Louise Charron

The appellant shot and killed a police officer during a struggle following a domestic dispute.

At trial, he admitted to the shooting but claimed it was accidental and lacked the intent for murder.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the Crown's theory, mentioning the appellant's failure to check on the officer before threatening suicide.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by suggesting the jury could infer intent from post-offence conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not contain an error of law.

The Court further held that even if an error existed, the curative proviso would apply as no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for telemarketing fraud.

In support of the committal application, the requesting state submitted a record of the case containing a summary of evidence gathered in both the US and Canada.

The respondent objected to the Canadian-gathered evidence as inadmissible hearsay under s. 32(2) of the Extradition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that ss. 32(2) and 33(1) provide a modified approach to the hearsay rule in the extradition context, allowing Canadian-gathered evidence to be presented in summary form provided its contents would otherwise be admissible under Canadian law.

The appeal was allowed and the committal and surrender orders were restored.

The CRTC ordered telecommunications carriers to create deferral accounts from urban residential telephone service revenues.

It later directed that these funds be used to improve accessibility for persons with disabilities, expand broadband coverage, and distribute remaining amounts to subscribers as credits.

Bell Canada, TELUS, and consumer groups appealed the CRTC's authority to make these allocations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the CRTC's creation and use of the deferral accounts was a reasonable exercise of its rate-setting authority under the Telecommunications Act, which requires it to balance the interests of consumers, carriers, and competitors while implementing national telecommunications policy objectives.

Appeal from Ontario pension litigation concerning whether an employer could charge plan administration expenses to a pension trust fund, take contribution holidays in a defined benefit component, and use actuarial surplus from that component to satisfy contribution obligations for a newly added defined contribution component.

The majority held that reasonableness review applied to the Financial Services Tribunal's determinations, upheld the finding that most plan expenses were payable from the fund, and confirmed that the defined benefit contribution holidays were permitted under the plan text.

The majority further held that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to permit defined contribution holidays once retroactive amendments designated defined contribution members as beneficiaries of the same trust.

The Tribunal lacked authority to order costs from the fund because the fund was not a party, and the courts properly declined to award the appellants' costs from the fund because the litigation was adversarial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The trial judge instructed the jury on reasonable doubt using the Lifchus model.

During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification on the difference between absolute certainty and balance of probabilities.

The trial judge repeated the original charge verbatim and stated that further explanation would lead to confusion.

The accused was convicted, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a responsive answer to the jury's question and by discouraging further questions, which raised a concern that the verdict was not based on a proper understanding of the standard of proof.

The appellant challenged firearms convictions arising from a street encounter with police, alleging arbitrary detention and breach of the right to counsel before he disclosed possession of a firearm.

The Court held that a psychological detention had crystallized during the encounter, that the detention was arbitrary under s. 9, and that the failure to advise of counsel breached s. 10(b).

The Court reformulated the legal framework for detention and established a revised three-part approach to exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), ultimately admitting the firearm because the police conduct, though unconstitutional, was not egregious and the evidence was highly reliable and essential.

The Court also held that simple movement of a firearm from place to place did not constitute a 'transfer' for the purpose of the weapons trafficking offence, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving and driving 'over 80'.

The arresting officer observed erratic driving and physical signs of impairment, and made a breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the officer lacked objective reasonable grounds for the demand, and acquitted the appellant.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal, but the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the application of the legal standard of reasonable and probable grounds to the facts is a question of law, and that the officer had ample objective evidence to support his subjective belief of impairment.

The appellant was driving a rented SUV when he was pulled over by a police officer who mistakenly believed the vehicle required a front licence plate.

Despite realizing his error, the officer continued the detention, discovered the appellant's licence was suspended, arrested him, and searched the vehicle, finding 35 kg of cocaine.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the revised s. 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant.

The Court held that the police conduct was a brazen and flagrant disregard for Charter rights, aggravated by misleading testimony, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store.

The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions.

After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant transit authorities refused to post the respondents' political advertisements on the sides of their buses, citing policies that permitted commercial but not political advertising.

The respondents challenged the policies under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transit authorities are government entities subject to the Charter.

The Court found that the sides of buses are public places where expressive activity is protected, and the policies infringed the respondents' freedom of expression.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter because the blanket ban on political advertising did not minimally impair the right.

The policies were declared of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

A 14-year-old Jehovah's Witness was apprehended by child protection services after refusing a potentially life-saving blood transfusion.

The applications judge ordered the transfusion under s. 25(8) of the Child and Family Services Act, which allows a court to authorize treatment in the best interests of a child under 16.

The adolescent appealed, arguing the legislation violated her Charter rights by irrebuttably presuming she lacked capacity to make medical decisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislation is constitutional when the 'best interests' standard is interpreted as a sliding scale that gives increasingly determinative weight to the young person's views depending on their maturity.

The employer, Camvrac, defaulted on a line of credit with the Caisse.

The Caisse exercised its right of compensation on Camvrac's term deposit pursuant to an agreement.

The Crown sought to collect unremitted source deductions from the proceeds of the term deposit, arguing that the compensation agreement created a 'security interest' under s. 224(1.3) of the Income Tax Act, making the property subject to a deemed trust in favour of the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the agreement did create a security interest, and the proceeds of the term deposit were subject to the Crown's deemed trust.

The accused were convicted of first degree murder and manslaughter following a shooting related to a drug debt.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and an out-of-court statement made by the deceased shortly before his death expressing fear of one of the accused.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial based on errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, reasonable doubt, and the limiting instruction for the hearsay statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding that the jury instructions on the burden of proof were adequate when read as a whole and that the deceased's statement was properly admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to establish his fear and rebut the defence's theory of alternative suspects.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder following a third trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of prior consistent statements admitted during the re-examination of a key Crown witness.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, because the statements had no probative value and did not bolster the witness's reliability, no limiting instruction was required.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault and other offences.

Due to late disclosure of forensic evidence by the Crown and subsequent scheduling delays, the trial was set for 30 months after the charges were laid.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, but the Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the stay, finding that the delay far exceeded the Morin guidelines, was largely attributable to the Crown, and caused prejudice to the appellant.

The accused was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after the victim identified him as the attacker.

At trial, the lead investigating police officer testified for the Crown, providing a narrative of the investigation that included hearsay and his personal opinion that the accused was guilty.

The trial judge failed to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding the permissible use of this investigative hearsay and opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions due to this error.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, it was harmless in the context of the trial and caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was sentenced to a 90-day intermittent sentence for assault causing bodily harm, and two concurrent 18-month conditional sentences for uttering a death threat and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal held the intermittent sentence was legal but had to be served on consecutive days.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is not a 'sentence of imprisonment' within the meaning of s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore does not render an intermittent sentence illegal or require it to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant, acting as a licensed customs broker, overpaid $2,937,123 in GST due to errors.

The appellant did not collect the overpayments from its customers but deducted the amounts from its own GST liability.

The Minister of National Revenue disallowed these deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was entitled to a rebate under s. 261(1) of the Excise Tax Act because it was the person who actually paid the amount in error, and the Minister was obliged to apply the rebate against the appellant's net tax pursuant to s. 296(2.1).

The Crown appealed a majority decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that overturned the respondent's convictions for first degree murder, aggravated sexual assault, and kidnapping.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal as of right, and the Crown brought a cross-motion for leave to appeal the refusal of the majority to apply the curative proviso.

The respondent withdrew the motion to quash.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is unnecessary for the Crown to seek leave to appeal the application of the curative proviso, as the provisions for taking account of the severity of errors are always intertwined with any error of law considered by the Court.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed as unnecessary.

The police suspected the appellant of operating an ecstasy lab and seized bags of garbage he had placed for collection at the rear of his property adjacent to a public alleyway.

Evidence from the garbage was used to obtain a search warrant for his home, leading to drug charges.

The appellant argued the taking of his garbage violated his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant had abandoned his privacy interest in the garbage when he placed it for collection at the edge of his property, accessible to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.