Kathryn N. Feldman

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the offences.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence from two adult nieces of the appellant who testified to similar inappropriate touching when they were children.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous admission of similar fact evidence due to collusion; (2) failure to properly address material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and over-reliance on demeanour; (3) impermissible inference of guilt from rejection of the appellant's testimony; and (4) unsafe and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine.

The respondent was convicted only of simple possession.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence regarding cocaine trafficking and in finding that the respondent was a heavy cocaine user without evidentiary basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the expert evidence or his findings regarding the respondent's cocaine use.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography entered by the trial judge on March 13, 2015.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find that the appellant had knowledge of the child pornography on his computer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational explanation was that the appellant had knowledge of the contents of the computer, given his control and regular use of the computer, the vast quantities of child pornography found by police, and the absence of evidence that anyone else occupied the home.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of nine months in custody, three years probation, and $50,000 restitution imposed for an eleven-year fraud on a small union.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider mitigating factors including early guilty plea, cooperation, and intent to make restitution.

The sentencing judge rejected a request for a conditional sentence as part of a blended sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's rejection of the conditional sentence given the circumstances of the offence and the need for general deterrence, and determined that the custodial sentence was at the low end of the range reflecting mitigating factors.

The appellants, judgment creditors of the respondent McCallum from a defamation action, sought a stay pending their appeal of a motion judge's decision dismissing their action under Rule 21.

The action sought to set aside a 1993 conveyance of McCallum's interest in the matrimonial home to his wife Boughner as a fraudulent conveyance under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge found the appellants lacked standing as "creditors or others" under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The appellants moved for a stay to prevent Boughner from disposing of the property pending appeal.

The motion was dismissed on the basis that there was no serious issue to be tried and no evidence of irreparable harm or balance of convenience favoring the stay.

On appeal from a trial judgment, the appellant House challenged the trial judge's findings regarding municipal liability for winter road maintenance, apportionment of fault, and the discount rate applied to damages.

The trial judge found that the Township of Wilmot was not liable for the accident despite unanticipated ice formation on Huron Road, as the municipality met its statutory defences under the Municipal Act.

The trial judge apportioned fault equally (50/50) between House as driver and Baird as vehicle owner, whose defective tires contributed to the loss of control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed House's appeal on all three issues and also dismissed Baird's cross-appeal regarding costs.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment under s. 264(1) and (2)(d) of the Criminal Code for creating a private Yahoo!

Group website that portrayed the complainant in a false and sexually degrading manner.

The sole ground of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in finding that the actus reus of the offence had been established.

The appellant argued that establishing the actus reus requires proof of subjective intent to engage in threatening conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, holding that the actus reus of threatening conduct under s. 264(2)(d) is assessed objectively, not subjectively, and does not require proof of the accused's specific intent to instil fear.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown conceded that the two convictions for possession of proceeds of crime could not stand and those convictions were set aside with acquittals entered.

The convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were upheld as the trial judge had a reasonable basis to uphold the warrant issuance and police had reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct searches incident to arrest.

The sentence was reduced from 14 months on each count to 6 months less one day on each count running consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 12 months less two days, to account for the appellant's risk of deportation and demonstrated rehabilitation.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning the treatment of a Maher (Islamic marriage contract) in the equalization of net family property under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge excluded the Maher payment from the calculation of net family property and treated it as a separate obligation.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the Maher payment must be included in the equalization calculation because the parties did not expressly agree to exclude it from net family property.

The court distinguished the case from Khanis v. Noor Mohamed, where the Maher contained express language excluding it from net family property.

The court reduced the equalization payment but confirmed the wife's entitlement to collect the Maher obligation as a debt.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following his fourth conviction for sexual assault, for which he received a four-year sentence.

The Crown opposed the application on the grounds that detention was necessary in the public interest and that the grounds of appeal were frivolous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that detention was not necessary in the public interest under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the grounds of appeal to be very weak, the offence to be serious, and evidence of above-average risk to reoffend in a sexual manner.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

At trial, the appellant admitted to dishonest acts but contested whether he possessed the necessary mens rea for fraud.

The trial judge found that he did.

On appeal, the appellant raised two main arguments: first, that the trial judge erred in treating evidence about a remuneration scheme as hearsay when led to show the appellant's state of mind; and second, that the trial judge erred in relying on the Crown's suggestion that the appellant should have called other managers as witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a question of law alone, arguing that the trial judge applied a categorical rather than contextual approach to assessing whether a Charter section 8 breach had been established.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did apply a contextual approach and therefore no question of law arose on the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated October 16, 2016.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge from a conditional discharge, arguing the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Board upheld the conditional discharge, finding the appellant remained a significant threat based on expert evidence that absolute discharge would lead to medication non-compliance and increased marijuana use, resulting in decompensation and threatening behavior.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable and supported by evidentiary foundation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sexual assault conviction from the Summary Convictions Appeal Court.

He raised four issues: (1) admission of fresh expert evidence regarding the complainant's medical condition; (2) admission of the complainant's undisclosed criminal record; (3) admissibility of the complainant's videotaped hearsay statement under the Khelawon framework; and (4) whether a Charter s. 11(b) delay violation occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and holding that the Jordan framework did not apply retroactively to trials completed before its release.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following conviction on four counts: sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and assault against his biological daughter when she was 13-14 years old.

He was sentenced to eight years in penitentiary.

The Crown opposed bail on public interest grounds, arguing that the seriousness of the offence and length of sentence warranted detention.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding that the grounds of appeal were sufficiently strong to meet the threshold under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, particularly given the incomplete reasons for conviction and the appellant's lengthy history of bail compliance without incident.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment finding its building in St. Thomas unsafe under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The applicant also sought an injunction to prevent demolition pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions.

The court found that the applicant had not formed an unequivocal intention to appeal, the delay in bringing the motion was not adequately explained, there was significant prejudice to the respondents due to the unsafe condition of the building and public safety concerns, and the appeal lacked merit as the application judge's findings were well-reasoned and supported by evidence.

An employee's employment was terminated without cause pursuant to an employment contract containing a termination clause that limited severance pay to base salary only, thereby excluding commissions.

The employee argued the clause violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 by contracting out of an employment standard.

The contract also contained a severability clause.

The application judge used the severability clause to excise only the offending sentence, leaving the remainder of the termination clause enforceable.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that where a termination clause contracts out of any employment standard, the entire termination clause is void under section 5(1) of the ESA, and the severability clause cannot be used to save it.

The employee is therefore entitled to common law reasonable notice.

A high school teacher was acquitted at trial of voyeurism contrary to s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after using a camera pen to surreptitiously record videos of female students focusing on their chests and cleavage.

The Crown appealed the acquittal on three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding no sexual purpose; whether evidence from a warrantless search should have been admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter; and whether the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The majority (Feldman and Watt JJ.A.) allowed the Crown's appeal on the sexual purpose issue but dismissed it on the privacy issue, finding that students in public areas of a school do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, arguing the students did have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The appellants commenced a civil action for misfeasance in public office against a Canada Revenue Agency investigator and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging that the investigator had intentionally sworn a false Information to Obtain search warrants.

The action was discontinued on consent during trial after the appellants failed to establish key elements of their claim.

Approximately one month later, the appellants received Notices of Reassessment from the Minister of National Revenue reversing the original tax assessment.

The appellants moved to set aside the discontinuance based on these reassessments as fresh evidence.

The motion was dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the reassessments could not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office and did not meet the high threshold for setting aside a consent discontinuance.

Following protracted custody and access litigation involving two trials and a prior appeal, a costs award of $200,000 was made in favour of the father.

The mother subsequently filed for bankruptcy before the costs could be enforced.

The father sought to lift the automatic stay of bankruptcy under section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to enforce the costs award against the mother's exempt assets (RRSPs).

The motion judge granted the order, finding material prejudice and equitable grounds.

The mother appealed, arguing the lift-stay remedy applies only to equalization claims, not costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lift-stay remedy applies to costs awards in appropriate circumstances and that the motion judge properly found material prejudice and equitable grounds based on the mother's breach of representations to the court and the protracted nature of the family litigation.