Marc Rosenberg

The appellant was convicted of threatening and criminally harassing his former common law wife.

Following the finding of guilt, defence counsel requested a psychiatric assessment, which led to a finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) due to alcohol-related dementia and delusions.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the NCRMD finding was unreasonable and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer raised his mental state without instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the NCRMD verdict was reasonable and that the appellant failed to prove his counsel acted without instructions or that the counsel's performance resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for producing marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Police discovered a marijuana grow operation in an apartment leased to the appellant.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable and that the reasons for judgment were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by strong circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's rental application and supporting documents.

The Court also held that while the reasons could have been more comprehensive, the basis for the finding was apparent from the record, satisfying the requirements for appellate review.

The appellant appealed her sentence, arguing she was an addict/trafficker rather than trafficking for commercial profit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the sentencing judge to conclude the trafficking activity was undertaken for commercial profit.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to the United States for a conspiracy charge in Louisiana.

The applicant argued the surrender violated his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision reasonable as the Cotroni factors favoured surrender, given that most witnesses and the servers were located in the United States.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an order on consent in the form of a draft order.

The appellant law firm appealed directions issued by an Administrative Judge regarding the review of legal fees under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The Administrative Judge had ruled that decisions of the Chief Adjudicator in the fee review process are not subject to appeal or judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash the appeal, finding it had jurisdiction.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, holding that a Chief Adjudicator's decision is only reviewable by an Administrative Judge in very limited circumstances where it fails to enforce the provisions of the Settlement Agreement, which the appellant failed to establish.

The testator left a life interest in the residue of his estate to his wife, directing that upon her death, the residue be divided equally between his son and daughter, 'per stirpes'.

The son predeceased the life tenant, leaving his estate to his second wife.

The application judge held that the phrase 'per stirpes' indicated an intention to benefit the son's children, rather than his estate or the surviving daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a gift to named children 'per stirpes' can be contradictory, in this context it conveyed the testator's intention to benefit his children's children if either child predeceased the life tenant.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after it offered no further evidence following a ruling on a Charter motion.

The Court of Appeal stayed the appeal, finding the Crown failed to demonstrate that the Charter ruling was sufficiently important to prevent the prosecution from continuing.

The Court noted that other evidence, including a co-accused's accident report and testimony, was potentially available.

Allowing the appeal on such a sparse record would constitute an impermissible interlocutory appeal and an abuse of process.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision finding that work performed on the leased premises constituted leasehold improvements rather than structural repairs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding, noting the premises were taken on an 'as is' basis and the tenant failed to obtain the landlord's approval as required by the lease.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties (respondents on appeal) brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from an order dismissing their motion to strike a statement of claim.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that because the motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion to strike the entire action for lack of jurisdiction, the order finally determined a substantive right and was therefore a final order.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant association appealed a decision finding that the process for renewing the appointments of Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court does not infringe the principles of judicial independence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Valente.

The Court held that a reasonable and well-informed observer would conclude that the Deputy Judges and the Small Claims Court are sufficiently independent, as the renewal discretion rests with senior judicial officers rather than the Executive.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to clarify the costs and interest awarded in its previous decision (2012 ONCA 143).

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $6,700, costs of the trial to be agreed upon or assessed, and pre- and post-judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act.

A commercial condominium corporation sought a compliance order against a grocery store tenant and its landlord to prevent the display of merchandise on the common element sidewalk.

The application judge granted the compliance order, dismissed the landlord's oppression application, and awarded costs to the condominium corporation.

The landlord and tenant appealed the compliance order, and the condominium corporation cross-appealed the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding the limitation period had not expired due to continuous breaches, and upheld the dismissal of the oppression application.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on costs, finding the application judge erred in principle by failing to explain her calculation of 'additional actual costs' under s. 134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998, and remitted the costs issue for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed a judgment interpreting the Constitution of a religious society and upholding a freezing order on memberships.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that a 'bona fide member' only required payment of dues for the last two calendar years, rejecting the appellants' argument for a 24-month probationary period.

The Court also upheld the freezing order, finding it was validly passed by the Executive Committee in response to a forcible takeover and was justified to restore calm.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant law firm appealed a motion judge's order excluding its final account from a court-ordered assessment of its accounts, and a subsequent order awarding the respondents full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the exclusion of the account, finding that the appellant failed to deliver the account 'forthwith' as explicitly required by the prior Assessment Order.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, substituting a partial indemnity award because there was no finding of reprehensible conduct by the appellant to justify a full indemnity scale.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision finding that the OMERS Board and its wholly-owned subsidiaries were Crown agencies exempt from paying land transfer tax under the Land Transfer Tax Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the motion judge's conclusion that the government had de jure control over the OMERS Board, making it a Crown agency.

The Court also agreed that the statutory scheme allowed the OMERS Board to act through wholly-owned subsidiaries, which were therefore also Crown agencies entitled to the tax exemption.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder following a home invasion robbery where the victim was bound and shot.

At trial, they advanced a cut-throat defence, each accusing the other of being the shooter.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the elements of constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code and party liability under s. 21(2).

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 21(2) can form the basis for first degree murder, the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on what factual findings were required to conclude the non-shooter actively participated in the killing.

The appeals were allowed in part, the first degree murder convictions were set aside, and convictions for second degree murder were substituted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The application judge found the equalization claim was statute-barred as the parties separated more than six years before the application was commenced, and declined to extend the limitation period under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The spousal support claim was dismissed because the appellant failed to establish financial hardship or need.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment staying his Ontario action against the respondent on the bases of issue estoppel, jurisdiction simpliciter, and forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the factors from Van Breda to conclude that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum for the dispute.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the delay caused by the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure, failed to consider inferred prejudice, and incorrectly treated a stay of proceedings as an extraordinary remedy.

The Court concluded that the 35-month delay, largely attributable to the Crown and institutional delay, was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a stay of proceedings was entered.