Lawrence Alan Greenspon

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to exclude the defendant police officers from being present during each other's examinations for discovery.

The Superior Court of Justice determined that the standard of review for this mixed question of fact and law was palpable and overriding error.

Finding that the Master thoroughly reviewed the applicable law and that the plaintiffs' affidavit evidence failed to set out reasons for exclusion, the court found no palpable or overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The accused was sentenced following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking involving 111.85 kilograms of cocaine.

The court considered the extraordinary quantity, high purity, and multi‑million‑dollar value of the drugs, as well as the accused’s prior conviction for a similar offence involving multi‑kilogram quantities.

Although the court found the accused’s role was limited to that of a courier, the circumstances demonstrated a high level of organization, planning, and trusted involvement in a large trafficking enterprise.

Emphasis was placed on denunciation and both general and specific deterrence.

A penitentiary sentence of 15 years was imposed with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant challenged terrorism convictions and sentence arising from his participation in and support of a group engaged in violent jihad, including training, financing, transporting supplies, and building remote detonator devices.

The court held that the definition of "terrorist activity" in s. 83.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code did not infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter, rejected the trial judge's "chilling effect" analysis, and upheld the convictions.

The court also held that the armed conflict exception was unavailable and that judicial notice of basic facts concerning Afghanistan was proper.

On the Crown's cross-appeal, the court found the total sentence manifestly unfit and imposed life imprisonment with ten years before eligibility for full parole.

The appellant was convicted of mischief after placing a spray-painted, beat-up van on his property line to interfere with his neighbours' attempts to sell their home, amidst an ongoing dispute over basement flooding.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected his defence under s. 430(7) of the Criminal Code, which protects acts done solely for the purpose of communicating information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the s. 430(7) defence applies even if the communication is intended to persuade or pressure others by interfering with their property rights, provided the act itself is peaceful and solely communicative.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because there was no direct evidence identifying him as the occupant of the apartment where the drugs were found.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly based his conclusion on the entire body of circumstantial evidence, which included the sublease in the appellant's name, his expired identity documents found in the apartment, and his car parked in the apartment's space.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a witness, erred in finding the possible source of a burn, and failed to properly apply the W.D. test.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension of evidence, held the trial judge was entitled to draw conclusions about the burn based on common experience, and found no error in the application of the W.D. test.

The sentence appeal was abandoned, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for damages arising from a severe neural tube defect allegedly caused by exposure to TCE.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellants' expert theory of causation, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court confirmed that the exceptional material contribution test for causation from Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke did not apply, as the evidence established no association between TCE and the defect.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder.

They argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, pointing to an intervening act where the victim's colleague opened fire on them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that evidence of prior communication, arriving in a convoy, rushing the victim while armed, and the nature of the attack provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of his detention order.

The court found no realistic likelihood that a panel would interfere with the lower court's decision, particularly regarding the tertiary ground for detention under s. 515(10)(c).

The court noted the strong circumstantial case, including motive, opportunity, and gunshot residue, as well as the egregious circumstances of the planned killing.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the dangerous driving conviction, including the appellant's speed and a prior warning from police not to drive.

The court also upheld the over 80 conviction, finding that a voluntary breath sample provided reasonable grounds for a search warrant to seize blood samples at the hospital.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that his driving was the result of unexpectedly falling asleep due to sleep apnea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this non-blameworthy explanation, noting the weak expert evidence and the appellant's lack of history of falling asleep unexpectedly.

The court also dismissed procedural arguments regarding the trial judge's conduct.

However, based on a Crown concession, a clerical conviction for dangerous driving simpliciter was quashed.

The appellant, a professional bus driver, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving after he drove a bus too far to the right and struck a curb.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of steering failure and that the reasons for judgment were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the steering was functional prior to impact and that the appellant's delayed reaction constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and detained in a police cell for 11 hours with virtually no contact with police officers.

He sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention was breached.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11-hour detention was indeed arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy, as the breach occurred post-offence and did not impact trial fairness or the gathering of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of possession of contraband cigarettes and faced a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600 under the Excise Act.

Finding the accused unable to pay and concluding that jail was inappropriate, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment and cannot be used merely to enforce an unpaid fine where the offender genuinely lacks the means to pay.

The Court set aside the conditional sentence but stayed further collection procedures since the sentence had already been served.

The appellant sued the Crown and two police officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn upon his entering a peace bond.

The motions judge struck the statement of claim for failure to give proper notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and for expiry of the limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the notice requirements do not apply to individual police officers and that a limitation period defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence before a motion to strike can be brought.

The appeal was allowed in part, reinstating the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence against the police officers.

The appellants, family members of a deceased cyclist, appealed an order striking their negligent investigation claim against a municipal police officer and his employer.

They alleged the officer's post-accident investigative failures caused the collapse of criminal proceedings against the driver and prolonged their emotional distress through subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

Applying the motion to strike standard and the Kamloops duty of care framework, the court held the investigating officer owed no private law duty of care to the appellants because they had no legal interest in the criminal investigation, prosecution, or discipline process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of distribution and possession of child pornography and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both the convictions and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, particularly given the lack of objections at trial.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, substituting a 14-month conditional sentence.

The Court noted the appellant's lack of prior record, his steady employment, the devastating impact the proceedings already had on his family, and the Supreme Court's guidance in Proulx that conditional sentences can achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the issuance and execution of a search warrant for records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conditions imposed on the warrant's execution were sufficient and that the appellant failed to show a section 8 Charter violation affecting the issuing judge's jurisdiction.

The Court left open the possibility for the appellant to argue at trial that certain documents are inadmissible due to common-law privilege or a section 7 Charter violation.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he challenged the constitutionality of the 'rape shield' provisions in s. 276 of the Criminal Code, which restrict the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provisions, finding that they do not violate the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the right to a fair trial, or the right against self-incrimination.

The Court held that the provisions properly balance the accused's rights with the need to protect the integrity of the trial process and the privacy of complainants.