Lawrence Alan Greenspon

The plaintiffs sued the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers for negligent investigation, false arrest, and Charter breaches following a dramatic police raid on their home.

The raid stemmed from a long-standing neighbourhood dispute over a drainage pipe, which led an investigating officer to obtain a public safety warrant and arrest the plaintiff for mischief and intimidation.

The court found the officer's investigation was negligent, as he failed to interview key witnesses or consider the lack of urgency.

The court also held the arrest was unlawful and the search violated section 8 of the Charter due to material omissions in the warrant application and the unreasonable use of a SWAT team.

The plaintiffs were awarded damages for false arrest, negligent investigation, wrongful seizure of firearms, and Charter breaches.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to bar the Crown from calling witnesses to testify about matters that the defence had already admitted or offered to admit.

The defence argued that calling such evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant given the admissions.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown has broad prosecutorial discretion to determine how to present its case, including the right to reject defence-framed admissions and to call evidence to prove elements such as planning and deliberation, negate third-party suspect theories, and provide confirmatory evidence for unsavoury witnesses.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to police during a missing person investigation that later became a first-degree murder case.

The court found the first statement inadmissible because the police officer's notes were inadequate to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second statement, which was video-recorded, was ruled admissible because the accused attended the police station voluntarily, the interaction was conversational, and the police did not yet have reasonable grounds to suspect the accused of a crime, meaning no caution was required.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, and breach of probation.

At trial, the sole issue was the identity of the driver, with the defence arguing that a passenger was driving.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the third prong of the W.(D.) framework regarding credibility and reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's detailed credibility analysis and factual findings.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of misconduct under the Police Services Act.

The hearing officer, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, and the Divisional Court all applied a balance of probabilities standard of proof.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Penner, which established that the standard of proof in PSA hearings is a higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence', not a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was granted and the matter remitted to the Commission.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in law and that the proposed use of electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found that while the Justice of the Peace made some errors of law warranting intervention, the electronic monitoring proposal did not amount to a material change.

Upon conducting a fresh review, the court concluded the applicant failed to meet the reverse onus, finding detention was necessary on all three grounds due to flight risk, likelihood of reoffending, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused applied for an order requiring that his murder trial be scheduled earlier than the agreed trial date because he would have been in custody for nearly four years by the time of trial.

Granting the request would effectively require the reassignment of one of the Crown prosecutors who was unavailable on earlier court dates.

The court held that the assignment of Crown counsel is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion belonging to the Attorney General and is reviewable only for abuse of process.

As no abuse of process or improper motive was alleged or established, the court declined to interfere with prosecutorial discretion.

The application for an earlier trial date was therefore dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

He argued the appeal judge erred in reviewing the trial judge's credibility findings and failed to address whether the breathalyzer machine was working properly.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the trial judge's credibility analysis was adequate and that faking a breath sample constitutes a refusal regardless of whether the device is an approved instrument.

The plaintiff, a member of the university's men's varsity hockey team, brought a proposed class action against the university and its president after the entire team was suspended following sexual assault allegations against two players.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and misfeasance in public office under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court dismissed the motion to strike the negligence claim, finding a recognized duty of care between the university and its students.

However, the court struck the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and misfeasance in public office, as the university had multiple competing interests to balance and there were no facts pleaded to support bad faith or dishonesty.

The respondent public complainant sought partial indemnity costs of $9,316.87 from the applicant police officer following a proceeding.

The applicant did not dispute the quantum but argued no costs should be ordered because the matter was a test case concerning the standard of proof in police disciplinary cases.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that while the co-respondent police service did not seek costs, the proceeding was not a test case for the public complainant, who was maintaining a civil claim against the applicant.

The court awarded the requested costs to the respondent public complainant.

This was a costs decision following a motion to strike in an action alleging sexual assault, sexual harassment, vicarious liability, and negligence against an employer and an individual defendant.

The court held that success on the underlying motion was mixed, but that the plaintiff had been more successful overall because key claims in vicarious liability for sexual assault and negligence survived.

Applying the general principle that costs follow the event together with the discretionary factors under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the plaintiff reduced costs fixed at $3,000.00 payable forthwith.

The appellant appealed an impaired driving conviction, alleging legal error in the dismissal of a Charter s. 11(b) application based on trial delay.

The court held that delay caused by the unexplained absence of an interpreter was properly treated as neutral rather than institutional, because the cause of the absence was unknown and attribution required an evidentiary basis.

The court also held that delay following outstanding expert-related disclosure was not Crown-caused, since the Crown had not received the material and the trial would have required additional dates in any event due to an inadequate time estimate.

Applying the Morin framework, the court found no unreasonable delay and dismissed the summary conviction appeal.

Les demandeurs ont poursuivi l’exploitant et le propriétaire d’un parc aquatique après une chute ayant causé une fracture du coude.

Le procès portait uniquement sur la responsabilité des occupantes au regard de la Loi sur la responsabilité des occupants.

Le tribunal a conclu que la preuve n’établissait pas, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, l’existence d’une condition dangereuse ayant causé la chute, notamment en raison d’incohérences importantes entre les témoignages au procès et les interrogatoires préalables.

La preuve des défenderesses sur l’entretien continu et l’état impeccable des lieux a été retenue.

L’action a donc été rejetée sur la question de la responsabilité.

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims of vicarious liability and negligence arising from an alleged sexual assault by a co-worker at an unsupervised staff party.

The court struck the claim for the independent tort of sexual harassment, as it is ousted by the Human Rights Code.

However, the court declined to strike the claims for vicarious liability and negligence, finding it was not plain and obvious that they had no reasonable prospect of success given the employer's role in hosting the party and providing alcohol.

In a bifurcated slip-and-fall trial arising from an incident at a recreational waterpark, the plaintiffs sought to call a mechanical engineer to opine on whether the water filtration system was designed to operate underwater and on contaminants allegedly affecting the surface condition.

After a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan criteria for admissibility of expert evidence and held that the proposed witness lacked specific expertise in commercial pool filtration systems, waterpark operations, and water contamination analysis.

The court further found the opinion evidence did not satisfy the necessity requirement because it was not shown how it would materially assist in proving the alleged hazard at the location of the fall.

The plaintiffs' expert was therefore disqualified.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml under the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, which permitted reliance on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that discrepancies between officers’ recorded times created a reasonable doubt about whether the sample was taken within the required period and that the trial judge failed to apply the proper burden of proof or provide sufficient reasons.

The court held that the reliable evidence, including video and intoxilyzer timestamps, established that the sample was taken within two hours.

The alleged evidentiary “stream” of timing discrepancies lacked evidentiary support, and the trial judge’s reasons were adequate for appellate review.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault under s. 271(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapplied the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on a prior statement to police, and failed to recuse himself due to an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge’s credibility findings and determined that although the trial judge made minor factual errors in describing certain circumstances, those errors were not overriding and did not undermine the conviction.

The court found that the trial judge properly used inconsistencies in the appellant’s prior statement only to assess credibility and correctly applied the Browne v. Dunn rule and the reasoning in R. v. Truong when drawing inferences about new allegations raised in the appellant’s testimony.

The court also held that the W.(D.) framework had not been misapplied and that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the complainant’s spouse having previously served as a judicial colleague of the trial judge.

The conviction was upheld.

During a jury trial concerning an alleged agreement to share proceeds of a winning Lotto 6/49 ticket, the defendant moved for a non-suit after the plaintiff closed her case.

The court considered whether the plaintiff’s evidence could support a breach of contract claim for a one-third share of lottery winnings based on an alleged oral agreement involving the defendant and a third party.

The court held there was no evidence of a “meeting of the minds” with the third party and no agency relationship allowing the defendant to bind that party to a contract.

As a result, no reasonable jury could find a valid contract existed.

The non-suit motion on the breach of contract claim was granted, the jury was dismissed, and the remaining equitable trust claims were left to be determined by the judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for importing and trafficking almost 112 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehensions of evidence and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the proper range given the unprecedented quantity of drugs and the appellant's prior record for the same offence.