Lawrence Alan Greenspon

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and attempt to overcome resistance by suffocation against his wife, and his sentence of 11 years in custody.

The sole issue on appeal concerned the propriety of a sentencing order under section 743.21 of the Criminal Code that imposed an absolute prohibition on contact with his children during the custodial portion of his sentence.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the division of responsibility between criminal sentencing and family law regimes, and that the family court or Children's Aid Society should determine the nature of his relationship with his children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit.

This decision addresses a costs award sought by the Attorney General of Canada against counsel, Ms. Fay Brunning, personally.

The underlying matter involved Requests for Directions (RFDs) related to the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement (IRSSA), where Ms. Brunning represented claimants.

Canada sought $25,000 in costs, alleging Ms. Brunning brought duplicative, vexatious proceedings, made baseless and scandalous allegations against Canada and the courts, and unduly enlarged the proceedings.

The court found Ms. Brunning's conduct, including relitigating issues and defying court orders, fell within Rule 57.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and also warranted sanction under the court's inherent jurisdiction for seriously undermining the administration of justice.

Despite finding her conduct not dishonest or malicious, the court concluded it was an extraordinary case justifying a personal costs award.

Canada's request for $25,000 was granted, payable by Ms. Brunning personally.

This decision addresses a recusal motion brought by counsel, Fay Brunning, seeking to have Justice Perell recuse himself from deciding costs against her personally.

The motion arose after Justice Perell issued a case management direction ordering Ms. Brunning to attend her client's Independent Assessment Process (IAP) hearing, following her stated intention not to attend due to dissatisfaction with a prior ruling.

Ms. Brunning argued that the direction created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no convincing evidence of bias and emphasizing the judge's role in administering the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) and ensuring access to justice for claimants.

Appeal from a trial judgment finding police liable for negligent investigation, false arrest, unlawful detention, unlawful imprisonment, and Charter breaches arising from the arrest of the respondent and execution of a public safety firearms warrant at his residence.

The trial judge awarded over $50,000 in damages.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in imposing a standard of care inconsistent with established jurisprudence, failed to apply proper legal tests, and engaged in impermissible second-guessing of police discretion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge had erred in multiple respects including defining the standard of care without evidentiary basis, misapplying the reasonable and probable grounds test, and conducting improper warrant review.

Following a successful trial for false arrest, excessive use of force, and Charter breaches against the police, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court found the plaintiff beat her Rule 49 offer to settle, entitling her to partial indemnity costs up to the offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

After considering the complexity of the action and the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $181,210.00.

The defendant police services board brought a motion to strike paragraph 28 of the plaintiff's amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The court found that the plaintiff's amendments, which alleged the board failed to have a system to track Charter violations and excessive force by officers, fell under the board's statutory responsibilities and provided sufficient material facts.

The motion to strike the paragraph in its entirety was dismissed, though the word 'training' was struck as it violated a previous order.

The defendants brought a motion to strike paragraph 64 of the plaintiff's Amended Amended Statement of Claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff had previously been granted leave to amend certain subparagraphs.

The court found that the plaintiff could not add the Chief of Police to the narrative as it was outside the scope of the previous order.

However, the court held that the plaintiff had provided sufficient material facts to support the novel claim that the Police Services Board failed to have a system in place to recognize officers' propensity for Charter breaches.

The motion to strike paragraph 64 in its entirety was dismissed, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The offender was convicted after trial of robbery of a gas bar.

He entered the store, approached the cashier with his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun, and demanded money.

He obtained over $100 and left.

There was no actual weapon, no violence, and no physical injury to the victim, though the victim was anxious.

The offender is 44 years old, employed as a journeyman refrigeration and air conditioning mechanic, and has a dated criminal record from 2007-2008.

He has a significant alcohol addiction that motivated the offence, which occurred during a three-day drinking bender.

He has a 13-year-old son whom he supports and sees on weekends.

The Crown sought one year incarceration followed by probation; the defence sought 90 days served on weekends followed by probation.

The accused, a financial advisor, brought an application for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown's case, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on 30 of 37 counts of fraud, theft, misappropriation, and forgery.

The accused argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to the circumstantial evidence, requiring the evidence to be consistent only with guilt.

The court rejected this argument, applying the test from Arcuri that requires only limited weighing to determine if the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt.

After reviewing the evidence of multiple former clients whose funds were allegedly withheld, misdirected, or returned from unidentifiable sources, the court found sufficient evidence on all essential elements of the offences and dismissed the application.

During a fraud trial involving a financial advisor, the Crown brought an application to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct across counts as similar fact evidence.

The Crown alleged the accused misappropriated funds from ten clients using a similar modus operandi.

The court applied the Handy framework and found the evidence highly probative to the issues of actus reus and mens rea, with minimal risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The application to admit the similar fact evidence was allowed.

The defendants, the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers, brought a motion to strike paragraph 64 of the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim.

The court applied the test for striking pleadings and found that the paragraphs relating to training and supervision should be struck without leave to amend, relying on established case law.

The court also struck the remaining paragraphs for failing to provide sufficient material facts, but granted leave to amend those specific portions.

The motion was granted and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The defendant Ottawa Police Services Board brought a motion to strike paragraph 28 of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim.

The court found that paragraphs 28(a) and (b) lacked sufficient material facts to support the allegations regarding the Board's knowledge of the officers' propensity for excessive force, and struck them with leave to amend.

Paragraphs 28(c), (d), and (e), which related to training and supervision, were struck without leave to amend based on established precedent.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of $3,360.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction for Unnecessary Exercise of Authority.

After a lengthy appellate history reaching the Court of Appeal, which determined the correct standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence rather than a balance of probabilities, the matter was remitted to the Commission.

The complainant subsequently withdrew the complaint.

Given the withdrawal and the inability to determine if the Hearing Officer would have reached the same conclusion under the correct standard, the Commission rescinded the Hearing Officer's decision.

The applicants, owners of a restaurant offering shisha, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the City of Ottawa from enforcing a bylaw prohibiting the use of water pipes in indoor public places, pending their Charter challenge.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm due to the corporate applicant's potential lack of standing for Charter damages.

However, the balance of convenience favoured the City, as the public interest in protecting health from second-hand smoke outweighed the applicants' financial losses and temporary limits on cultural traditions.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.

The plaintiff sued police officers and the police board arising from a warrantless arrest at her residence, the force used during arrest and detention, subsequent charging decisions, and her treatment in custody.

The court held the arrest was unlawful under both the Trespass to Property Act and the Criminal Code, found excessive force against two officers, and found one arresting officer liable for negligent investigation.

The court also found breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter, including unreasonable search, arbitrary detention, and a serious s. 7 breach arising from the removal of the plaintiff’s clothing and leaving her naked in a cell for over two hours.

The board was not directly liable for negligent training or supervision absent expert evidence, but was vicariously and statutorily liable for the tortious conduct of liable officers.

Damages were awarded for general damages, loss of earning capacity, expenses, and Charter breaches, but punitive damages were refused.

The plaintiffs, Upper Canada District School Board and Patricia Brown, sought an interim injunction to compel the defendant, James Gilcig o/a Seaway Media, to remove two allegedly defamatory publications from the internet and prohibit future similar publications.

The publications concerned Ms. Brown's handling of swastika graffiti at a school in 2013.

The court applied the modified test for interim injunctions in defamation cases, which requires a high degree of certainty that the plaintiff will succeed at trial and that the words are manifestly defamatory and impossible to justify.

While acknowledging the potential reputational harm to the plaintiffs, the court found that the plaintiffs' evidentiary record was incomplete, specifically lacking a sworn deposition from maintenance staff regarding the timely removal of the graffiti.

Consequently, the motion for an interim injunction was dismissed, though the plaintiffs were not precluded from bringing the motion again with a more complete record.

The Plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $117,629.60 after recovering modest damages (under $50,000 each) in an action against the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers for negligent investigation, false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, negligence in training, and Charter rights breaches.

The Defendants argued no costs should be awarded due to the low recovery, suggesting the case should have proceeded under Simplified Procedure.

The court found it reasonable for the Plaintiffs to have used the ordinary procedure given the importance of Charter rights, the need for discovery, oral evidence, and the complexity of legal issues.

However, the court found the Plaintiffs' counsel's docketing heavy, hourly rates inappropriate for the entire eight-year litigation, and the use of two senior lawyers unjustified given the modest recovery.

Considering proportionality and the importance of the issues, the court awarded the Plaintiffs $65,000 in costs, less $3,750 owed to the Defendants for an unsuccessful motion, resulting in a net recovery of $61,250.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had set aside a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge had found that the respondent raised a doubt regarding the reliability of the breath-testing instrument based on a low calibration check.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge erred by failing to apply the proper standard of appellate review and by substituting his own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge.

The Court restored the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of his daughter-in-law.

At trial, he advanced a non-insane automatism defence, claiming he was in a dissociative state when he shot the victim.

The sole ground of appeal concerned Crown counsel's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown violated the principle in Browne v. Dunn by failing to confront defence witnesses with inferences and arguments later urged to the jury.

The trial judge found one Browne v. Dunn violation and two material misstatements of evidence but rejected seven other defence arguments.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's rulings, finding the corrective instructions adequate and the other Crown submissions not improper.

The applicant, a Quebec resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

She initially received income loss benefits from the Quebec SAAQ, which were later terminated.

She then applied for income replacement benefits in Ontario from the respondent insurer.

The respondent brought a preliminary issue motion arguing the applicant was precluded from claiming benefits in Ontario because she was a Quebec resident and the SAAQ was her primary source of benefits.

The Tribunal dismissed the respondent's motion, finding that the applicant met the definition of an 'insured person' under the Schedule because the accident occurred in Ontario.

The Tribunal held that the Schedule permits an insured person to claim benefits in Ontario even if they have received benefits in another jurisdiction, provided there is no double recovery for the same time period.