Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's Charter ruling regarding the timing of his detention by police.

The appellant argued he was detained and handcuffed before verbally identifying himself under a false name, contrary to the trial judge's finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's factual finding that the detention occurred after the false identification.

The appellant appealed his conviction for weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's attribution of intake and institutional delay, as well as the assessment of prejudice.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge reasonably characterized the initial four months as neutral intake and properly allocated the delay caused by an adjournment.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to establish significant prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was struck by a car and suffered significant physical injuries that led to chronic pain and mental disorders.

She applied for enhanced statutory accident benefits, claiming a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the SABS.

A designated assessment centre and an arbitrator found she met the criteria because she had a marked impairment in one category of daily living, and they included physical pain in their assessment of her mental disorder.

The director's delegate upheld this decision.

The Divisional Court overturned the delegate's decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying a correctness standard of review.

Applying the reasonableness standard, the Court of Appeal found the delegate's interpretation of s. 2(1.1)(g)—that a single marked impairment is sufficient and that physical pain can be considered cumulatively with a mental disorder—was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the amount of $5,000 inclusive.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the existence of a commission agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of a written commission agreement, the interpretation of email correspondence to determine if an agreement existed was a matter for the motion judge.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that upheld a trial conviction.

The appellant argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the case raised no legal issues of significance to the general administration of justice and that the trial judge had given extensive, well-reasoned findings.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed following a jury trial, specifically challenging the probation order.

The Court of Appeal found that the probation was properly imposed for the purposes of rehabilitation and protection of the public, noting a lack of evidence that the appellant had taken steps towards rehabilitation to prevent reoffending.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant did not pursue his costs appeal, so leave to appeal costs was denied.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $8,000.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of income tax evasion after claiming her depression prevented her from filing returns.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in admitting a doctor's letter as hearsay and relying on it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge and further finding that the trial judge erred in law by relying on evidence he had previously ruled inadmissible to support the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Superior Court of Justice granting the Crown's application for certiorari, which quashed a preliminary inquiry judge's order committing the appellant to stand trial for second degree murder and instead ordered him to stand trial for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by weighing evidence and choosing between competing inferences regarding planning and deliberation.

The Court found there was sufficient evidence, including a document showing a grudge and the circumstances of the knife attack, to support an inference of planning and deliberation.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and contraband offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the vehicle search was reasonable and that he had knowledge of the contraband.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding the reliability of the confidential informant's tip and the assessment of witness credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the appellant's prior record for similar offences.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board failed to make the least onerous and least restrictive disposition by not granting the hospital discretion to permit him to live in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disposition reasonable and supported by evidence that community living was not a viable option due to the appellant's obsession with living with his daughters.

The appellant was convicted of importing over 20 kilograms of marijuana after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Jamaica.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly took judicial notice of common practices in drug importation cases to reject her credibility.

She also appealed her 18-month custodial sentence, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly relied on his experience and common sense in assessing credibility, and that the custodial sentence was appropriate given the commercial quantity of drugs and the need for deterrence.

The appellants failed to appear for their appeal, providing only a vague allusion to emergency dental surgery.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appeal appeared to be moot and that continuing the matter would unnecessarily increase costs.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned without costs.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault, raising issues regarding pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code and the trial judge's consideration of the victim's severe injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the pre-sentence custody issue was not clearly raised below and the appellant was being released on parole that day.

The court also held that the sentence was entirely fit given the seriousness of the assault and the severity of the injuries.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences after police found him in an apartment with drugs and a loaded handgun.

At trial, the judge refused to allow the defence to call a third-party witness who was expected to testify that the drugs and gun belonged to him, ruling there was an insufficient nexus between the witness and the offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapplied the test for alternate suspect evidence.

Where the defence proposes to call direct evidence from another person taking responsibility for the crimes charged, that proposed evidence itself constitutes a sufficient nexus.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the respondent employer was entitled to direct the appellant to take his vacation during the notice period.

The employer's vacation policy was ambiguous, meaning the issue could not be resolved on summary judgment before discoveries.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

The trial judge had found that as the operator of the vehicle, the appellant had prima facie de facto possession of its contents unless there was evidence to the contrary.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error in law, as it impermissibly transferred the burden of proof to the accused and created a rebuttable presumption not found in common law or statute.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible and detained in a psychiatric facility, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board.

He argued that his transfer to a more restrictive unit violated his rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter, and sought a conditional discharge as a stand-alone remedy under section 24(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's findings that the transfer was necessary due to the appellant's dangerous conduct and did not violate his Charter rights.

The Court also affirmed that the Board lacks jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy, such as a conditional discharge, that would endanger public safety and frustrate its statutory mandate.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the trial judge rejected a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in finding the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

However, the trial judge failed to account for the appellant's lesser role compared to his co-accused.

Considering the appellant's lesser role, pre-trial custody, house arrest, and compelling fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 9 months' imprisonment.