Marc Rosenberg

The appellant employer appealed the trial judge's award of a nine-month notice period and costs for wrongful dismissal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the respondent was induced to leave her previous secure employment.

The respondent cross-appealed the dismissal of her claim for lost disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the notice period or costs award.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the respondent was entitled to the value of disability benefits she would have received during the notice period, adjusted to prevent double recovery of both full salary and disability benefits for the same period.

The parties appealed the trial judge's costs award in a shareholder oppression and valuation proceeding.

The trial judge had awarded the dissenting shareholders substantial indemnity costs up to the date of a settlement offer, and awarded the corporation partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both costs appeals, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The Court also ordered no costs for the main appeals due to divided success.

The minority shareholders of Ford Canada dissented from a squeeze-out transaction and sought fair value for their shares, along with an oppression remedy against Ford Canada and Ford U.S. regarding a transfer pricing system that caused the Canadian subsidiary to lose money over a ten-year period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the transfer pricing system was oppressive and that the business judgment rule did not protect the directors.

However, the Court reversed the dismissal of the oppression claim against Ford U.S., finding that the parent company's actions were oppressive.

The Court also held that minority shareholders were not entitled to compensation for historical oppression that occurred before they acquired their shares, and that fair value does not include a component for historical oppression.

The trial judge's order directing a reference to a Master to determine shareholdings was set aside.

The self-represented appellant was convicted of mischief following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing several errors occurred during the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excusing prospective jurors who had been victims of break and enters without the parties' consent, in proceeding with 11 jurors over the appellant's objection without considering s. 644(1.1) of the Criminal Code, and in giving an inappropriate instruction on the late disclosure of an alibi.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and, given the unusual circumstances and age of the minor offence, entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant vendor appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment for the return of a $15,000 deposit to the respondent purchaser.

The Divisional Court had previously declined jurisdiction, finding the order was not for a 'single payment'.

The Court of Appeal held the Divisional Court erred in its jurisdictional analysis but retained the appeal to save the parties further expense.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in his conclusion that the appellant's explanation for the default was inadequate and that the respondent would be entitled to relief from forfeiture.

The appellant, SimEx Inc., acquired rights to certain films from IMAX Corporation under a Transfer Agreement.

A dispute arose when a third party, Robots of Mars, Inc., commenced arbitration in California claiming unpaid royalties under a prior Production Agreement with IMAX.

IMAX cross-claimed against SimEx, arguing SimEx assumed all liabilities under the Production Agreement.

SimEx applied for a declaration in Ontario that it was not bound by the Production Agreement's arbitration and royalty clauses.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the assignment conveyed both benefits and burdens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the unambiguous terms of the Transfer Agreement only transferred ownership rights to the films, not the contractual obligations of the Production Agreement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that improper cross-examination, erroneous jury instructions regarding his criminal record, and limitations on cross-examining a Crown witness undermined his credibility and rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged several errors by the trial judge and Crown counsel, including improper suggestions during cross-examination and incorrect instructions on the use of the appellant's criminal record.

However, the Court concluded that these errors did not affect the fairness of the trial or cause a miscarriage of justice, given the overwhelming Crown case and the appellant's incredible testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for breach of contract and negligent performance regarding the construction of a golf course reservoir.

On appeal, they brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, which had not been pleaded at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the amendment were allowed post-trial.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in finding that the respondents complied with the amended agreement and that the agreement did not stipulate an average depth for the reservoir.

The respondent pleaded guilty to manslaughter after abandoning her two-year-old child for several days, resulting in the child's death from dehydration.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of three years in the penitentiary.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was manifestly inadequate and failed to reflect the respondent's moral blameworthiness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was at the very bottom of the acceptable range, the trial judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not clearly unreasonable.

The appellant, a young person, appealed the sentence imposed by the youth court judge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard the appeal and reserved its decision.

The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, noting that the case raised important issues concerning the interpretation of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and stated that reasons for the decision would be delivered at a later date.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when a snowmobile track shredded while the defendants were attempting to start it.

The defendants sought a declaration that their automobile insurer (TD) and their property insurer (Germania) had a duty to defend the negligence action.

The motion judge found that TD had a duty to defend, as the injuries arose from the ownership, use, or operation of a motor vehicle, and that Germania did not, as its policy excluded such claims.

TD appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in admitting affidavit evidence regarding coverage preconditions and in finding a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the affidavit evidence was properly admitted as it only affected coverage and not liability, and that the negligence claims were inextricably linked to the use and operation of the snowmobile, thus falling within TD's coverage and Germania's exclusion clause.

The appellant appealed a decision of the application judge finding no prejudice resulting from a lack of notice of a letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was ample evidence to support the application judge's conclusion that the appellant would not have acted differently had it received notice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break-ins following a jury trial.

During the trial, a police officer testified about unrecorded and ambiguous statements made by the appellant.

Although the trial judge and counsel agreed by the end of the case that the appellant had not admitted involvement, the trial judge failed to clarify this to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that because the Crown's case was not overwhelming, there was a real risk the jury interpreted the statements as an admission.

The appeal from conviction was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for historical sexual and physical abuse of his children.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly inadequate and held that the trial judge erred in giving credit for delay in sentencing.

The appeal was allowed, and the total sentence was increased to nine years' imprisonment.

The appellant lender appealed the dismissal of its claim against a law firm that acted for both sides in a loan transaction, alleging conflict of interest and failure to advise on risks.

The respondent mortgagors cross-appealed, arguing the mortgage was invalid because the law firm failed to insist the wife obtain independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that no disqualifying conflict existed, the lender would have proceeded regardless of further advice, and the wife would have signed the mortgage even with independent legal advice because the loan benefited her family.

The parties appeared before the Court of Appeal to determine issues of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest following an appeal regarding a wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued against pre-judgment interest due to the respondent's delay in issuing the claim and the fact that the appeal judgment awarded no more than the original termination offer.

The court rejected these arguments, noting the appellant had use of the funds, and awarded pre-judgment interest.

The court also declined to vary the agreed post-judgment interest rate of 4 percent, finding the delay in obtaining Employment Insurance repayment information was avoidable.

Costs of the attendance were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant purchased property to construct a fourplex and submitted applications for site plan approval and building permits.

The respondent municipality subsequently passed an interim control by-law freezing development in the area, having discussed the by-law in closed committee meetings.

The appellant moved to quash the by-law, arguing the closed meetings violated the open meeting requirements of the Municipal Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the meetings fell under the 'potential litigation' exception.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the by-law, holding that the subject matter of the meetings was the by-law itself, not potential litigation, and that the statutory requirement for open meetings had been breached.

The appellant appealed an order denying him costs and expenses incurred in realizing on a mortgage security.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that there had been no default by the mortgagors and no waste committed, meaning the costs were not recoverable.

The court also dismissed the appellant's claims of procedural errors and bias, and upheld the denial of a certificate of pending litigation.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed, deleting a $5,000 payment previously awarded to the appellant for expenses, as there was no default to justify it.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee $28,000 for wrongful dismissal, representing seven months' notice including Wallace damages.

The employer argued it had just cause to terminate the employee for dishonesty and breach of policy, and challenged the Wallace damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusion that the employer failed to prove dishonesty.

The Court also upheld the Wallace damages, noting the employer's blatant disregard for the employee by terminating her two weeks before she was to give birth.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against Inco Limited for environmental contamination in Port Colborne, alleging that nickel oxide emissions caused a decline in property values following a 2000 Ministry of the Environment announcement.

The motion judge and Divisional Court refused certification, finding the class arbitrary and individual issues overwhelming.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the action, holding that the narrowed claim focusing solely on property devaluation met all certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act, including identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.