Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-03-12
Docket: C70852
Coram: Peter Lauwers, L.B. Roberts, Benjamin Zarnett JJ.A.

Between

His Majesty the King
Respondent

and

L.B.
Appellant

Iris Liu, for the appellant
Hannah Freeman, for the respondent

Heard: March 7, 2025

On appeal from the sentence imposed on January 31, 2022 by Justice Clyde Smith of the Superior Court of Justice.

Reasons for Decision

[1] The appellant was convicted of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and physically assaulting his adopted son over a lengthy period of time while they were children and under his care. He received a global 10-year sentence, less 6 months for pre-trial custody and harsh detention conditions. The global 10-year sentence was broken down as follows:

8 years for sexual interference;
8 years for invitation to sexual touching, to be served concurrently with the sentence for sexual interference;
1 year for sexual exploitation, to be served consecutively with the sentences for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching;
1 year for assault, to be served consecutively with the sentences for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation.

[2] The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, but the two appeals were bifurcated by this court on December 5, 2024, so that his sentence appeal could be heard in a timely manner. On March 5, 2025, the appellant abandoned his conviction appeal. The appellant now appeals only his sentence.

[3] The appellant does not appeal the ancillary orders imposed by the sentencing judge. He challenges his global 10-year sentence on two grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in ordering the sentence for sexual exploitation to be served consecutively with the sentence for sexual interference; and (2) the 10-year global sentence was harsh and disproportionate. He submits an 8-year global sentence should be substituted as the fit sentence in the circumstances of this case.

[4] We do not accept the appellant’s submissions. The sentencing judge made no errors. We agree with his careful analysis and conclusions.

[5] The first ground of appeal can be disposed of summarily. We agree with the sentencing judge’s determination that the convictions for the appellant’s sexual interference and sexual exploitation of his adopted daughter required consecutive sentences.

[6] While both offences involve the sexual abuse of children, the offence of sexual exploitation seeks to protect vulnerable young persons (defined as children over the age of 16 but under 18 years) from abuse at the hands of those who are in a position of trust towards them, a different societal interest: ss. 153(1) and (2), Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46; R. v. Trachy, 2019 ONCA 622, para 70; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, para 136. Aside from a small overlap of time, the offence of sexual exploitation in this case largely related to a later, different period of time when the complainant was over 16 years of age.

[7] As a result, we see no reason to interfere with the sentencing judge’s imposition of a consecutive sentence for the offence of sexual exploitation in this case, which is owed deference on appeal: R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, para 94.

[8] We also reject the second ground of appeal. The 10-year global sentence was entirely fit and proportionate and in keeping with sentences imposed for similar offenders and similar offences. As the Supreme Court noted in Friesen, at para. 114, “…mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances”.

[9] The aggravating features of the appellant’s offences were severe. The appellant’s unrelenting and hideously vicious, protracted abuse of his adopted children in their home where they should have felt safe represented a gross breach of trust and had a significant impact on the victims. As the sentencing judge concluded, the appellant’s actions “all call out for the strongest possible public condemnation”. Moreover, the appellant had a serious albeit dated criminal record including two relevant entries for violent crime – an armed robbery and a sexual assault.

[10] As the sentencing judge observed, there were no mitigating factors in this case. The appellant had a sporadic employment record and, as the sentencing judge observed, “leads a hand to mouth existence”. He had no family or other supports or contacts. He expressed no remorse. At 53, he was not a young offender at the time of sentencing.

[11] The sentencing judge thoroughly reviewed the facts and correctly applied all the relevant sentencing principles and the approach to sentencing sex offenders who abuse children that the Supreme Court set out in Friesen. He found, correctly in our view, that the appellant was a prime candidate to reoffend. The global 10-year sentence appropriately reflected the paramountcy of the principles of deterrence and denunciation, given the hugely aggravating factors and the absence of any mitigating factors in this case, as well as the appellant’s high moral culpability.

[12] There is no basis for appellate intervention. There is no error in principle and the sentence is fit. The sentencing judge’s determination of the appropriate sentence is entitled to deference: Friesen, at paras. 25, 26. The sentence appeal is therefore dismissed.

“P. Lauwers J.A.”
“L.B. Roberts J.A.”
“B. Zarnett J.A.”