Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the sentence should be reduced because the conviction that formed the basis for the suspension was later set aside, meaning the appellant's record for similar offences was less than what was known to the trial court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the fine to $2,000, and dismissed the conviction appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict was not unreasonable, as several witnesses identified the appellant.

However, the court admitted the fresh evidence of a new witness, finding it was reasonably capable of belief and could have affected the result given the frailties in the identification procedure.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The defendants appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay a proposed class action in favour of arbitration.

The plaintiff brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was precluded by s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the motions judge's decision was interlocutory because she deferred the final determination of whether the dispute should be arbitrated to the certification stage of the class proceeding.

As the order was not final, s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act applied to bar the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for driving offences arising from a serious collision.

He argued issues related to bolus drinking, a discrepancy in the time of the collision, and a violation of his right to be present under s. 650 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly addressed bolus drinking and that the appellant's absence when written reasons were delivered did not violate s. 650.

Leave to appeal the sentence was refused due to the appellant's serious driving record and the severity of the collision.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly used similar fact evidence to bolster the complainants' credibility and erred in departing from the 2:1 guideline for pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the similar fact evidence to confirm the representations were made.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge provided reasons for departing from the pre-trial custody credit guideline, and the lengthy penitentiary sentence was fit given the appellant's record and commission of offences while serving a previous sentence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction.

The trial judge had rejected his defence under section 43 of the Criminal Code after finding he dangled a child's legs out of a 9th-floor window.

The Court of Appeal found no inconsistent credibility findings and held that such conduct is clearly unreasonable and cannot amount to a section 43 defence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant, staying his previously instituted proceedings, and requiring him to obtain leave before instituting further proceedings.

He also appealed a costs order of $21,000 and the dismissal of two other motions.

The Court of Appeal found the appeals to be without merit, noting the appellant's unfounded allegations of bias against judges.

The appeal was dismissed, the vexatious litigant order was confirmed, and costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment for sending two unwanted letters to the complainant over an 18-month period.

He appealed, arguing that two communications do not meet the threshold of 'repeatedly' communicating under s. 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'repeatedly' means more than once, and that two communications can suffice depending on the context and history between the parties.

The court also denied leave to appeal the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, finding it manifestly fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant, a wholesale distributor of fresh fruit, suffered produce spoilage due to a widespread power failure that caused its refrigeration equipment to stop working.

The respondent insurer denied the claim based on exclusion clauses for mechanical/electrical breakdown and changes of temperature.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the insurer and refused the appellant's request for an adjournment to file evidence on the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the refusal to grant an adjournment would not have affected the result and that the change of temperature exclusion clause was clear and unambiguous.

The appellant ministry appealed a lower court order dismissing its applications for judicial review of two orders by the commissioner.

The commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records relating to funding applications, finding they did not fall under the 'advice or recommendations' exemption in s. 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The appellate court held that the standard of review for the commissioner's interpretation of s. 13(1) is reasonableness, and found the commissioner's interpretation and application to the records to be reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records containing the Ministry's evaluations and scores of consultants who submitted tenders for highway construction projects.

The appellants argued the records were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's findings that the scores did not constitute 'advice or recommendations' under section 13, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm under sections 17 and 18.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision applying the doctrine of res judicata based on prior CCAA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants were neither parties nor privies in interest to the prior proceedings.

The court noted that the appellants only participated as witnesses and that respondents' counsel had previously indicated that findings in the CCAA proceedings would not affect proceedings against other parties.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment which found that although the respondent lawyers were negligent, their negligence caused no actual loss to the appellants.

The appellants argued the trial judge ignored evidence that settlement funds were a loan from their mother.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no credible evidence of a loan, and that the appellants would have proceeded with the settlement regardless of the lawyers' negligence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, retail employees and corporate retailers, were charged with working in or carrying on a retail business on a holiday contrary to the Retail Business Holidays Act.

They challenged the constitutionality of the 1993 amendments to the Act, arguing it infringed their freedom of religion under s. 2(a) and equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Act's purpose remains the secular one of providing common pause days for retail employees, and that it does not significantly burden religious freedom.

The court also held that any differential treatment was based on occupational status, not an enumerated or analogous ground under s. 15, and therefore did not constitute discrimination.

The appellant landlord appealed a jury award of punitive damages arising from its continuing failure to maintain and repair the respondent's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury properly identified an independent actionable wrong based on the landlord's highly reprehensible conduct.

The respondent's cross-appeal on costs was allowed, as the trial judge erred in failing to apply Rule 49.10 after the judgment exceeded the respondent's offer to settle.

The respondent was awarded substantial indemnity costs for the trial and costs of the appeal.

The appellant, the deceased's son-in-law, appealed a trial decision that found the deceased intended to gift his investments to his daughter (the respondent) by placing them in joint ownership.

The appellant argued the investments should form part of the estate residue, of which he was a joint beneficiary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the deceased actually intended to gift the beneficial interest to his daughter, making it unnecessary to rely on the presumption of advancement or resulting trust.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault arising from prolonged sexual abuse of a child over several years and sought leave to appeal a three-year custodial sentence.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility analysis, while containing a minor error on one point, was substantially grounded in the evidentiary record and did not reverse the burden of proof or apply an unfairly different level of scrutiny to defence evidence.

The court distinguished authority on improper credibility reasoning and found the trial judge had carefully considered inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence in the context of the record as a whole.

On sentence, the court held that the sentencing judge properly used prior authority as guidance, recognized factual differences, and imposed a fit sentence given the position of trust and prolonged escalating abuse.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with serious offences against his spouse.

The trial judge found the 19-month delay in the Ontario Court of Justice exceeded guidelines.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred by including the neutral intake period in the systemic delay calculation, isolating the delay in the Ontario Court of Justice from the total time, and mischaracterizing inherent time requirements as systemic delay.

The total 23-month delay was not unreasonable given the serious charges and scheduling complexities.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, following a traffic stop.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons, improperly rejected allegations of racial profiling, and erred in evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and no evidence of racial profiling.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence to two years less 20 days to preserve the appellant's right to appeal his deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant previously appealed his committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the surrender decision.

The appeal was dismissed, but the judicial review was adjourned pending reconsideration of the surrender decision.

The Minister of Justice subsequently vacated the surrender order and discharged the appellant.

The parties agreed the matter was moot, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.