Louise Charron

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his wife.

At trial, a police officer gave lay opinion evidence that a mark on the appellant's finger was a bite mark, corroborating the complainant's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from a forensic dentist concluding the mark was not a bite mark.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the due diligence criterion was not met, the fresh evidence was sufficiently cogent that it could reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment and the ultimate verdict.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada that substituted a fine for a 30-day sentence of imprisonment imposed by a military judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right under s. 245(2)(a) of the National Defence Act, finding that the dissent in the Court of Appeal was on a question of law.

The Court agreed with the dissenting judge that the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge's decision, and restored the original sentence.

Consumer appeal concerning the enforceability of a mandatory mediation-arbitration clause and class action waiver in a mobile phone services contract.

The Court held that the competence-competence principle generally requires arbitral jurisdictional challenges to be decided first by the arbitrator, but the statutory interpretation issue raised a pure question of law that the court could decide.

Interpreting ss. 3 and 172 of British Columbia's consumer protection legislation textually, contextually and purposively, the majority held that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under s. 172 were non-waivable and could proceed in Supreme Court notwithstanding the arbitration clause.

Other statutory, repealed statutory, and common law claims remained subject to a stay in favour of arbitration, and the class action waiver fell with the invalid portion of the arbitration clause.

The respondent was charged with sexual interference with his daughter.

The indictment alleged the offence occurred between April 1 and May 31, 2002.

The trial judge convicted the respondent based on an incident occurring after September 22, 2002.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, finding trial fairness was compromised.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the exact time of the offence was not material and the defence, which was based entirely on credibility, was not prejudiced.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting a victim during a physical altercation and immediately fleeing the scene.

At trial, the appellant conceded to manslaughter but claimed the shooting was accidental, lacking the intent for murder.

The Crown argued the appellant's immediate flight without hesitation indicated murderous intent.

The trial judge instructed the jury to be careful with the post-offence conduct evidence.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge should have given a 'no probative value' instruction regarding his flight.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence of lack of hesitation was relevant to intent and the jury charge was adequate.

The Court further held that even if there was an error, it was harmless and saved by the curative proviso.

The appellants, representative plaintiffs in two class actions, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Public Service Superannuation Act and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act that reduced the supplementary death benefit payable to surviving spouses based on the age of the deceased plan member.

They argued this constituted age discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reduction provisions did not violate s. 15(1).

The Court clarified that a formalistic 'mirror comparator group' approach is not required for a s. 15(1) analysis.

Instead, a substantive equality approach must be taken, considering the full context of the legislative scheme.

Viewed contextually, the benefit scheme met the actual needs of the claimants and did not perpetuate disadvantage or negative stereotypes.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision dismissing its claim that the federal government was required to share in the costs of social services provided in schools and support services provided to persons with disabilities under the Canada Assistance Plan.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that social services in schools were not 'welfare services' because their primary object was to support the educational mission of schools, not to fight poverty.

Furthermore, the Court held that the federal government was already sharing the costs of support services for persons with disabilities requiring continuous assistance under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act, 1977, which triggered the residual exception in the Canada Assistance Plan.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard two appeals concerning the property and financial rights of common law partners upon the breakdown of their relationships.

The Court held that the 'common intention' resulting trust has no further role in resolving domestic property disputes.

Instead, the law of unjust enrichment is the primary vehicle.

The Court clarified that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment need not always be calculated on a quantum meruit (fee-for-services) basis.

Where the parties were engaged in a 'joint family venture' and there is a link between the claimant's contributions and the accumulation of wealth, the remedy should be calculated based on the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant's contributions.

In Vanasse, the Court restored the trial judge's award based on wealth accumulation.

In Kerr, the Court ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claims and restored the trial judge's order for spousal support effective from the date proceedings commenced.

The appellant brought a class action in defamation on behalf of Montreal taxi drivers whose mother tongue is Arabic or Creole, following racist and offensive comments made by a radio host.

The trial judge allowed the action, but the Court of Appeal set it aside.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the comments were wrongful and racist, an ordinary person would not have believed they damaged the personal reputation of each individual driver in the large, heterogeneous group.

Therefore, the requirement of personal injury for a defamation claim was not met.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, he admitted guilt to manslaughter but argued he lacked the mental state for murder.

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to explain the difference between manslaughter and second degree murder and to provide a specific definition of manslaughter.

The trial judge explained the difference lay in the mental state but declined to provide examples or a specific definition of manslaughter.

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge responded correctly to the jury's questions and there was no reasonable possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for a conviction.

The appellant landowner sought compensation from the respondent pipeline company for reclamation work on an expropriated easement.

After a protracted dispute involving two arbitration committees and a discontinued court action, the second Arbitration Committee awarded the appellant his costs for all proceedings.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside this award.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for the Committee's interpretation of its home statute regarding costs is reasonableness.

The Court found the Committee reasonably interpreted section 99(1) of the National Energy Board Act to award costs for both arbitration proceedings and the related court action, consistent with the principle of full compensation in expropriation law.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that struck down the section 38 scheme of the Canada Evidence Act as unconstitutional.

The scheme grants the Federal Court jurisdiction to determine questions of disclosure of information pertaining to international relations, national defence, or national security.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the scheme does not violate section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the scheme preserves the full authority and independence of the judge presiding over the criminal trial to do justice between the parties, including entering a stay of proceedings if necessary to protect the accused's right to a fair trial.

The accused was charged with a minor traffic offence and claimed the proceedings were a nullity because the court documents were uniquely in English, arguing that the provincial Languages Act was unconstitutional.

After exhausting his funds during a lengthy trial, the accused applied for interim costs.

The provincial court granted the order, but the superior court set it aside for lack of jurisdiction, instead using its own inherent jurisdiction to grant the interim costs.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the superior court's order, finding that superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to assist inferior courts to prevent a serious injustice, and that the case met the criteria for public interest funding.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, assault causing bodily harm, and possession of a weapon, challenging the adequacy of the identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority finding that the trial judge's decision was reasonable, supported by the evidence, and contained no error in applying the law to the facts.

Fish J. dissented, arguing that the trial judge's inferences regarding identification did not flow logically from the evidence.

The CBC appealed a decision dismissing its motion to broadcast a video recording of a statement made by the accused to the police, which was tendered as an exhibit at trial.

The trial judge had held that the Rules of Practice of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec, Criminal Division prohibited broadcasting the recording.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the rules prohibit broadcasting recordings of proceedings, not exhibits.

Access to exhibits is governed by the open court principle, and trial judges must apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test to determine if broadcasting should be limited.

The appeal was dismissed as moot because the accused had been acquitted.

The media organizations challenged rules and a directive that limited filming, taking photographs, and conducting interviews to predetermined locations in courthouses, and prohibited the broadcasting of official audio recordings of hearings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while these activities are protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter and the measures infringe freedom of expression, the limits are reasonable and justified under s. 1.

The measures advance the pressing and substantial objective of maintaining the fair administration of justice by ensuring the serenity of hearings, protecting the privacy of litigants, and reducing stress on witnesses.

The appellant, a US-based distributor of the patented medicine Thalomid, sold the drug to Canadians through the Special Access Programme.

The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board requested pricing information, asserting jurisdiction under the Patent Act over medicines 'sold in any market in Canada'.

The appellant argued that under commercial law principles, the sales occurred in the United States.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's decision, finding that a purposive interpretation of the Patent Act supported the Board's consumer protection mandate to regulate prices of medicines delivered and dispensed in Canada, regardless of the commercial locus of the sale.

The appellant, a former member of the Canadian Forces, brought a class action against the Crown challenging the deduction of his disability pension from his long-term disability benefits.

The Crown argued the action should be stayed because the lawfulness of the deduction could only be challenged by judicial review.

Applying TeleZone, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to entertain the action and declined to exercise its residual discretion to stay the proceedings, as the essential character of the claim was for alleged breaches of s. 15(1) of the Charter rather than a veiled application for judicial review.

During a labour dispute, veterinarians employed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) stopped working, halting meat inspections at Quebec slaughterhouses.

The CFIA subsequently ordered the uninspected meat destroyed.

The slaughterhouse operators sued the veterinarians and their union for damages in the Quebec Superior Court.

The defendants brought recourses in warranty against the CFIA.

The CFIA moved to dismiss, arguing the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because its decision had not been quashed on judicial review by the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the CFIA's appeal, holding that judicial review is not a prerequisite for a civil action for damages against the federal Crown, and that a lawful administrative decision can still constitute a civil fault under Quebec law.

The appellant generic drug manufacturer sought damages against the federal Crown for losses incurred when Health Canada prohibited the sale of its drug.

The Crown successfully moved for summary judgment in the lower courts on the basis that the appellant was required to first invalidate the prohibition decision via judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying its companion decision in TeleZone.

The Court held that section 17 of the Federal Courts Act grants concurrent jurisdiction over claims for damages against the Crown, and nothing in the Act requires a plaintiff to successfully challenge the underlying administrative decision on judicial review before pursuing a tort action.