Louise Charron

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and detained in a mental health facility, sought an absolute discharge and treatment orders as remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a new approach for determining whether an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1).

The Court held that the Ontario Review Board has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because it has the authority to decide questions of law.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific remedies sought by the appellant—an absolute discharge for a dangerous patient and a treatment order—were expressly precluded by the Board's statutory scheme under the Criminal Code.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

A confession made to police was ruled inadmissible at trial due to an improper inducement.

However, an e-mail sent by the accused to his former wife containing a second apology was admitted without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge should have held a voir dire on his own motion to determine if the e-mail was a derived confession or made to a person in authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a voir dire on his own motion, as the former wife was not a person in authority and there was no obvious connection between the police inducement and the subsequent e-mail to trigger the derived confessions rule, especially given defence counsel's consent to its admission.

The appellant, a Russian corporation, sought to enforce a foreign arbitral award against the respondent, an Alberta corporation, in Alberta.

The application was brought more than three years after the award was rendered.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards permits the application of local limitation periods.

In Alberta, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is subject to the general two-year limitation period under s. 3 of the Limitations Act, not the 10-year period for judgments under s. 11.

Consequently, the appellant's application was time-barred and the appeal was dismissed.

Appeal concerning whether a mining project in the James Bay Territory, approved under the environmental assessment regime in a modern treaty, was nevertheless subject to a further federal environmental assessment before a fisheries authorization could issue.

The majority held that the treaty is protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, but does not exclude the operation of federal laws of general application requiring CEAA compliance before issuance of a Fisheries Act permit.

The treaty's single-review provision governed internal treaty review processes only and did not eliminate the proponent's obligation to obtain necessary post-approval federal permits.

The Court varied the Court of Appeal's order to confirm that any fisheries authorization must comply with CEAA procedures and the Crown's duty to consult.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed the accused admitted to wiping down the crime scene to remove DNA.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but failed to mention the informant's potential motives to lie, such as a reward and pending charges.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial due to the inadequate warning.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the accused sought to introduce fresh DNA evidence showing his DNA on additional items in the room, contradicting the wiping down theory.

The Supreme Court admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the jury's assessment of the informant's credibility, and dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the order for a new trial.

The appellants, a newspaper and its journalists, received an allegedly forged document from a confidential source implicating the Prime Minister in a conflict of interest.

The police obtained a search warrant and assistance order to seize the document and its envelope to identify the source through forensic testing.

The appellants challenged the warrant, claiming a constitutional or common law journalist-source privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 2(b) of the Charter does not provide a blanket constitutional immunity for journalists, a case-by-case privilege may be established using the Wigmore criteria.

On the facts, the public interest in investigating the serious crime of forgery outweighed the public interest in protecting the confidential source.

The search warrant and assistance order were upheld as reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellant municipality abolished its business occupancy tax and restructured its property tax system.

The respondent federal Crown corporations, which previously made payments in lieu of property taxes but not business taxes, deducted an amount equivalent to the abolished business tax from their payments in lieu of taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents' decisions were unreasonable because they based their calculations on a fictitious tax system rather than the one actually in place.

The Court also found that the port authority's silos were not 'reservoirs' exempt from the calculation.

The appellant was charged with kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first degree murder as a party to the offences committed by a co-accused.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding he lacked the requisite knowledge of the co-accused's intention to commit the crimes.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that wilful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge and that the trial judge's failure to consider it constituted a legal error necessitating a new trial.

The accused was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first-degree murder.

At trial, the judge rejected the accused's testimony, citing his 'very great motive to be untruthful' to secure an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding this undermined the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while such language is concerning in isolation, the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole in the context of a trial where the accused challenged every witness's credibility based on their motives to lie, did not rely on an impermissible assumption.

The appellants alleged they were physically and sexually abused while residing in a privately operated children's home between 1928 and 1976.

The Lieutenant Governor in Council referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the Province owed duties to the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Province owed no duty of care, non-delegable duty, vicarious liability, or fiduciary duty to the children, as the home was privately operated and the Province had no statutory authority or control over its management.

The respondent, a criminal defence lawyer, sought to withdraw as counsel of record for an accused after his legal aid funding was suspended.

The Territorial Court refused her application to withdraw.

The Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory dismissed her application for certiorari.

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, finding the Territorial Court had no discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a court has the inherent or necessarily implied jurisdiction to refuse counsel's request to withdraw for non-payment of fees if allowing withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the jury's rejection of his insanity defence was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the case from Molodowic.

The Court held that the jury was faced with conflicting expert evidence, statements from the appellant, and circumstantial evidence that could reasonably be interpreted as showing he knew his acts were morally wrong.

The jury's finding that the appellant had not made out his defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code was not unreasonable.

The accused was convicted of possession of child pornography after police searched his computer pursuant to a warrant.

The warrant was obtained based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) sworn by a police officer after a computer technician reported seeing suspicious bookmarks and a webcam pointed at a child's play area.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the ITO, which contained misleading and incomplete information, failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused possessed child pornography.

The Court distinguished between the offences of accessing and possessing child pornography, holding that possession requires control over the underlying data files, not merely viewing images online.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and an acquittal was entered.

During a drug trafficking investigation, police discovered a loaded firearm in a hidden compartment of the respondent's vehicle while installing listening devices.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), leading to a conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision and excluded the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis was entitled to deference and that applying the Grant framework supported admitting the evidence.

The accused was subjected to excessive force by police during his arrest for impaired driving and flight from police, resulting in broken ribs and a punctured lung.

The trial judge found breaches of the accused's Charter rights and reduced his sentences to conditional discharges under s. 24(1).

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of excessive force but substituted the mandatory minimum fine for the impaired driving offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that while state misconduct can be considered in sentencing, a sentence cannot be reduced below a statutory minimum absent a constitutional challenge to the minimum itself.

During a bitter strike at the Giant Mine, a striking miner evaded security, entered the mine, and planted a bomb that killed nine replacement miners.

The surviving family members and a first responder sued the mine's security firm, the territorial government, and the national union in negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the security firm and the government owed a duty of care to the miners, they did not breach the standard of care.

The Court also held that the national union and local union were separate legal entities, and the national union was not directly or vicariously liable for the criminal acts of the striking members.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Province of British Columbia issued a request for proposals (RFP) for the construction of a highway, restricting eligible bidders to six proponents.

The Province accepted a bid from an ineligible joint venture involving one of the eligible proponents and an ineligible third party.

The unsuccessful eligible bidder, the appellant, sued for breach of contract.

The Province relied on an exclusion clause in the RFP that barred claims for compensation as a result of participating in the RFP.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Province breached the tendering contract by accepting an ineligible bid.

The Court laid to rest the doctrine of fundamental breach and established a three-part test for exclusion clauses.

Applying the test, the majority found that the exclusion clause did not apply to the Province's conduct, as the appellant's claim arose from the Province's dealings with an ineligible bidder, not from the appellant's participation in the RFP process.