Sexual exploitation

The appellant, Sandra Forcier, appealed her convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s credibility findings or conclusions.

The court noted the assistance of amicus curiae due to the appellant’s brain injury and confirmed that the trial judge’s reasons were entitled to deference.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Lorne Rappaport’s appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation.

The appellant, a hockey coach, was found to have engaged in a sexual relationship with the complainant, who was 15 at the time.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of evidence and improper application of legal principles regarding credibility.

The Court found no material misapprehension and held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and application of the law were reasonable and thorough.

This decision addresses the admissibility of evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code concerning a complainant's prior sexual activity and a purported recantation of a previous sexual assault allegation against her biological father.

The court found that the evidence of the complainant's prior allegation and recantation is admissible because it is relevant to the complainant's credibility and has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice.

The ruling clarifies the application of the twin myths prohibition, the criteria for admissibility under s. 276(2), and the balancing of interests under s. 276(3), emphasizing the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant, L.B., was convicted of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and physically assaulting his adopted son over a lengthy period while they were children in his care.

He received a global 10-year sentence, less 6 months for pre-trial custody and harsh detention conditions.

On appeal, L.B. challenged the consecutive nature of the sexual exploitation sentence and the overall length of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis or conclusions, and held that the sentence was fit and proportionate given the aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating factors.

Norman Ellis pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation under section 153(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the sentence should be served in custody or in the community.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence; the defence sought less than two years to allow for a conditional sentence.

The court reviewed the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles, ultimately imposing a five-year custodial sentence.

The decision discusses the gravity of sexual offences against minors, the impact on the victim, and the unavailability of a conditional sentence in these circumstances.

The court considered charges of sexual exploitation and sexual assault against Steven Ronald Moreau, who was accused of engaging in a sexual relationship with VJ, his employee, beginning when she was 16 years old.

The court found Moreau guilty of sexual exploitation under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code, finding he was in a position of trust and authority as VJ’s employer.

However, the court acquitted him on two counts of sexual assault, finding that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Moreau abused his position to induce sexual activity or that he engaged in sexual activity without VJ’s consent on the occasion alleged.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the legal distinctions between sexual exploitation and sexual assault in the context of positions of trust and authority.

The appellant, C.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault, and his sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned during oral submissions.

The conviction appeal raised three issues: the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct (the "shower incident"), the lack of a caution regarding the complainant's prior consistent statement, and the absence of an instruction against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court held that the shower incident evidence was admissible for motive and to rebut defence theories, and that the lack of specific jury instructions was a legitimate tactical decision by defence counsel.

The appellant, Daniel Wright, appealed a three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence for sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, committed between 1988 and 1990.

He argued the sentence was excessive, the judge erred in applying contemporary sentencing principles to a historical offence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a risk assessment and prior willingness to take responsibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact, and that the sentence was fit.

The court also denied the fresh evidence application, concluding it would not have affected the outcome, and declined jurisdiction over the SOIRA order given the sentence was not reduced.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and sexual interference involving his two stepdaughters.

The court, after hearing testimony from the complainants, the accused, and the accused's wife, found the complainants' evidence unreliable due to numerous inconsistencies, contradictions, and a concerning possibility of collusion.

The accused's testimony was found to be convincing.

Applying the principles of reasonable doubt and credibility assessment, the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of child witnesses (his daughter S.R. and step-granddaughter S.R.D.) by improperly discounting inconsistencies and compartmentalizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of inconsistencies or his distinction between intentional and inadvertent tainting of evidence.

The court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding child witnesses and that his credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The accused, William Schatz, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a 17-year-old student.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the egregious breach of trust by a teacher and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her sister.

Mitigating factors included the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and strong community support.

The Crown sought a two-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a 6 to 12-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing that carceral sentences are the norm for sexual offences against children, and imposed an 18-month incarceration period followed by two years of probation.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order, finding it disproportionate given the accused's low risk of reoffending and the significant time elapsed since the offence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation and uttering death threats following a judge-alone trial.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by relying on an ungrounded "common-sense" assumption to reject his evidence and by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were plausible and grounded in the evidence, and that the burden of proof was not reversed.

The court emphasized the high deference given to trial judges' credibility findings and clarified the application of the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions.

D.W. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation involving the complainant G.J., who was 13-15 years old at the time of the offence (1988-1990).

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the abuse of a position of trust and authority, the grooming and manipulation of a vulnerable child, the repetitive nature of the abuse over two years, and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her family.

Mitigating factors included the offender's guilty plea, lack of a prior criminal record, low risk of reoffending, and strong family support.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for child abuse offences.

The court sentenced D.W. to three years and six months in jail, along with a DNA order and a 10-year SOIRA order.

The accused, H.P., was charged with five sexual offences against his step-daughter, K.T., including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, spanning from June 2018 to February 2020.

The trial focused on the credibility of the complainant's testimony versus the accused's denials.

The court found the complainant's evidence compelling and reliable, supported by an audio recording, and rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and fabricated.

H.P. was found guilty on all five counts.

The accused, Aurèle Guindon, faced eleven counts of sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and sexual assault involving three adolescent boys he employed for property maintenance.

The court found the accused guilty on seven counts of sexual exploitation involving two complainants (D.M. and Z.M.), while acquitting him on four counts related to a third complainant (B.M.) due to concerns about witness testimony tainting.

The central issue was credibility, with the court finding the testimony of D.M. and Z.M. credible and reliable, and rejecting the accused's denials.

The court applied the factors for determining a position of trust or authority under section 153 of the Criminal Code, concluding that such a relationship existed and that the accused's actions were for a sexual purpose.

The defendant, S.K., facing sexual assault and sexual exploitation charges, renewed his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court had previously dismissed a similar application.

The renewed application focused on the calculation of delay, particularly when the "Jordan clock" begins, and whether the defendant waived or caused any delay by terminating counsel and seeking an adjournment.

The court, bound by appellate precedent, ruled that the s. 11(b) clock begins when the Information is sworn, not upon arrest.

It found that the defendant was responsible for the additional delay caused by his actions.

The total net delay was calculated at 14 months and 4 days, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court trials.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation, and from the imposed sentence.

The convictions stemmed from the appellant's prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.

The conviction appeal, based on the trial judge's credibility assessments, was dismissed as the appellate court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge applied incorrect sentencing legislation that was not in force at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal re-sentenced the appellant, substituting a global sentence of nine years for the sexual offences, running concurrently, with a 90-day consecutive sentence for a breach of conditions offence.

G.S. was found guilty by a jury of five sexual offences against D.A., committed between 1998 and 2001 when D.A. was 13-16 years old.

The offences involved sexual intercourse and a breach of trust, as G.S. was D.A.'s workplace supervisor and family friend.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the inherent wrongfulness and profound harm of sexual offences against children.

Despite G.S. having no prior criminal record and no remorse, the court imposed a significant penitentiary sentence of 5.5 years for two counts of sexual assault, to be served concurrently, and conditionally stayed other convictions.

Ancillary orders included DNA sample, SOIRA registration for life, lifetime prohibitions on attending places frequented by children, and contact prohibitions.

The appellant, G.J.S., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault involving his step-daughter.

The trial judge had found the appellant guilty of these charges but not guilty of sexual exploitation, distinguishing between earlier and later alleged incidents.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's use of the complainant's prior consistent statements and a threatening incident involving her biological father.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly used this evidence to enhance the complainant's general trustworthiness and reliability, rather than solely to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

This improper use was deemed determinative of guilt for the earlier allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on both counts.

The appellant, a former fashion photographer, appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving four young women, and his subsequent 51-month imprisonment sentence.

The appeal raised four grounds: the application judge's refusal to sever charges, the trial judge's decision to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and the fitness of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the lower court's decisions regarding severance, similar fact evidence admissibility, or jury instructions, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for the offences committed.