Marc Rosenberg

The applicants, independent private associations of RCMP members, challenged the constitutionality of provisions excluding RCMP members from the Public Service Labour Relations Act and establishing the Staff Relations Representative Program (SRRP).

The application judge found that the SRRP violated s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that s. 2(d) protects the right to collective bargaining only in a derivative sense, and it was not effectively impossible for RCMP members to meaningfully exercise their freedom of association.

The cross-appeal regarding freedom of expression and the exclusion from the PSLRA was dismissed.

The appellant leased a water heater from the respondent.

The respondent proposed an amendment to the rental agreement requiring customers to deal directly with the respondent to terminate the agreement, rather than using an agent.

The appellant sought a declaration that the amendment was invalid under the Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendment did not comply with the Regulation because the right to terminate was not unconditional.

However, the Court upheld the application judge's decision to invoke s. 93(2) of the Act, binding the appellant to the amendment, as the application was brought for a collateral purpose to benefit a competitor and no consumer was prejudiced.

The young person appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as a serious violent offence designation.

In an addendum to a previous endorsement, the Court of Appeal noted the Crown's intention not to proceed on a new trial.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, ordered a new trial, and stayed those charges.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the serious violent offence designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, as the remaining conviction for weapons dangerous could not support it.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action against the respondent and declaring the individual appellant a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, as the corporate appellant was in receivership and the individual appellant lacked authority to bring a claim on its behalf.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the vexatious litigant declaration, holding that under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, such an order can only be made on an application, not on a motion in an action.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, relying on fresh psychiatric and correctional evidence developed after a lengthy delay in perfecting the appeal.

The court accepted that the original designation and sentence were proper when imposed and held that the updated record did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant's risk in the community, as required for a long-term supervision order.

The court emphasized the appellant's extensive history of serious sexual and violent offending, persistent treatment resistance, and the contingent nature of the more optimistic expert opinion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property over $5,000 after being found in possession of stolen specialty refrigerators.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding the refrigerators were delivered and paid for in the middle of the night, when evidence suggested delivery occurred during regular business hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's misapprehension of the delivery time was material to his reasoning process and met the stringent test for a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give instructions on post-offence conduct, a Vetrovec warning, the defence of accident, the elements of manslaughter, causation, and the victim's reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that the defence counsel at trial had not requested the omitted instructions or objected to the charge.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claims against the respondents for knowing assistance in a breach of trust, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.

The claims hinged on whether a defendant breached a fiduciary duty and duty of confidence by acquiring a mining property allegedly on the appellant's behalf.

The Court of Appeal applied the 'full appreciation' test for summary judgment and upheld the motion judge's finding that the documentary evidence overwhelmingly contradicted the appellant's assertion of an agency relationship.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The appellant focused on a six-month delay during the preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the delay was neutral and that the prejudice experienced by the appellant was not significant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence affecting credibility findings regarding a key witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions that the witness had no motive to lie and that independent evidence confirmed his testimony were reasonably open to her.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant lied about not knowing the witness.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a statement made during a traffic stop should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 8 violation.

The Court of Appeal applied the Grant framework and upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence.

The court found that the police conduct was not egregious, the state of the law was uncertain at the time, and the reliable evidence was essential to the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that was more restrictive of his liberty than previous orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a solid evidentiary basis for the disposition and noting the Board's intention to maintain oversight while allowing for the possibility of an earlier hearing if progress was made.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for the second-degree murder of his wife, applied to receive the proceeds of her life insurance policy.

The application judge dismissed the claim, applying the public policy rule that a person cannot profit from their own criminal act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the public policy rule does not apply to an NCR accused, as they are not morally responsible for their actions.

The Court also found that the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 does not supplant the common law rule, though it leaves open the possibility for the Attorney General to seek forfeiture.

The appeal was allowed and the proceeds were ordered payable to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim on a Rule 21 motion, arguing the motion judge failed to consider whether the limitation period was tolled under s. 7 of the Limitations Act due to her mental and psychological condition.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that based on the statement of claim, it was not plain and obvious that the claim was statute-barred.

The order of the motion judge was set aside and the defendant's Rule 21 motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, primarily challenging the length of the custodial term.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had already served the jail sentence.

Given the appellant's record and the serious nature of the offences, the court declined to reduce the driving prohibition and found the five-year probation period to be entirely appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The trial judge properly concluded the proposed sentence was contrary to the administration of justice, as the appellant committed the current offence against the same victim while serving an intermittent sentence for a previous offence against them, making specific deterrence an overwhelming consideration.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to grant relief nunc pro tunc.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the application judge appeared to have treated the failure to obtain leave as a nullity rather than a mere irregularity.

Finding no basis on the record to refuse the order, the Court granted the order nunc pro tunc.

The appellants abandoned their appeal.

On consent, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned without costs.

Appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition order under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant challenged the reasonableness of a detention order and a 50 km radius restriction requiring proximity to the hospital.

The court held that the disposition was supported by the record and reflected the least restrictive disposition agreed to by the parties before the Board.

Although fresh evidence showed the appellant was doing well, that progress was for the next Board hearing and did not render the earlier disposition unreasonable.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their sentences for failing to provide the necessaries of life, arguing that previous case law established a sentencing range of four to eight months for first offenders.

The Court of Appeal disagreed that the cited case established such a range.

Finding no error of law, the court refused leave to appeal.