Louise Charron

The appellant obtained import permits from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to import wheat.

The permits were revoked while the cargo was en route, and a new permit with different conditions was issued, causing the appellant to incur additional costs.

The appellant brought an action for damages in the Federal Court without first seeking judicial review of the licensing decisions.

The Crown successfully moved to strike the claim on the basis that judicial review was a prerequisite.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its companion decision in TeleZone, holding that the Federal Court has concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages against the Crown and that a prior successful judicial review application is not required.

The respondent, a prison inmate, spent over four years in solitary confinement.

He brought an action for damages in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the federal Crown and a prison warden, alleging arbitrary detention and cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Charter.

The appellants argued that the claim was a collateral attack on the segregation orders and that the respondent must first seek judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its concurrent decision in TeleZone, held that the Federal Courts Act does not grant the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over such damages claims, and the provincial superior court has jurisdiction to hear the action without prior judicial review.

The respondent, TeleZone Inc., brought an action for damages against the federal Crown in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice after its application for a telecommunications licence was rejected by Industry Canada.

The Attorney General of Canada challenged the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, arguing that based on the Grenier principle, the claim was a collateral attack on the Minister's decision and that TeleZone had to first seek judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, overruling Grenier.

The Court held that the Federal Courts Act and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act grant concurrent jurisdiction to provincial superior courts to hear damages claims against the federal Crown, and there is no requirement to first quash the underlying administrative decision via judicial review in the Federal Court.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which held that several provisions of the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act were ultra vires Parliament.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part.

A majority of the Court found that the provisions regulating controlled activities (such as clinical practice and research) exceeded Parliament's criminal law power and intruded into provincial jurisdiction over health and property and civil rights.

However, provisions prohibiting specific negative practices, such as the use of reproductive material without consent, were upheld as valid criminal law.

The debtor company commenced CCAA proceedings and obtained a stay.

It owed unremitted GST to the Crown.

The ETA creates a deemed trust for unremitted GST, but the CCAA nullifies statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown.

The chambers judge ordered the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account.

When reorganization failed, the debtor sought to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

The Crown sought immediate payment of the GST funds.

The Supreme Court held that the CCAA rule prevails, meaning the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor for GST claims during CCAA proceedings.

The Court also held that the chambers judge had the discretion to partially lift the stay to allow the assignment in bankruptcy, and that no express trust was created by segregating the funds.

The appellant entered his estranged wife's apartment uninvited and discovered her in bed with her new boyfriend.

The appellant attacked them both, repeatedly stabbing and killing the boyfriend.

At trial, the judge accepted the defence of provocation and convicted the appellant of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the manslaughter conviction and substituted a conviction for second degree murder, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the discovery of an estranged spouse's involvement with another person does not constitute an 'insult' within the meaning of section 232 of the Criminal Code, nor did the appellant's actions meet the requirement of suddenness.

The appellant, a Convention refugee in Canada, was sought for extradition by Romania to serve a prison sentence for forging visas.

The Minister of Justice ordered his surrender, applying a test that required the appellant to prove he would face persecution that shocks the conscience.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its concurrent decision in Németh v. Canada (Justice).

The Court held that the Minister applied the wrong legal principles because the appellant's refugee status had not been revoked, and the Minister should have considered section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act rather than requiring the appellant to prove persecution under section 44(1)(a).

The matter was remitted to the Minister for reconsideration.

The appellants, recognized as Convention refugees in Canada due to persecution in Hungary based on their Roma ethnic origin, were sought for extradition by Hungary on fraud charges.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding they had not established a continuing risk of persecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Minister has the authority to extradite a refugee, the Minister erred by placing the burden on the refugees to prove they would face persecution if returned.

The Court ruled that under section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, a recognized refugee is presumed to face prejudice, and the burden is on the state to show the person is no longer entitled to refugee protection.

The police suspected the accused of operating a marijuana grow operation and requested the electric utility company to install a digital recording ammeter (DRA) on the power line to his home without a warrant.

The DRA data showed a cyclical pattern of electricity use consistent with a grow operation, which the police used to obtain a search warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DRA data, given the nature of the information revealed and the regulatory scheme permitting the utility to disclose customer information to police.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation entered into a modern comprehensive land claims agreement with the federal and territorial governments.

Under the treaty, members have a right of access for hunting and fishing for subsistence in their traditional territory.

A non-Aboriginal resident applied for an agricultural land grant within this territory, which was approved by the territorial government.

The First Nation sought judicial review, arguing the government failed to consult and accommodate them.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a duty to consult Aboriginal peoples before making decisions that might adversely affect their treaty rights, even in the context of a modern comprehensive land claims agreement.

However, on the facts of this case, the duty to consult was at the lower end of the spectrum and was discharged by the government.

There was no duty to accommodate.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, was granted court-appointed counsel under s. 694.1 of the Criminal Code for proceedings in the Supreme Court of Canada and incidental proceedings in the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The parties disagreed on the hourly rate to be paid by the Attorney General.

The Crown argued for the provincial legal aid tariff, while counsel sought higher rates based on their experience and the complexity of the case.

The Supreme Court held that the legal aid tariff is not conclusive, and the determination should be based on a broader assessment of what is fair and reasonable.

The Court fixed the rates at $225 per hour for senior counsel and $175 per hour for junior counsel.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

He argued that the majority of the Court of Appeal applied the incorrect standard of review, erred regarding the admissibility of footprint evidence, and erred in finding the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard from W. (D.).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdict was reasonable, there was no basis to intervene on the evidentiary issue, and the trial judge did not err in applying the reasonable doubt standard to the whole of the evidence.

The appellants brought a civil liability action against the succession of a man who murdered his former spouse and their two children before committing suicide.

The trial judge awarded personal damages for solatium doloris but dismissed the successions' claims for compensatory and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that punitive damages under s. 49 of the Quebec Charter are autonomous and can be awarded even without compensatory damages.

The Court also held that the death of the wrongdoer does not preclude an award of punitive damages, as they serve a denunciatory purpose.

The Court awarded $10,000 in exemplary damages to the victims' successions.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the conduct of a police officer constituted entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the brief conversation between the police officer and the appellant did not ground a finding of entrapment.

The Court noted that the appellant was not induced to commit a crime but was already engaged in criminal activities when he allowed the officer to witness a drug transaction.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal on three counts of sexual assault and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the objective test for sexual assault.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal properly exercised its power under section 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to substitute a conviction, as the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature and the appellant would necessarily have been convicted but for the trial judge's error of law.

The debtor executed a General Security Agreement with the respondent credit union covering present and after-acquired property, but the credit union did not immediately register its interest under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The debtor subsequently granted a Bank Act security interest to the appellant bank, which was registered.

The debtor later acquired additional property, to which both security interests attached simultaneously.

When the debtor defaulted, the bank seized and sold the after-acquired property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank's security interest was subject to the credit union's prior unregistered PPSA interest.

Under the Bank Act, the bank could acquire no greater interest than the debtor held at the time the security was given.

Because the credit union had already acquired an inchoate proprietary interest in the after-acquired property upon execution of its security agreement, the debtor's title was already encumbered when the bank took its security.

The Bank of Montreal appealed a decision granting priority to Innovation Credit Union's prior unregistered security interest under the Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act over the Bank's subsequently acquired and registered Bank Act security interest in the same farm equipment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Bank Act, the Bank could acquire no greater interest in the collateral than the debtor had at the time the security was taken.

Because the debtor had already conveyed a statutory interest analogous to a fixed charge to the Credit Union, the Bank took its security interest subject to that prior interest, regardless of the fact that the Credit Union's interest was unperfected.

The appellant union applied to the Canada Industrial Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the employees of a children's aid society providing services to Aboriginal families in Toronto.

The agency challenged the application, arguing its labour relations fell under exclusive provincial authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential function of the agency is to deliver child welfare services, which is a provincial function.

The presumption of provincial jurisdiction over labour relations was not displaced by the Aboriginal aspects of the agency's operations.

The appellant, an Aboriginal child welfare agency, provides services to Aboriginal children and families in British Columbia.

The respondent union applied to the provincial Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the appellant's employees.

The appellant objected, arguing its labour relations fell within federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the essential nature of the appellant's operation is the provision of child welfare services, a provincial matter.

Applying the functional test, the Court concluded that the appellant is a provincial undertaking and its labour relations are subject to provincial jurisdiction.

The appellant filed a civil liability action for sexual assault more than 25 years after the alleged assault occurred.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was prescribed, and the Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal that the issue of when prescription started to run raised questions of fact that could not be resolved on the face of the record.

The case was remanded to the Quebec Superior Court to assess the evidence.