Aiding and abetting

The court considered whether Dexter Peters was a party to a violent gunpoint robbery committed by his younger half-brother, J.M., in Toronto.

The Crown alleged Peters conspired with J.M. or aided and abetted the robbery, relying on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance, the presence of a GPS tracker on the victim’s car, and Peters’ conduct before, during, and after the offence.

The defence argued there were reasonable inferences consistent with innocence, including that Peters was unaware of J.M.’s plan and did not assist in the robbery.

The court found the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peters was a party to the offence, emphasizing the need for more than mere presence at the scene.

Peters was acquitted of all charges.

The City of Toronto prosecuted Adamson Barbecue Ltd., Adamson BBQ Ltd., and William Adamson Skelly for 95 by-law offences, including operating an eating establishment and a refreshment vehicle without licenses, and contravening Planning Act by-laws.

The court proceeded ex-parte as no defendants appeared.

The individual defendant, William Adamson Skelly, was found guilty on 17 counts related to operating without licenses.

However, all charges against the corporate defendants were dismissed due to insufficient evidence linking them to the business operations.

Additionally, charges against Mr. Skelly for Planning Act contraventions and aiding and abetting the corporations were dismissed, the latter on the principle that one cannot be convicted as both a principal offender and an aider/abettor for the same offence, and because the corporate defendants were found not guilty.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Christine Decaire on a mischief charge related to the Freedom Convoy.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in applying principal and party liability and inferential reasoning from circumstantial evidence.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent engaged in overt acts of mischief or formed a common intention to block streets, distinguishing her conduct from other protest-related cases.

The appellant, Qiao Zeng, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and inadequate, particularly regarding the two distinct routes to liability (aiding a planned murder and common intention in a kidnapping resulting in death) and the evidence relevant to each.

The blending of these routes and the lack of clear delineation between them for the appellant and co-accused likely confused the jury and may have led to a compromise verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder.

The accused, Wasitt Izaz, was charged with nine firearms-related offences as the driver of a vehicle from which two occupants exited and committed a shooting.

The Crown sought to establish criminal responsibility based on party liability and constructive possession.

The court found the accused not guilty of the first six counts, which related to aiding the shooting and possession of one of the firearms (Glock 30), due to reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge of the firearms and intent prior to the shooting.

However, the court found the accused guilty of counts 7, 8, and 9, related to the constructive possession of the second firearm (Glock 21) found in the glove compartment, concluding that he had knowledge and control of it after the shooting occurred.

The defendant, Tyler Willan, was charged with arson as an aider under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code, for assisting in the burning of a Honda Accord used in a murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including video chronology of the Honda and Willan's Outlander, the purchase of gas in a Jerry Can, and the movements of the alleged perpetrators (Male 1 and Male 2).

The court found that Male 1 and Male 2 committed arson by intentionally burning the Honda, which was not wholly owned by them, to destroy evidence related to a murder.

The court concluded that Willan aided the arson by driving Male 1 and Male 2 from the burn site back to Oshawa, having known about the Jerry Can and the purpose of the trip.

Willan was found guilty.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter/robbery, respectively, stemming from a fatal assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for second-degree murder, ordering a new trial due to the improper admission and use of lay opinion evidence regarding the likelihood of death, and the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire or provide a limiting instruction.

The appeal for manslaughter was also allowed, and a new trial ordered, due to inadequate jury instructions on aiding and abetting.

The robbery conviction was upheld.

The court dismissed other grounds of appeal, including challenges to the pathologist's cross-examination limits and the delay argument under the Charter.

The appellant, Candy Locey, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder, seeking to set aside her guilty plea.

She argued that the Agreed Statement of Facts, which she had accepted, did not support the conviction, specifically regarding the mens rea for murder.

The appellant contended that a question posed by the trial judge after her plea, but before conviction, and her answer to it, cast doubt on whether the mens rea was established.

The Court of Appeal found that the Agreed Statement of Facts fully supported the plea, establishing both the actus reus and mens rea for aiding and abetting second-degree murder.

The court concluded that the subsequent question and answer did not undermine the facts supporting the mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

Egypt Morgan was sentenced for manslaughter after being jointly charged with first-degree murder.

The jury found her guilty of manslaughter, while her co-accused, Shamoi Palmer, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The victim, Jermaine Titus, was an innocent bystander killed by a bullet intended for another individual.

Morgan's role involved alerting Palmer to the victim's location, knowing Palmer possessed a firearm and intended to discharge it recklessly.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the planned nature of Morgan's actions, the innocent victim, and her post-offence assistance to Palmer.

Mitigating factors included her status as a youthful first offender, family support, participation in rehabilitation programs, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a 10-year sentence, with credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 3 years, 9 months, and 21 days to serve.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient as they did not provide an adequate pathway to support the convictions, particularly regarding the appellant's role as a party to the offences.

The trial judge's instruction on party liability under section 21 of the Criminal Code was found to be erroneous, and the reasons failed to specify how the appellant aided or abetted the commission of the offences.

The accused, Abu Mandal, was charged under s. 7.1(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for selling items intending they be used in the unlawful production of a Schedule I substance (methamphetamine).

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence that Mandal sold chemicals and equipment to an individual operating a clandestine methamphetamine lab.

The central issue was whether Mandal possessed the requisite intent.

The court found that Mandal had knowledge of the unlawful end-use of the chemicals, which was sufficient to establish intent, rejecting the defence's argument that a desire for the outcome was required.

The court relied on principles from aiding and abetting cases under the Criminal Code.

Mandal was found guilty.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of graffiti found on the exterior walls of a building where a murder occurred.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude these writings from evidence, arguing they were irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The Crown contended the writings were relevant to the accused's state of mind, either as a principal or an aider, by demonstrating animus towards the deceased or knowledge of a co-accused's intent.

The court found that the evidence, primarily a security camera video, was insufficient to connect the writings to the accused or his co-accused, rendering them logically irrelevant.

Furthermore, even if relevant, their probative value was extremely slight and significantly outweighed by the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice, given their discreditable and potentially confusing nature.

The court excluded the evidence, noting the ruling was provisional and could be revisited if the evidentiary record changed.

This is an appeal from convictions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for aiding or abetting persons to possess a passport to contravene the Act and aiding or abetting illegal entry into Canada.

The appellant drove individuals to a border crossing, presenting Canadian passports that did not match the individuals, with Nigerian passports subsequently found.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of lay opinion identification evidence from border services officers, arguing a voir dire was required.

The Court of Appeal found no voir dire was necessary, as the evidence constituted admissible lay opinion based on direct observations.

The appellant also argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, which the Court found to be an error in narration, not substance, and thus not warranting appellate intervention.

Finally, the Court dismissed the unreasonable verdict argument, finding the circumstantial evidence of guilt overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after a retrial.

He appealed his conviction on three grounds: the application judge erred by dismissing the application to admit hearsay for a third-party suspect, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient corrective instruction regarding the Crown’s prejudicial closing argument, and the trial judge erred by charging the jury on party liability without factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's hearsay ruling, the trial judge's handling of the Crown's closing, or the party liability instruction, which was found to have an evidentiary basis and was akin to co-principal liability.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the party liability issue, arguing insufficient evidentiary foundation and inadequate jury instructions.

The appellant, Preston Darnell Scott, appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

The Crown alleged he acted as the getaway driver in a home invasion.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's inference of knowledge regarding the co-accused's masks and the sufficiency of reasons, as well as the fitness of the six-and-a-half-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inference of knowledge was reasonable despite an "unfortunate" choice of words, and that the reasons were sufficient.

The court allowed the sentence appeal only to grant credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the sentence by 23 days.

The appellants, Darko Stojanovski and Daniel Stojanovski, appealed their convictions for attempted murder and their 18-year sentences.

The central issues included the adequacy of jury instructions on party liability (aiding), the introduction of alternative Crown theories, the use of prior consistent statements for identification, and the appropriateness of the sentences.

The majority dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the jury charge adequate and the sentences fit.

A dissenting judge would have allowed Darko's conviction appeal, arguing the jury instruction on the specific intent required for attempted murder by aiding was insufficient and misleading.

A young person, K.S., was charged with multiple offences including common assault, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assisting Jacob A. to escape, and second-degree murder, all stemming from a violent incident at a party.

The court found K.S. guilty of common assault on two individuals (A.D. and F.K.), aggravated assault and assault with a weapon on M.O., and assisting Jacob A. to escape.

However, K.S. was acquitted of second-degree murder due to reasonable doubt regarding her direct participation and intent in the fatal stabbing of F.N. The judgment details K.S.'s role as an accomplice to Jacob's rampage, balancing the Crown's theory of aiding and abetting against the defence's argument of protective behaviour.

The defendant, Matthew Legault, was charged with aggravated assault on Christopher Chrisjohn at Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

Legault admitted to two physical altercations but claimed consent.

The Crown argued Legault was liable as a principal and as a party to a group assault.

The court found Legault's testimony incredible and unbelievable due to numerous inconsistencies.

While the Crown could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Legault as principal caused the "wounding" injuries (nasal bone fractures, gash between eyes) due to a subsequent attack by another inmate, it found him liable as principal for the lesser included offence of assault causing bodily harm.

Ultimately, the court found Legault liable as an aider and abettor for the aggravated assault, concluding that the 34-minute attack was a planned, deliberate, and orchestrated group assault involving Legault and other inmates.

The accused, Michel Bertrand, was charged with trafficking methamphetamine under section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

An undercover officer sought to purchase drugs from the accused, who stated he did not sell methamphetamine but could introduce the officer to someone who did.

The accused then facilitated an introduction to a third-party vendor, Shaun Gravelle, from whom the officer directly purchased methamphetamine.

The court analyzed whether the accused's actions constituted trafficking or aiding and abetting trafficking.

Applying the principles from R. v. Greyeyes, the court found that the accused's conduct amounted to merely incidental assistance to the purchaser, not the vendor, and therefore did not meet the definition of trafficking.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused, a young person, was on trial for first-degree murder.

This decision provides reasons for the judge's instructions to the jury regarding the use of post-incident conduct evidence.

The Crown sought to use this evidence for all elements of the offence, including planning, deliberation, and intent to kill.

The defence argued for a "no probative value" instruction.

The court ruled that post-incident conduct was not relevant to the shooters' intent to kill or whether the murder was planned and deliberate, citing risks of speculation and inferring intent.

However, the court found the evidence relevant to whether the accused aided the shooters in carrying out their plan and the accused's knowledge of the plan, particularly regarding flight and disposal of weapons.