Louise Charron

The appellant challenged his sexual assault convictions on the basis that provisions permitting child witnesses to testify behind a screen and presuming the testimonial competence of witnesses under 14 infringed ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The appeal arose from convictions involving two child complainants who testified under protective measures.

The Court, in a brief oral judgment, adopted the reasons of the court below and dismissed the appeal.

The constitutional challenge failed and the convictions were upheld.

The respondent, an Ontario police constable, travelled to New York City after September 11, 2001, to assist with search and rescue efforts.

The appellant newspaper published articles alleging he misrepresented himself to authorities and interfered with rescue operations.

The respondent sued for defamation.

At trial, the appellants pleaded qualified privilege but not the English defence of responsible journalism.

The jury found for the respondent.

The Court of Appeal recognized a new responsible journalism defence but denied the appellants its protection because they had not pleaded it at trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the appellants should have the opportunity to avail themselves of the newly recognized defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

The appellants brought a defamation action against the respondent newspaper and reporter over an article concerning a proposed private golf course development and alleged political influence.

At trial, the jury found for the appellants and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, recognizing a new defence of responsible journalism.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, formally recognizing the new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

The Court held that the traditional strict liability regime for defamatory statements of fact failed to adequately protect freedom of expression under the Charter.

The new defence applies where the publication is on a matter of public interest and the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations.

A new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to leave this defence to the jury and errors in the fair comment instruction.

The accused was charged with first degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault.

The trial judge found an air of reality to the defence of abandonment and convicted the accused of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that the evidence was incapable of supporting the defence of abandonment.

The Court set aside the manslaughter conviction and entered a conviction for first degree murder, as the facts found by the trial judge clearly established a planned and deliberate murder involving unlawful confinement.

The insured engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse and contracted genital herpes, which led to transverse myelitis and resulted in paraplegia.

He claimed compensation under his group accident insurance policy, which covered bodily injuries occasioned solely through external, violent and accidental means.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the injury was the result of a disease contracted in the ordinary course of events.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the transmission of a disease through normal sexual intercourse is not an accident within the ordinary meaning of the term, and therefore the resulting paralysis was not covered by the policy.

The appellant was charged with hybrid offences more than six months after the alleged conduct.

The Crown elected to proceed summarily, but upon discovering the limitation period had expired, sought to re-elect to proceed by indictment.

The trial judge declared the information a nullity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that while the six-month limitation period applies when the Crown elects to proceed summarily, the failure of the accused to consent to out-of-time summary proceedings renders the Crown's initial election a nullity.

The original information remains valid, allowing the Crown to proceed by indictment absent an abuse of process.

The accused was arrested without a warrant and found in possession of crack cocaine.

The arresting officer did not investigate the accused's claim of mistaken identity at the time of the arrest.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the officer lacked objective grounds for the arrest and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not impose a more onerous standard for reasonable grounds under s. 495 of the Criminal Code, but rather based her conclusion on the inconsistent and contradictory evidence of the arresting officer.

The appellant engaged in sexually explicit online chats with a 12-year-old girl, believing her to be 13 or 14.

He was acquitted at trial of luring a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the trial judge found he did not intend to meet the complainant or carry out the secondary offence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence is an inchoate crime that does not require an intention to meet the victim or commit the secondary offence, but only the specific purpose of facilitating its commission.

The appellants were employees at a Wal-Mart store that closed shortly after a union was certified and an arbitrator was appointed to resolve collective agreement differences.

The employees filed complaints under the Labour Code alleging they were dismissed due to union activities and sought reinstatement.

The Commission des relations du travail initially found the employer failed to prove the closure was definitive, but in a companion case, it was established that the store was permanently closed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that since the store was permanently closed, reinstatement was impossible and the substratum of the claim no longer existed.

The appellant's union was certified to represent employees at a Wal-Mart store in Jonquière.

On the day the Minister of Labour referred the dispute over a first collective agreement to arbitration, Wal-Mart announced the store's closure.

The appellant filed a complaint under ss. 15 to 17 of the Quebec Labour Code, claiming he lost his employment due to union activities and seeking reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedural vehicle and statutory presumption under ss. 15 to 17 are not available where a workplace no longer exists.

A definitive business closure constitutes 'good and sufficient reason' for dismissal under s. 17, and any remedy for a closure motivated by anti-union animus must be sought under the unfair labour practice provisions in ss. 12 to 14.

The appellant, a freight forwarding company with branches across Canada, consolidates and deconsolidates freight but contracts with third-party carriers for interprovincial transport.

A union applied to the Alberta Labour Relations Board for a declaration that the company's labour relations were subject to federal jurisdiction.

The Board and the Court of Appeal held the company was a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that because the company does not itself perform interprovincial carriage of goods, it remains a local undertaking subject to provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The accused were charged with corruption, fraud, and breach of trust.

The Crown objected to disclosing unredacted documents, claiming informer privilege, and sought an ex parte, in camera hearing.

The trial judge allowed defence counsel to attend the hearing subject to undertakings.

The Crown appealed under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge's decision was a disclosure order subject to appeal, and that the trial judge erred in permitting defence counsel to attend the hearing, as doing so would inevitably reveal information protected by the informer privilege.

The respondents were charged with sexual assault based on allegations by three children.

The charges were stayed by the appellant Crown prosecutor, and the children later recanted.

The respondents sued the prosecutor for malicious prosecution.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal found the prosecutor liable, concluding his lack of subjective belief in the probable guilt of the respondents was sufficient to ground a finding of malice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that malice requires proof of an improper purpose.

A prosecutor's lack of subjective belief in reasonable and probable cause does not equate to malice and does not dispense with the requirement to prove an improper purpose.

The appellant, a U.S. corporation, submitted a bid for a military procurement contract.

When another bidder was awarded the contract, the appellant filed a complaint with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) alleging violations of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT).

The CITT ruled the appellant had standing, but the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-Canadian suppliers do not have standing before the CITT to bring a complaint under the AIT, as the AIT is a domestic free trade agreement and its procurement provisions apply only to Canadian suppliers.

The respondent, a bookkeeper, made voluntary cash advances to her employer, a law firm experiencing financial difficulties.

The law firm also provided limited legal services to the respondent.

When the firm went bankrupt, the respondent sued for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, but the Court of Appeal found an ad hoc fiduciary duty based on a power-dependency relationship.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an ad hoc fiduciary duty requires an undertaking by the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the other party, which was absent here.

The Court also found no breach of duty arising from the limited solicitor-client relationship.

The Quebec legislature amended the Charter of the French language to disregard periods of attendance at unsubsidized English-language private schools and instruction received pursuant to special authorizations when determining eligibility for publicly funded English-language instruction.

The respondents challenged these amendments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that paragraphs 2 and 3 of s. 73 of the Charter of the French language infringe the minority language educational rights guaranteed by s. 23(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the absolute prohibition on considering such instruction creates a fictitious educational pathway, preventing the required global qualitative assessment.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as the measures were not minimally impairing.

The appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed, and the provisions were declared unconstitutional, with the declaration suspended for one year.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent on a charge of first degree murder.

The extradition judge committed the respondent for second degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first degree murder under Canadian law.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the respondent's surrender for the American offence of first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal quashed the surrender order, applying the 'misalignment test' to find it unreasonable to surrender the respondent for first degree murder without evidence of premeditation at the committal hearing.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Minister's surrender order, holding that the 'misalignment test' is incompatible with the conduct-based approach to double criminality, the principle of comity, and the role of the extradition judge.

The accused was charged with multiple counts arising from two separate sexual assaults committed against different complainants approximately one month apart.

The trial judge denied the accused's pre-trial application to sever the counts.

The accused was convicted on all charges, and the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to properly balance the relevant factors for severance.

The Court held that the significant risk of prejudice to the accused, including the dangers of credibility cross-pollination and prohibited propensity reasoning, clearly outweighed any minimal benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together.

The appellant applied for authorization to institute a class action against the municipality, alleging that property tax increases exceeded the statutory 5% ceiling.

He sought a declaration that the tax by-laws were inconsistent with the municipal charter and a refund of the overpayments.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the lower courts' refusal to authorize the class action, finding that the facts alleged did not justify the conclusions sought, as a simple declaration of inconsistency without quashing the by-laws could not legally ground a claim for a tax refund.

The appellants sought authorization to institute class actions to quash municipal by-laws imposing property and business taxes and to obtain a refund of taxes paid.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that a class action is not an appropriate procedure for seeking to quash a municipal by-law.

The Court found that a declaration of nullity would apply to all ratepayers, making a class action unnecessary, and that the conclusions sought regarding tax refunds were unenforceable as they would require a recalculation of taxes rather than an immediate right to a refund.