Lawrence Alan Greenspon

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the Crown brought a Mohan application seeking to qualify a forensic psychiatrist as an expert to give opinion evidence regarding automatism.

The defence argued that the proposed expert’s methodology lacked reliability and that prior judicial criticism of his opinions should preclude qualification.

The court reviewed the admissibility criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, including relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule, and proper qualification.

While acknowledging some concerns about the expert’s prior reports and methodology, the court found that he possessed sufficient expertise in forensic psychiatry and that automatism is primarily a legal concept closely related to dissociative states recognized in psychiatry.

The expert was therefore qualified to give opinion evidence in forensic psychiatry, including on the issue of automatism.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml.

At trial, the accused argued that the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand was not made 'forthwith' due to an unexplained six-minute delay between the officer demonstrating the device and the accused providing a sample.

The court found that this unexplained delay violated the accused's rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court excluded the breath test results, concluding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown proceeded on facts arising from a collision with an Enbridge van.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches and excluded all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop through to the Intoxilyzer results.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission revoking its liquor licence.

The Board found the appellant permitted unlawful gambling and the sale, distribution, or consumption of controlled drugs on its premises.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The Court held that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant had constructive knowledge of the drug activity and that the penalty of revocation was reasonable.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to exclude the defendant police officers from being present during each other's examinations for discovery.

The Superior Court of Justice determined that the standard of review for this mixed question of fact and law was palpable and overriding error.

Finding that the Master thoroughly reviewed the applicable law and that the plaintiffs' affidavit evidence failed to set out reasons for exclusion, the court found no palpable or overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The accused was sentenced following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking involving 111.85 kilograms of cocaine.

The court considered the extraordinary quantity, high purity, and multi‑million‑dollar value of the drugs, as well as the accused’s prior conviction for a similar offence involving multi‑kilogram quantities.

Although the court found the accused’s role was limited to that of a courier, the circumstances demonstrated a high level of organization, planning, and trusted involvement in a large trafficking enterprise.

Emphasis was placed on denunciation and both general and specific deterrence.

A penitentiary sentence of 15 years was imposed with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario issued a Notice of Proposal to revoke the liquor licence of Adams Pizzeria (Prescott) Ltd., operating as Limit Exotic Lounge.

Following a police search warrant execution, officers discovered significant quantities of cocaine, prescription pills, and marijuana in the establishment's locked office, along with debt lists indicative of drug trafficking.

AGCO inspectors also found an illegal poker machine, adulterated liquor bottles containing maple syrup and vinegar, and evidence of after-hours sales and liquor being removed from the premises.

The Board found the licensee breached multiple provisions of the Liquor Licence Act and its regulations.

Concluding that the licensee could not be trusted to operate with integrity and honesty, the Board ordered the immediate revocation of the liquor licence in the public interest.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario sought to revoke the liquor licence of the Licensee following a police search that uncovered significant quantities of cocaine, prescription pills, and marijuana in the establishment's office.

Inspectors also found an illegal poker machine, adulterated liquor bottles, and evidence of alcohol being removed from the premises.

The Board found breaches of the Liquor Licence Act and its regulations, concluding that the Licensee failed to control the premises and permitted illegal drug trafficking and gambling.

The Board ordered the immediate revocation of the liquor licence.

The appellant challenged terrorism convictions and sentence arising from his participation in and support of a group engaged in violent jihad, including training, financing, transporting supplies, and building remote detonator devices.

The court held that the definition of "terrorist activity" in s. 83.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code did not infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter, rejected the trial judge's "chilling effect" analysis, and upheld the convictions.

The court also held that the armed conflict exception was unavailable and that judicial notice of basic facts concerning Afghanistan was proper.

On the Crown's cross-appeal, the court found the total sentence manifestly unfit and imposed life imprisonment with ten years before eligibility for full parole.

The Licensee brought a motion to reopen a hearing regarding the suspension of its liquor licence to introduce fresh evidence concerning the conduct and credibility of an AGCO Inspector.

The Board applied the two-part test from Sagaz, finding that the proposed evidence regarding the Inspector's unrelated conduct would not have been admitted, would not have changed the outcome of the hearing, and could have been obtained with due diligence prior to the original hearing.

The motion to reopen was dismissed.

The Registrar brought a motion to rescind an order that had lifted the interim suspension of the Licensee's liquor licence, alleging that the Licensee breached conditions requiring functional video surveillance and barring a specific individual from the premises.

The Board found that while the Licensee technically breached the conditions by having inadequate camera coverage and allowing the barred individual in the entranceway, restoring the interim suspension would be too harsh a penalty.

The Board ordered the Licensee to comply with the conditions and maintained the order lifting the suspension.

The appellant was convicted of mischief after placing a spray-painted, beat-up van on his property line to interfere with his neighbours' attempts to sell their home, amidst an ongoing dispute over basement flooding.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected his defence under s. 430(7) of the Criminal Code, which protects acts done solely for the purpose of communicating information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the s. 430(7) defence applies even if the communication is intended to persuade or pressure others by interfering with their property rights, provided the act itself is peaceful and solely communicative.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario issued a Notice of Proposal to revoke the licensee's liquor licence and ordered an immediate interim suspension in the interest of public safety.

Following a hearing, the Board ordered that the interim suspension be rescinded subject to strict conditions, including the installation of operational video cameras, clearing all patrons by 3:00 a.m., prohibiting gaming machines, and barring the principal's son from the premises.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because there was no direct evidence identifying him as the occupant of the apartment where the drugs were found.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly based his conclusion on the entire body of circumstantial evidence, which included the sublease in the appellant's name, his expired identity documents found in the apartment, and his car parked in the apartment's space.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a witness, erred in finding the possible source of a burn, and failed to properly apply the W.D. test.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension of evidence, held the trial judge was entitled to draw conclusions about the burn based on common experience, and found no error in the application of the W.D. test.

The sentence appeal was abandoned, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for damages arising from a severe neural tube defect allegedly caused by exposure to TCE.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellants' expert theory of causation, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court confirmed that the exceptional material contribution test for causation from Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke did not apply, as the evidence established no association between TCE and the defect.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder.

They argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, pointing to an intervening act where the victim's colleague opened fire on them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that evidence of prior communication, arriving in a convoy, rushing the victim while armed, and the nature of the attack provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to infer planning and deliberation.