Lawrence Alan Greenspon

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in law and that the proposed use of electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found that while the Justice of the Peace made some errors of law warranting intervention, the electronic monitoring proposal did not amount to a material change.

Upon conducting a fresh review, the court concluded the applicant failed to meet the reverse onus, finding detention was necessary on all three grounds due to flight risk, likelihood of reoffending, and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused applied for an order requiring that his murder trial be scheduled earlier than the agreed trial date because he would have been in custody for nearly four years by the time of trial.

Granting the request would effectively require the reassignment of one of the Crown prosecutors who was unavailable on earlier court dates.

The court held that the assignment of Crown counsel is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion belonging to the Attorney General and is reviewable only for abuse of process.

As no abuse of process or improper motive was alleged or established, the court declined to interfere with prosecutorial discretion.

The application for an earlier trial date was therefore dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

He argued the appeal judge erred in reviewing the trial judge's credibility findings and failed to address whether the breathalyzer machine was working properly.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the trial judge's credibility analysis was adequate and that faking a breath sample constitutes a refusal regardless of whether the device is an approved instrument.

The plaintiff, a member of the university's men's varsity hockey team, brought a proposed class action against the university and its president after the entire team was suspended following sexual assault allegations against two players.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and misfeasance in public office under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court dismissed the motion to strike the negligence claim, finding a recognized duty of care between the university and its students.

However, the court struck the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and misfeasance in public office, as the university had multiple competing interests to balance and there were no facts pleaded to support bad faith or dishonesty.

The respondent public complainant sought partial indemnity costs of $9,316.87 from the applicant police officer following a proceeding.

The applicant did not dispute the quantum but argued no costs should be ordered because the matter was a test case concerning the standard of proof in police disciplinary cases.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that while the co-respondent police service did not seek costs, the proceeding was not a test case for the public complainant, who was maintaining a civil claim against the applicant.

The court awarded the requested costs to the respondent public complainant.

This was a costs decision following a motion to strike in an action alleging sexual assault, sexual harassment, vicarious liability, and negligence against an employer and an individual defendant.

The court held that success on the underlying motion was mixed, but that the plaintiff had been more successful overall because key claims in vicarious liability for sexual assault and negligence survived.

Applying the general principle that costs follow the event together with the discretionary factors under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the plaintiff reduced costs fixed at $3,000.00 payable forthwith.

The appellant appealed an impaired driving conviction, alleging legal error in the dismissal of a Charter s. 11(b) application based on trial delay.

The court held that delay caused by the unexplained absence of an interpreter was properly treated as neutral rather than institutional, because the cause of the absence was unknown and attribution required an evidentiary basis.

The court also held that delay following outstanding expert-related disclosure was not Crown-caused, since the Crown had not received the material and the trial would have required additional dates in any event due to an inadequate time estimate.

Applying the Morin framework, the court found no unreasonable delay and dismissed the summary conviction appeal.

Les demandeurs ont poursuivi l’exploitant et le propriétaire d’un parc aquatique après une chute ayant causé une fracture du coude.

Le procès portait uniquement sur la responsabilité des occupantes au regard de la Loi sur la responsabilité des occupants.

Le tribunal a conclu que la preuve n’établissait pas, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, l’existence d’une condition dangereuse ayant causé la chute, notamment en raison d’incohérences importantes entre les témoignages au procès et les interrogatoires préalables.

La preuve des défenderesses sur l’entretien continu et l’état impeccable des lieux a été retenue.

L’action a donc été rejetée sur la question de la responsabilité.

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims of vicarious liability and negligence arising from an alleged sexual assault by a co-worker at an unsupervised staff party.

The court struck the claim for the independent tort of sexual harassment, as it is ousted by the Human Rights Code.

However, the court declined to strike the claims for vicarious liability and negligence, finding it was not plain and obvious that they had no reasonable prospect of success given the employer's role in hosting the party and providing alcohol.

In a bifurcated slip-and-fall trial arising from an incident at a recreational waterpark, the plaintiffs sought to call a mechanical engineer to opine on whether the water filtration system was designed to operate underwater and on contaminants allegedly affecting the surface condition.

After a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan criteria for admissibility of expert evidence and held that the proposed witness lacked specific expertise in commercial pool filtration systems, waterpark operations, and water contamination analysis.

The court further found the opinion evidence did not satisfy the necessity requirement because it was not shown how it would materially assist in proving the alleged hazard at the location of the fall.

The plaintiffs' expert was therefore disqualified.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml under the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the alleged offence, which permitted reliance on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that discrepancies between officers’ recorded times created a reasonable doubt about whether the sample was taken within the required period and that the trial judge failed to apply the proper burden of proof or provide sufficient reasons.

The court held that the reliable evidence, including video and intoxilyzer timestamps, established that the sample was taken within two hours.

The alleged evidentiary “stream” of timing discrepancies lacked evidentiary support, and the trial judge’s reasons were adequate for appellate review.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault under s. 271(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapplied the principles in R. v. W.(D.), improperly relied on a prior statement to police, and failed to recuse himself due to an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge’s credibility findings and determined that although the trial judge made minor factual errors in describing certain circumstances, those errors were not overriding and did not undermine the conviction.

The court found that the trial judge properly used inconsistencies in the appellant’s prior statement only to assess credibility and correctly applied the Browne v. Dunn rule and the reasoning in R. v. Truong when drawing inferences about new allegations raised in the appellant’s testimony.

The court also held that the W.(D.) framework had not been misapplied and that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the complainant’s spouse having previously served as a judicial colleague of the trial judge.

The conviction was upheld.

During a jury trial concerning an alleged agreement to share proceeds of a winning Lotto 6/49 ticket, the defendant moved for a non-suit after the plaintiff closed her case.

The court considered whether the plaintiff’s evidence could support a breach of contract claim for a one-third share of lottery winnings based on an alleged oral agreement involving the defendant and a third party.

The court held there was no evidence of a “meeting of the minds” with the third party and no agency relationship allowing the defendant to bind that party to a contract.

As a result, no reasonable jury could find a valid contract existed.

The non-suit motion on the breach of contract claim was granted, the jury was dismissed, and the remaining equitable trust claims were left to be determined by the judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for importing and trafficking almost 112 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehensions of evidence and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the proper range given the unprecedented quantity of drugs and the appellant's prior record for the same offence.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the Crown brought a Mohan application seeking to qualify a forensic psychiatrist as an expert to give opinion evidence regarding automatism.

The defence argued that the proposed expert’s methodology lacked reliability and that prior judicial criticism of his opinions should preclude qualification.

The court reviewed the admissibility criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, including relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule, and proper qualification.

While acknowledging some concerns about the expert’s prior reports and methodology, the court found that he possessed sufficient expertise in forensic psychiatry and that automatism is primarily a legal concept closely related to dissociative states recognized in psychiatry.

The expert was therefore qualified to give opinion evidence in forensic psychiatry, including on the issue of automatism.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml.

At trial, the accused argued that the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand was not made 'forthwith' due to an unexplained six-minute delay between the officer demonstrating the device and the accused providing a sample.

The court found that this unexplained delay violated the accused's rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court excluded the breath test results, concluding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown proceeded on facts arising from a collision with an Enbridge van.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches and excluded all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop through to the Intoxilyzer results.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission revoking its liquor licence.

The Board found the appellant permitted unlawful gambling and the sale, distribution, or consumption of controlled drugs on its premises.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The Court held that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant had constructive knowledge of the drug activity and that the penalty of revocation was reasonable.