Lawrence Alan Greenspon

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of his detention order.

The court found no realistic likelihood that a panel would interfere with the lower court's decision, particularly regarding the tertiary ground for detention under s. 515(10)(c).

The court noted the strong circumstantial case, including motive, opportunity, and gunshot residue, as well as the egregious circumstances of the planned killing.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that his driving was the result of unexpectedly falling asleep due to sleep apnea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this non-blameworthy explanation, noting the weak expert evidence and the appellant's lack of history of falling asleep unexpectedly.

The court also dismissed procedural arguments regarding the trial judge's conduct.

However, based on a Crown concession, a clerical conviction for dangerous driving simpliciter was quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the dangerous driving conviction, including the appellant's speed and a prior warning from police not to drive.

The court also upheld the over 80 conviction, finding that a voluntary breath sample provided reasonable grounds for a search warrant to seize blood samples at the hospital.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a professional bus driver, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving after he drove a bus too far to the right and struck a curb.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of steering failure and that the reasons for judgment were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the steering was functional prior to impact and that the appellant's delayed reaction constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and detained in a police cell for 11 hours with virtually no contact with police officers.

He sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention was breached.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11-hour detention was indeed arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy, as the breach occurred post-offence and did not impact trial fairness or the gathering of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of possession of contraband cigarettes and faced a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600 under the Excise Act.

Finding the accused unable to pay and concluding that jail was inappropriate, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment and cannot be used merely to enforce an unpaid fine where the offender genuinely lacks the means to pay.

The Court set aside the conditional sentence but stayed further collection procedures since the sentence had already been served.

The appellant sued the Crown and two police officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn upon his entering a peace bond.

The motions judge struck the statement of claim for failure to give proper notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and for expiry of the limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the notice requirements do not apply to individual police officers and that a limitation period defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence before a motion to strike can be brought.

The appeal was allowed in part, reinstating the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence against the police officers.

The appellants, family members of a deceased cyclist, appealed an order striking their negligent investigation claim against a municipal police officer and his employer.

They alleged the officer's post-accident investigative failures caused the collapse of criminal proceedings against the driver and prolonged their emotional distress through subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

Applying the motion to strike standard and the Kamloops duty of care framework, the court held the investigating officer owed no private law duty of care to the appellants because they had no legal interest in the criminal investigation, prosecution, or discipline process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of distribution and possession of child pornography and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both the convictions and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, particularly given the lack of objections at trial.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, substituting a 14-month conditional sentence.

The Court noted the appellant's lack of prior record, his steady employment, the devastating impact the proceedings already had on his family, and the Supreme Court's guidance in Proulx that conditional sentences can achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the issuance and execution of a search warrant for records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conditions imposed on the warrant's execution were sufficient and that the appellant failed to show a section 8 Charter violation affecting the issuing judge's jurisdiction.

The Court left open the possibility for the appellant to argue at trial that certain documents are inadmissible due to common-law privilege or a section 7 Charter violation.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he challenged the constitutionality of the 'rape shield' provisions in s. 276 of the Criminal Code, which restrict the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provisions, finding that they do not violate the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the right to a fair trial, or the right against self-incrimination.

The Court held that the provisions properly balance the accused's rights with the need to protect the integrity of the trial process and the privacy of complainants.

The plaintiffs, the parents and brother of a two-year-old boy who was killed in a motor vehicle accident, brought an action for damages for nervous shock after witnessing his death.

The defendants appealed a ruling that the claim for nervous shock was not barred by s. 266(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that 'bodily injury' includes psychological injury and that the exception to immunity 'where the injured person has died' applies only to the person who actually died, not to third parties claiming independent nervous shock injuries.

The appellant appealed his conviction for common nuisance after donating blood he knew to be HIV-contaminated to the Red Cross.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 216 of the Criminal Code imposed a duty of care on the appellant when giving blood.

The Court found this duty was breached by his failure to disclose that his blood contained HIV antibodies, which endangered the life, safety, and health of the public.

The complainants applied to be firefighters with the City of Ottawa but were rejected because they did not meet the uncorrected visual acuity standard of 20/20 in each eye.

They filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination based on handicap.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaints, finding that the complainants' impaired visual acuity did not constitute a 'handicap' under s. 9(b)(i) of the Human Rights Code because there was no evidence it was caused by bodily injury, illness, or birth defect.

The appellants challenged the federal cabinet's decision to permit the United States to test cruise missiles in Canada, alleging it violated their right to life, liberty, and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter by increasing the risk of nuclear war.

The respondents moved to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while cabinet decisions are reviewable under the Charter, the statement of claim must be struck out.

The Court found that the causal link between the testing of the cruise missile and an increased risk of nuclear war was entirely speculative and incapable of proof, meaning the facts alleged could not establish a violation of s. 7.

The Ontario Legislature enacted The Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, establishing the Residential Tenancy Commission to oversee and enforce landlord and tenant rights, including the power to make eviction and compliance orders.

The Executive Council referred questions to the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the province's authority to grant these powers.

The Court of Appeal found the provisions ultra vires.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada established a three-step test for determining whether a provincial grant of power violates section 96 of the British North America Act.

The Court concluded that the powers to order eviction and compliance were historically exercised by section 96 courts, remained judicial in their institutional setting, and were the central adjudicative function of the Commission rather than being ancillary to an administrative scheme.

The appeal was dismissed, and the provisions were held ultra vires.

The applicant union applied for certification to represent a comprehensive bargaining unit of paramedical employees at the respondent hospital.

A group of objecting professional paramedical employees argued they should be excluded from the unit, asserting a desire not to be represented by any union and citing differences between professional and technical paramedicals.

The Board, following its established policy in Stratford General Hospital, held that a single comprehensive unit of both professional and technical paramedical employees is appropriate to avoid undue fragmentation in the public hospital sector.

The objectors' request to be carved out was dismissed, and the Board directed that the segregated ballots be counted.