Louise Charron

The government of British Columbia sought the British Columbia Utilities Commission's approval of a 2007 Energy Purchase Agreement between BC Hydro and Alcan.

The respondent First Nations asserted that the agreement should be subject to consultation under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, due to historical and ongoing impacts of the dam project on the Nechako River.

The Commission found it had jurisdiction to consider consultation but concluded the agreement would not adversely affect any Aboriginal interest, thus no duty to consult arose.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the Commission's decision, holding that while the Commission had the power to assess the adequacy of consultation, its finding that the agreement caused no novel adverse impacts was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a judge and jury.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could consider his post-offence conduct as consistent with a pre-existing plan and intention to kill.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, were fair, balanced, and accurate regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellant newspaper appealed orders compelling its journalist to answer questions that could reveal a confidential source, and a publication ban on reporting settlement negotiations in the Sponsorship Scandal litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no class-based constitutional privilege exists for journalists, the common law Wigmore framework applies in Quebec civil proceedings to determine journalist-source privilege on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also quashed the publication ban, finding it was improperly issued without notice and failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test, as the media was not bound by the parties' confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant sought recognition in Quebec of an English judgment ordering the Republic of Iraq to pay costs arising from litigation over aircraft seized during the invasion of Kuwait.

Iraq claimed state immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Act applies to applications for recognition of foreign judgments, Iraq's conduct in controlling the defence of its state-owned airline in the English commercial litigation fell within the commercial activity exception.

The Court allowed the appeal and permitted the application for recognition to proceed.

The respondents built an aerodrome on land zoned as agricultural in Quebec without obtaining prior authorization from the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec.

The Commission ordered the land restored to its original state pursuant to provincial agricultural zoning legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provincial legislation is valid as relating to land use planning and agriculture, it is constitutionally inapplicable to aerodromes under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because it impairs the core of the federal power over aeronautics.

The respondents operated a commercial float plane business on a lake in a municipality.

The municipality amended its zoning by-law to prohibit aerodromes on that lake, while permitting them on another lake.

The municipality sought an injunction to stop the respondents' aviation activities.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-law amendment was ultra vires the province because its pith and substance was the regulation of aeronautics, an exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the amendment was not saved by the ancillary powers doctrine because it was not rationally and functionally connected to the broader, valid municipal zoning scheme.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested for multiple assaults and asserted his right to counsel.

After failing to reach his lawyer of choice, he consulted with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

During the subsequent police interrogation, he repeatedly requested to speak with a lawyer and have one present, but the police denied these requests and continued questioning until he confessed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 10(b) of the Charter does not require the presence of counsel during an interrogation, nor does it require police to provide further opportunities to consult counsel absent a change in circumstances.

The appellant was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

After an unsuccessful attempt to contact his preferred lawyer, he spoke with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

He subsequently provided an incriminating statement to the police.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police did not breach the appellant's right to counsel, as he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and voluntarily chose to speak with duty counsel.

The appellant was arrested for murder, advised of his right to counsel, and spoke with his lawyer twice before being interviewed by police.

During the five-hour interview, the appellant repeatedly stated he had nothing to say and wished to speak to his lawyer again.

The police refused further consultation and continued questioning, eventually obtaining a confession.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 10(b) of the Charter does not mandate the presence of counsel throughout an interrogation, nor does it require police to provide multiple opportunities to consult counsel unless there are changed circumstances, such as new procedures, a change in jeopardy, or reason to believe the detainee did not understand their rights.

As no such circumstances existed, the appeal was dismissed.

The employer sold a division of its business, resulting in the transfer of employees to a new company.

The transferred employees were removed from the employer's defined benefit pension plan and incorporated into a new successor plan.

At the time of the transfer, the employer's pension plan had a significant projected actuarial surplus.

The employer transferred enough funds to cover the transferred employees' defined benefits but did not transfer any surplus funds.

The transferred employees argued the employer breached its fiduciary duty of even-handedness by not transferring a portion of the surplus and by improperly charging plan administration expenses to the fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the pension plan documentation allowed the employer to charge administration expenses to the fund and that the transferred employees had no equitable interest in the actuarial surplus, meaning the employer's obligations were satisfied by assuring their defined benefits.

The insured, a general contractor, was sued for negligence and breach of contract after water damage caused rot and deterioration in several housing complexes it built.

The insured sought a declaration that its insurer owed a duty to defend under its commercial general liability policies.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurer owed a duty to defend, finding that the pleadings revealed a possibility of coverage.

The Court clarified that 'property damage' is not limited to third-party property and that defective workmanship can constitute an 'accident' if the resulting damage was neither expected nor intended by the insured.

Furthermore, the 'work performed' exclusions did not clearly and unambiguously exclude the claims, particularly given the involvement of subcontractors.

The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.

The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.

Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence using an unannounced 'dynamic entry' by a tactical team.

The appellant argued the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because the police used excessive force, failed to knock and announce, and did not have the warrant on their person upon entry.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police had reasonable grounds to depart from the knock and announce principle due to concerns about officer safety and the destruction of evidence.

The Court also found that s. 29(1) of the Criminal Code was satisfied because the lead investigator, who arrived shortly after the tactical team, had the warrant in his possession.

The union filed a grievance against a decision not to renew the contract of a university professor, arguing it amounted to a dismissal without good and sufficient cause under the collective agreement and s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found the collective agreement established an equivalent remedial procedure and ordered the parties to proceed under it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the collective agreement's provisions regarding dismissal were sufficiently clear and provided an equivalent procedure to s. 124, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction to hear the grievance without incorporating the statutory provision.

The union filed a grievance against the Cégep's decision to withdraw employment priority from a teacher, alleging it constituted dismissal without good and sufficient cause under s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found she lacked jurisdiction to apply s. 124 as the collective agreement did not provide an equivalent remedial procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 124 is not implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, and where an agreement lacks adequate protection, the Commission des relations du travail has exclusive jurisdiction.

The appellant union filed grievances on behalf of two employees (one casual, one probationary) who were dismissed.

The collective agreement denied them access to the grievance procedure for dismissals.

The union argued that the public order standard in s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards, which prohibits dismissal without good and sufficient cause after two years of service, was implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the standard is not implicitly incorporated, the public order nature of the Act renders the collective agreement clauses denying arbitration absolutely null.

Consequently, the grievance arbitrator has jurisdiction to hear the complaints and provide a recourse equivalent to that of the Commission des relations du travail.

The respondent was mistakenly identified as a suspect, arrested, strip-searched, and his vehicle was seized.

The trial judge found breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights and awarded damages under s. 24(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada established a four-step framework for awarding Charter damages: (1) proof of breach, (2) functional justification (compensation, vindication, deterrence), (3) absence of countervailing factors, and (4) quantum assessment.

The Court upheld the $5,000 damage award for the strip search but set aside the $100 award for the vehicle seizure, finding a declaration sufficient for the latter.

The appellant appealed convictions for child luring arising from sexually explicit computer communications with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old.

The central issue was the interaction between the presumption in s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code and the reasonable steps requirement in s. 172.1(4).

The Court held that where an interlocutor is represented as underage, the accused is presumed to believe that representation unless rebutted by evidence that includes reasonable steps taken to ascertain age.

Because the appellant took no reasonable steps despite repeated assertions that the interlocutor was 13, the Court upheld the substituted convictions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants were stopped in a commercial truck during a random roadside check.

The police officer discovered regulatory violations and, during a search of the cab for documents, found $115,000 in a duffle bag.

The appellants were arrested for possession of proceeds of crime.

A subsequent search of the trailer revealed 392 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the initial stop and regulatory search were lawful and did not violate the Charter.

The arrest was based on reasonable and probable grounds, and the search of the trailer was a valid search incidental to arrest.

Although a later inventory search violated section 8, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.