Lawrence Alan Greenspon

The applicant, a retired television broadcaster charged with criminal harassment, sought a publication ban on his name, arguing that publication would violate his rights under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and cause irreparable damage to his reputation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Charter does not protect a privacy interest to prevent media publication of an accused's name, nor does publication compromise the presumption of innocence.

The court also held that the common law Mentuck test was not met, as the applicant's concerns were purely personal and lacked a public interest component.

Moussa Jaber pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

The Crown sought an 11-year global sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence, citing exceptional rehabilitation.

The court found that while the offender had made significant rehabilitative efforts and was at low risk to reoffend, these did not constitute "exceptional circumstances" sufficient to justify a non-custodial or conditional sentence given the gravity of the offences, particularly the large quantities of fentanyl/heroin, methamphetamine, cannabis, and the presence of two loaded restricted firearms and substantial cash proceeds.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation.

A global sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed, with concurrent sentences for other counts, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA order.

The appellant, a Senator, sued the Senate and the Attorney General of Canada for damages arising from his suspension from the Senate for allegedly claiming inappropriate expenses.

The Senate successfully moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction based on parliamentary privilege.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Senate's actions fell within established categories of parliamentary privilege, including the power to discipline its members, administer its internal affairs, and control parliamentary proceedings and freedom of speech.

The Court held that parliamentary privilege immunized the Senate's actions from judicial review, even where unlawful conduct or Charter breaches were alleged.

The appellant, counsel for plaintiffs in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement proceedings, appealed a decision of the Eastern Administrative Judge refusing to recuse himself from determining a request for costs against her personally.

The Divisional Court found that the judge's prior direction, which contained substantive findings against the appellant without notice or opportunity to respond, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed, the costs orders were set aside, and the costs matter was remanded to a different judge.

A voir dire decision addressing the admissibility of evidence regarding the complainant's sexual activity during captivity.

The Crown sought to elicit evidence through cross-examination of the defendant regarding his reasons for having children with the complainant while in captivity, arguing it was relevant to his credibility.

The court found the evidence had minimal probative value and that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value.

The court excluded the evidence and emphasized the importance of pre-trial applications and proper procedure when Crown seeks to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and causing the complainant to take a noxious thing.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Deborah Sinclair regarding the dynamics of domestic violence, traumatic bonding, coercive control, and victim behaviour.

The defence opposed admission on grounds of relevance, necessity, expert qualification, and impartiality.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility of the expert evidence.

This is a voir dire decision determining the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused, led by the Crown during trial.

The court considered whether evidence of consensual sexual conduct on other occasions, including details of BDSM activities and statements made by the accused on multiple occasions, should be admitted.

The court applied the principles established in R. v. Seaboyer and the statutory framework of section 276 of the Criminal Code, balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the complainant's privacy rights and the interests of justice.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to issues beyond the "twin myths" and that any interference with the complainant's privacy was justified by the interests of justice.

The court ruled on whether a complainant implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by testifying in cross-examination that she had sought legal advice from her lawyers before giving media interviews while subject to a witness exclusion order.

The court held that the complainant did not implicitly waive her privilege.

The court applied a principled approach considering the fundamental nature of solicitor-client privilege, the requirement of voluntary action by the privilege holder, and the significance of the evidence arising during compelled cross-examination.

The court concluded that fairness and consistency did not require waiver in these circumstances.

The defendants, the Ottawa Police Services Board et al., brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligent investigation.

The plaintiff, a 74-year-old Polish-speaking man with limited English, was arrested and charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement based on a complaint from an individual with a significant history of police contacts and dishonesty, which was not disclosed at the plaintiff's bail hearing.

The court found that while initial reasonable grounds for arrest might have existed, there were conflicting expert opinions regarding the police's standard of care in their subsequent and ongoing investigation.

Citing the Supreme Court's framework in Hyrniak v. Mauldin, the court determined that these genuine issues of fact, particularly the contentious expert evidence on causation and standard of care, required a trial.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and they were ordered to pay costs to the plaintiff.

The offender, a financial advisor, was convicted of defrauding 10 clients of over $215,000 over a 3-year period.

The offender returned the funds to his clients before being charged, resulting in no financial loss.

The Crown sought a 30-month penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victims, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court sentenced the offender to 15 months' imprisonment and imposed a lifetime prohibition order under s. 380.2 of the Criminal Code.

The defendants moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to re-attend discovery and for the defendants to be present during her examination.

The plaintiff cross-moved to exclude the defendants from her discovery and from each other's discoveries, citing psychological distress.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, affirming the inherent right of parties to attend discoveries.

While not finding exceptional circumstances for full exclusion, the court ordered the plaintiff's examination to proceed via video conference, with the plaintiff and her counsel in one room and the defendants and their counsel in another, to mitigate potential distress.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs thrown away due to the cancellation of the original examinations.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The court considered whether section 278.92 of the Criminal Code prohibits defence counsel from putting the contents of a private record to a complainant during cross-examination without first obtaining a court order.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and public mischief.

Defence counsel sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding statements she allegedly made to a health care provider that appeared inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding the timing of alleged incidents.

The Crown objected, arguing that section 278.92 required a court order before any contents of the private record could be put to the complainant.

The court held that an order under section 278.92 is required before defence counsel may put to a witness the contents of a record in the possession of the defendant in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's refusal to recuse himself from determining costs of a prior motion.

The motion judge had made comments about the respondent's conduct that the respondent argued gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent sought to appeal the recusal order to the Court of Appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the recusal order was interlocutory, not final.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the recusal order did not finally determine any substantive rights of the parties and was therefore interlocutory, appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court also quashed the motion for leave to appeal the costs order, as the amount involved ($25,000) fell below the Court of Appeal's monetary jurisdiction threshold.

Following the dismissal of a recusal motion brought by counsel for the requestors, Canada sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Counsel for the requestors did not file responding costs submissions, arguing that the court should not take further steps while the recusal decision was under appeal.

The court rejected this argument, noting no stay had been obtained, and fixed costs at $28,911.04 payable by counsel personally.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.93 (formerly s. 276.1) for a hearing under s. 278.94 (formerly s. 276.2) to determine whether evidence of the complainant's sexual activity other than that forming the subject matter of the sexual assault charges would be admissible under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused's application record must be provided to the complainant before the s. 278.94 hearing.

The court held that the complainant is entitled to receive the application record sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow her to prepare and make meaningful submissions.

The accused, a financial advisor, was charged with multiple counts of fraud, theft, misappropriation, and forgery relating to his handling of funds for 10 clients.

The Crown alleged that the accused received funds from clients to invest, but instead deposited them into his own accounts, retained them for extended periods, and provided forged documents to conceal his actions.

The court found the accused guilty on 33 of the 34 remaining counts, concluding that he intentionally retained client funds contrary to their directions, placing their financial interests at risk, and used forged documents to deceive them.

Senator Michael Duffy sued the Senate of Canada for over $7 million in damages, alleging his suspension and denial of expenses were politically motivated, unconstitutional, and violated his Charter rights, despite his acquittal on criminal charges.

The Senate moved to dismiss the action, asserting parliamentary privilege.

The court granted the Senate's motion, finding that the Senate's decisions regarding member discipline, internal affairs, proceedings, and freedom of speech were protected by parliamentary privilege and thus immune from judicial review.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to quash an appeal by Fay Brunning, a lawyer representing persons in proceedings under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The appeal challenged a direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge requiring Brunning to appear before an Independent Assessment Process Adjudicator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the direction was an interlocutory order rather than a final order, and that any appeal from it should go to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court also found the appeal moot since the scheduled proceedings had already taken place.

The court noted that while Brunning's concerns about the judge's comments regarding her conduct were understandable, those comments were part of the reasons for judgment, not the order itself, and could be challenged in other pending appeals.