Louise Charron

The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes.

The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability.

Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims.

The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability.

Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a planned robbery and relied on this to infer the accused's presence at the crime scene.

The Court of Appeal partially based its decision on R. v. Beaudry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The majority held that Beaudry does not apply to mistakes as to the substance of evidence, which are governed by R. v. Lohrer.

Furthermore, the majority found the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, as she did not rely on the existence of a planned robbery to infer the accused's presence at the scene.

The appellant, a status Indian living part-time off-reserve, earned interest income on term deposits at a caisse populaire located on a reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the income and refused to apply the tax exemption under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Applying the connecting factors approach from Bastien Estate, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the interest income was situated on a reserve because the contract was entered into on a reserve with an institution carrying on business there, and the income was payable there.

The appeal was allowed, and the income was declared exempt from taxation.

The appellant, a status Indian, earned interest income on term deposits at a caisse populaire located on a reserve.

The Minister of National Revenue assessed the income as taxable, and the lower courts upheld the assessment on the basis that the caisse generated its revenues in the 'commercial mainstream' off the reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the connecting factors approach from Williams.

The Court held that the location of the debtor, the place of payment, the residence of the payee, and the source of the invested capital all pointed to the reserve.

The fact that the financial institution generated its revenues in the commercial mainstream was legally irrelevant to the location of the appellant's interest income.

The income was therefore exempt from taxation under section 87 of the Indian Act.

The claimants, who were members of a Métis settlement in Alberta, registered as status Indians to obtain medical benefits.

Consequently, their membership in the Métis settlement was revoked pursuant to the Metis Settlements Act, which precludes status Indians from settlement membership.

The claimants challenged their exclusion under ss. 15, 2(d), and 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Metis Settlements Act is a genuinely ameliorative program protected by s. 15(2) of the Charter, as its object is to enhance and preserve Métis identity, culture, and self-governance through a dedicated land base.

The exclusion of status Indians serves this object.

The Court also dismissed the s. 2(d) and s. 7 claims, concluding the legislation is constitutional.

The appellant was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving.

The Crown and the appellant entered into a plea agreement for a lesser charge of careless driving.

However, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Criminal Justice Division subsequently repudiated the agreement, concluding it was contrary to the interests of justice.

The appellant alleged this repudiation breached her s. 7 Charter rights as an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the repudiation of a plea agreement is an act of prosecutorial discretion, reviewable only for abuse of process.

Finding no evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or trial unfairness, the Court dismissed the appeal.

During a murder investigation, police obtained a warrant to search a rooming house and found a sawed-off shotgun in the appellant's rented room.

The appellant was charged with weapons offences and argued the search violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant for the appellant's room.

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting his 12-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's pre-trial statements and that Crown counsel's conduct rendered the trial unfair.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider a miscarriage of justice not raised in the Notice of Appeal, the trial's shortcomings did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's reasons did not show improper use of statements, and Crown counsel's questions did not cross the threshold of impermissible leading questions.

The appellants, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, appealed a decision regarding the enforcement of sponsorship debts against eight sponsors whose relatives received social assistance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government has a duty to collect the full sponsorship debt, it retains a limited discretion to defer enforcement based on a sponsor's circumstances.

In exercising this discretion, the government owes a minimal duty of procedural fairness to notify the sponsor, allow them to explain their circumstances, consider those circumstances, and notify them of the decision.

The Court found that Ontario's debt collection policy did not improperly fetter its discretion and met the requirements of procedural fairness.

The respondent and his partner engaged in consensual erotic asphyxiation.

The partner consented in advance to being choked into unconsciousness and to the sexual activity that would occur while she was unconscious.

The trial judge convicted the respondent of sexual assault, finding that a person cannot legally consent to sexual activity while unconscious.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Criminal Code requires a conscious, operating mind throughout the sexual activity to provide valid consent, and advance consent to unconscious sexual activity is not recognized in law.

Masterpiece Inc. and Alavida Lifestyles Inc. both operate in the retirement residence industry.

Masterpiece Inc. used several unregistered trade-marks containing the word 'Masterpiece' in Alberta prior to Alavida applying to register 'Masterpiece Living' as a proposed trade-mark in Ontario.

Masterpiece Inc. applied to expunge Alavida's registration on the basis of confusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered the expungement of Alavida's trade-mark, holding that the location of use is irrelevant to the confusion analysis, that a proposed mark must be assessed based on all potential uses under the registration rather than actual use, and that the high cost of the services does not negate the likelihood of initial confusion.

The Court also cautioned against the unnecessary use of expert evidence in trade-mark confusion cases.

The appellant advanced funds to a corporation controlled by a fraudster.

The fraudster used the funds to purchase shares, which he and his spouse pledged to the respondent bank in exchange for an increased credit limit.

The appellant obtained a tracing order for the fraudulently obtained funds, excluding assets in the hands of bona fide purchasers for value without notice.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank acquired a valid security interest under the Personal Property Security Act and qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, thereby defeating the appellant's equitable claim to the proceeds of the shares.

The Information Commissioner of Canada sought judicial review of refusals to disclose records located in the offices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Prime Minister's agenda held by the RCMP and PCO.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Ministers' offices are not 'government institutions' under the Access to Information Act.

The Court established a two-part test to determine if records in a Minister's office are 'under the control' of a government institution: whether the record relates to a departmental matter, and whether the institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy.

Applying this test, the requested records were not under the control of the respective government institutions.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is not an 'officer' of a government institution under the Privacy Act, meaning his agenda is exempt from disclosure as personal information.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant government appealed a decision upholding the certification of a class action brought by elderly residents of long-term care facilities.

The residents alleged the government artificially inflated accommodation charges to subsidize medical expenses, claiming breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and a section 15 Charter violation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, striking the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and bad faith, finding that the government did not owe a fiduciary duty or a private duty of care to the residents in these circumstances.

However, the Court allowed the unjust enrichment and Charter claims to proceed to trial, and declined to decertify the class action.

The appellant represented a class of investors who purchased strata lots in a Hilton hotel developed by the respondent.

The respondent also developed an adjacent Marriott hotel and offered different financial arrangements to the Marriott purchasers, including a guaranteed rate of return, which were not disclosed to the Hilton purchasers.

The appellant sued for misrepresentation under the Real Estate Act, common law negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to prove the omitted information was material to a reasonable investor.

The Court also found the respondent had a valid statutory defence, did not breach the standard of care for negligent misrepresentation, and did not breach its fiduciary duties as manager.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to explain why certain factors did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding fabrication.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to give adequate consideration to whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was stopped for speeding.

The police officer smelled freshly burnt marijuana and found a large amount of cash on the appellant's person.

The officer arrested the appellant for possession of a controlled substance and searched his vehicle, finding crack cocaine.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and convicted the appellant of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the arrest was lawful under the Criminal Code and the search was properly incidental to the arrest, with no Charter violations.

The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to Ontario’s separate labour relations regime for agricultural workers.

The Court held that s. 2(d) of the Charter protects a meaningful process of collective action toward workplace goals, including employee representations that employers must consider in good faith, but does not constitutionalize any particular model of labour relations.

The majority interpreted the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 as implicitly requiring good faith consideration of employee representations and concluded that the claimants had not established that the statutory scheme made meaningful association effectively impossible.

The s. 15 challenge also failed because the record did not establish substantive discrimination, and the claim was premature.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside the accused's convictions for obstructing justice.

The Supreme Court found that the appeal raised a question of law and that it had jurisdiction.

Adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal, the Court held that suggesting a false doctor's note was an integral part of an overall attempt to dissuade a witness from giving evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions restored.