legislation.

The Court clarified notice obligations, severance duties, and the evidentiary burden on a third party resisting disclosure under statutory exemptions for trade secrets, confidential information, and probable harm.

The majority held that the third party had not proven that the remaining redacted material met the claimed exemptions on the record.

The Court affirmed that appellate intervention was available where the reviewing judge did not adequately apply governing legal principles to the evidence.

The appeals were dismissed and disclosure orders stood, subject to redactions already accepted.

The appellant sought to set aside a municipal taxation bylaw as unreasonable, arguing that tax burdens should track objective service-consumption factors.

The respondent municipality argued that reasonableness in bylaw review requires consideration of broader social, economic, and demographic factors affecting the community.

The Court held that substantive review of municipal bylaws is governed by reasonableness and is highly deferential in light of delegated legislative authority.

A bylaw is invalid only where no reasonable municipal body, informed by relevant contextual factors and statutory limits, could have enacted it.

The appeal was dismissed because the bylaw fell within a reasonable range of outcomes and was adopted through a proper process.

In a tax enforcement appeal, the Court considered whether a statutory requirement to pay issued to a bank lost priority after the tax debtor later filed a notice of proposal under federal insolvency legislation.

The Court endorsed the Federal Court of Appeal's reasoning that the subsequent insolvency filing did not displace the earlier requirement to pay under the tax statute.

The appeal was dismissed.

No costs were awarded.

The Governor in Council referred the proposed federal Securities Act to the Supreme Court of Canada to determine its constitutional validity.

The proposed Act sought to create a single national securities regulator and a comprehensive federal regime for securities regulation.

The federal government argued the Act was a valid exercise of its general trade and commerce power under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the General Motors test and concluded that while certain aspects of the securities market are national in scope, the main thrust of the Act was the day-to-day regulation of securities, which falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s. 92(13)).

Consequently, the Court found the proposed Act unconstitutional, though it noted that a cooperative federal-provincial approach remains available.

The parties entered into a comprehensive separation agreement that was incorporated into a 2003 court order, providing the wife with indexed spousal support with no termination date.

The wife had multiple sclerosis and was unable to work.

In 2007, the husband applied to vary the order under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, arguing the wife should seek employment.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal reduced and terminated support, finding the wife capable of working.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the original order, holding that the proper test for variation under s. 17 is whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the order was made.

As the wife's medical condition had not changed since 2003, there was no material change to justify varying the order.

The parties divorced in 1984 and the husband was ordered to pay spousal support, which was varied to $2,000 per month in 1991.

In 2008, the husband applied to terminate spousal support, citing his retirement and a market downturn that negatively impacted his assets.

The trial judge reduced support to $1,500 per month, and the Court of Appeal further ordered that support be gradually reduced and terminated.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the wife's appeal and restored the 1991 order.

The Court held that the husband failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act because he provided no evidence of his financial circumstances at the time of the 1991 order, nor did he prove that his investment losses were crystallized rather than temporary market fluctuations.

The appellant taxpayer engaged in a series of transactions, including a horizontal amalgamation of sister corporations, to preserve the paid-up capital of a subsidiary's shares that would have been cancelled in a vertical amalgamation.

The amalgamated corporation subsequently redeemed shares and paid out the preserved paid-up capital to its non-resident shareholder as a tax-free return of capital.

The Minister assessed the taxpayer for withholding tax, applying the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to reduce the paid-up capital and deem a portion of the redemption a taxable dividend.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, holding that the transactions constituted an abusive avoidance transaction that circumvented the purpose of section 87(3) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant union disputed an arbitrator's award regarding the calculation of vacation benefits for casual employees who became permanent.

The arbitrator concluded that time as a casual employee was not to be included.

On judicial review, the chambers judge found the arbitrator's reasons insufficient and unreasonable, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, clarifying that under the Dunsmuir reasonableness standard, the adequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision nor a question of procedural fairness.

Instead, reasons must be read together with the outcome to determine if the result falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner received complaints that the respondent disclosed private information in contravention of the Personal Information Protection Act.

The Commissioner took 22 months to extend the 90-day statutory time limit for completing the inquiry.

An adjudicator subsequently found the respondent had contravened the Act.

On judicial review, the respondent argued for the first time that the Commissioner lost jurisdiction by failing to extend the time limit within the initial 90 days.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the adjudicator implicitly decided the timelines issue, and this decision was reviewable on a standard of reasonableness because the tribunal was interpreting its home statute.

The Court found the adjudicator's implied decision to be reasonable and restored the order.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring s. 144 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases inoperative in relation to a requirement to pay issued under s. 126(4) of the Employment Insurance Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding a conflict of legislative purposes between the federal provision, which aims to recover overpayments summarily without regard to provincial exemptions, and the provincial provision exempting income replacement benefits from seizure.

The provincial provision was held to be constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant employer appealed a decision setting aside an arbitrator's award.

The arbitrator had found that while the employer breached the collective agreement regarding vacation entitlements, the respondent union was estopped from grieving the practice due to its long-standing acquiescence.

The Court of Appeal held the arbitrator's application of estoppel was reviewable on a standard of correctness and set it aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that labour arbitrators are not bound to apply equitable doctrines exactly as courts do, and their application of such doctrines is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The arbitrator's decision to impose an estoppel was reasonable given the labour relations context.

The appellant brutally assaulted two individuals while in a state of toxic psychosis caused by voluntary drug consumption.

He was convicted of aggravated assault at trial, as the judge applied s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which precludes self-induced intoxication as a defence for violent offences.

The appellant appealed, arguing he should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under s. 16.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a toxic psychosis resulting exclusively from self-induced intoxication is not a 'mental disorder' under s. 16, but rather falls under the self-induced intoxication provisions of s. 33.1.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard appeals regarding a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal finding of pay inequity between a largely female group of employees and a largely male comparator group.

The Federal Court of Appeal had previously overturned the Tribunal's finding.

In an oral judgment, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals on the merits, finding no reviewable error by the Tribunal, and dismissed the appeal regarding the reduction of damages, adopting the dissenting reasons of Evans J.A. from the court below.

The Lax Kw'alaams Indian Band claimed an Aboriginal right to the commercial harvesting and sale of all species of fish within their traditional waters, arguing this right evolved from their pre-contact practices.

The trial judge found that while the pre-contact society relied heavily on fishing for sustenance, their only significant trade was in eulachon grease, and trade in other fish was not integral to their distinctive culture.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a modern commercial fishery in all species lacked sufficient continuity and proportionality with the pre-contact trade in eulachon grease.

The Court also affirmed that Aboriginal rights claims must be characterized based on the pleadings, rejecting a 'commission of inquiry' approach to determining pre-contact practices.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had set aside the accused's conviction for first degree murder and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the first degree murder conviction, adopting the dissenting reasons of MacPherson J.A. at the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and murder.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging sexual harassment by the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal substantiated the complaint in part and awarded compensation, including $47,000 for legal costs under the statutory provision allowing compensation for 'any expenses incurred'.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Tribunal's decision should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, its interpretation of the statute to include legal costs was unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the Tribunal does not have the authority to award legal costs.