Michael Andrew Chambers

The applicant brought a motion for the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home, while the respondent brought a cross-motion for interim exclusive possession.

The parties had been separated for several years, and the respondent had resided in the home since 2014.

The court found that the respondent did not meet the test for exclusive possession under section 24(3) of the Family Law Act, as there were no dependent children and no evidence of alternate accommodation unavailability.

The court ordered the partition and sale of the home, noting that a claim for permanent exclusive possession was unrealistic and there was no valid reason to delay the sale.

This decision concerns the temporary care and custody of a child, S., apprehended at birth by the Children's Aid Society.

The agency relied on a prior parenting assessment report regarding the parents' first child, which the court ultimately rejected due to concerns about the assessor's qualifications, methodology, and potential bias, particularly concerning the Metis mother.

Despite the child's serious medical condition, the court found no evidence that the mother was unable or unwilling to provide necessary medical care.

The court emphasized that children should not be removed from parents solely because specialized medical services are not available in their rural community.

The court ordered the child to be returned to the mother's temporary care, subject to supervision and a detailed plan for medical support and training.

This is a costs endorsement following a prior motion in a family law matter.

The applicant sought costs, arguing she was substantially more successful on the main issue of the respondent's income imputation, which impacted child and spousal support.

The respondent argued for divided success and that each party should bear their own costs or receive a substantial discount.

The court found the applicant was the more successful party on the most significant issue and that the respondent's conduct, including non-compliance with financial disclosure and failure to pay support, was unreasonable, though it did not amount to bad faith.

The court awarded the applicant $12,000 in costs, inclusive of HST.

The moving party sought costs of $17,500 following a motion where he unsuccessfully sought sole custody but successfully obtained an order for access to his children.

The responding party opposed the costs, arguing success was divided and her behaviour was reasonable.

The court found that the matter was factually complex and neither party behaved unreasonably.

Noting that success was divided, the court ordered the responding party to pay $3,000 in costs to the moving party.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary previous orders, seeking temporary sole custody of the children and no access for the applicant mother, following the dropping of criminal charges against him and new charges laid against the mother.

The applicant mother opposed this and requested a s. 30 assessment.

The court dismissed the father's request for sole custody and no access for the mother, but granted him temporary supervised access with the paternal grandmother.

The mother's request for a s. 30 assessment was also declined at this stage.

Following the breakdown of a long marriage that began when the respondent was a teenager and the applicant was significantly older, the court addressed equalization of net family property, sale of the matrimonial home, and spousal support.

The respondent sought an unequal division of property, a constructive trust over a home purchased prior to marriage, exclusive possession of the home, and retroactive child and spousal support.

The court rejected the constructive trust claim and found no basis for an unequal division under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act because the circumstances did not reach the high threshold of unconscionability.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold, equalization was calculated, and post‑separation financial adjustments were made.

Retroactive and ongoing compensatory spousal support was awarded, but the claim for retroactive adult‑child support was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed an order directing the sale of a residential property they co-owned as tenants in common with the respondent.

The appellants sought physical partition instead of sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the property's configuration and the appellants' failure to pay municipal taxes and insurance made partition impractical and sale the most beneficial option.

The respondent's cross-appeal to purchase the appellants' share at a fixed price was dismissed, as joint tenants are entitled to the fair market value obtained through an open market sale.

The respondent was awarded costs for both the application and the appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a divorce order obtained at an uncontested hearing after she had been noted in default for failing to file an Answer.

The court applied the test for setting aside a default judgment by analogy to Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as permitted by the Family Law Rules.

The court found the motion was brought promptly, that the moving party provided a reasonable explanation for the default, and that there was an arguable case regarding the equalization of net family property and ongoing support issues.

Given the existence of unresolved financial issues, the court concluded that the matter should proceed with full participation of both parties.

The noting in default and the divorce order were set aside and the parties were directed to proceed to a settlement conference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Revision regarding the apportionment of assessments for the Gauthier Municipal Drain.

The Court of Revision had increased the benefit liability from 40 percent to 70 percent for certain properties, shifting more costs to the appellant.

The Tribunal accepted the engineer's evidence that the benefit to the affected properties was not significant enough to warrant the Court of Revision's increase.

The Tribunal ordered the apportionment of assessments to be adjusted to 40 percent outlet and 60 percent benefit, reflecting a reasonable ratio proportionate to the respective improvements.

The appellant sued the Crown and two police officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn upon his entering a peace bond.

The motions judge struck the statement of claim for failure to give proper notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and for expiry of the limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the notice requirements do not apply to individual police officers and that a limitation period defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence before a motion to strike can be brought.

The appeal was allowed in part, reinstating the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence against the police officers.

This drainage appeal concerned a proposed municipal drain improvement intended to reduce recurring flooding on agricultural land within a multi-municipality watershed.

After hearing evidence, the tribunal concluded the engineer's proposed works were no longer viable and abandoned the project, finding the limited relief did not justify the expense and that the fragmented statutory structure had contributed to the failure.

The tribunal emphasized the need for cooperative, system-wide administration of large intermunicipal drainage works and suggested that other legislative mechanisms, including joint municipal administration, may be more suitable.

All appeals were dismissed because no project remained to be implemented, and costs were apportioned among the downstream municipality, the engineering firm, and assessed landowners, with separate municipal and party-specific hearing costs.

The Township of Longueuil applied to the Ontario Drainage Tribunal to review the account of McNeely Engineering Consultants Limited for work on the Mill Creek Municipal Drain.

The Township argued that the engineer should have advised earlier that the project was impractical under section 40 of the Drainage Act and that fees incurred after that point should not be paid.

The Tribunal extended the time for filing the application under section 100 of the Act.

The Tribunal found deficiencies in the engineer's work but concluded that the responsibility was shared between the engineer, the municipal council, and the ratepayers.

The Tribunal confirmed the engineer's accounts up to the April 17, 1996 hearing and ordered the engineer to provide all original information to the Township.

Several landowners appealed the Court of Revision's decision confirming the assessments for the Mill Creek Municipal Drain Improvement.

The engineer who prepared the report, Philip McNeely, stated at the hearing that he no longer felt the proposed project was viable and that it should not proceed.

Based on this statement, the Tribunal ordered that the engineer's report be abandoned and provided the affected municipalities and landowners an opportunity to develop an alternative proposal to address the flooding problem.