Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question about reasonable doubt and by holding an in-chambers conference regarding the jury's request to clear the courtroom for the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repetition of the original reasonable doubt charge was appropriate.

The court also held that the in-chambers conference was not inappropriate, caused no prejudice, and any irregularity was cured by section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a custom home.

The trial judge found the respondent was entitled to terminate the contract because a building permit could not be obtained for the appellant's non-conforming plans.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's insistence on non-conforming features caused the failure.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to order the return of the appellant's $20,000 deposit, as the agreement had been terminated.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal stabbing following a street-level drug transaction and chase.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the jury charge was deficient on circumstantial evidence, cross-racial identification, and the included offence of manslaughter.

The court held that, although an explicit cross-racial identification instruction would have been appropriate, the identification charge as a whole was sufficient, the circumstantial evidence instruction did not misstate the burden of proof when read in context, and there was no air of reality to manslaughter given the depth and nature of the stab wound.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Muslims through pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that wilful blindness satisfied the mens rea requirement for the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the defence of good faith expression of religious opinion under s. 319(3)(b) was improperly rejected.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that wilful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge and satisfies the stringent mens rea requirement for wilfully promoting hatred, and that the appellant's statements went beyond the good faith expression of religious belief.

Appeal and cross-appeal arising from directions issued by a hospital restructuring body that would substantially reduce the services of Ontario's only francophone community hospital.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 16(3) of the Charter did not constitutionalize the institution's status and that s. 15 could not be used to supplement language rights not expressly conferred by the Charter.

However, the court held that the French Language Services Act had to be interpreted liberally and generously in light of the constitutional principle of respect for and protection of minorities, and that the impugned directions failed to respect that Act.

The court further held that, in exercising a public-interest discretion, the decision-maker was required to give serious weight and consideration to the institution's linguistic, cultural, and educational significance to the francophone minority.

Appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, the quashing order was affirmed, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from the birth of a child who suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation during a breech delivery.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to make an explicit finding on causation, misapprehending expert evidence regarding fetal monitoring, and failing to apply the 'Breech Plus Rule' for the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to explicitly determine causation did not affect the trial judge's conclusion that the obstetrician met the standard of care.

The court found the trial judge's factual findings regarding the obstetrician's decisions and the rejection of an absolute rule for breech deliveries were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant lien claimant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that its non-possessory lien attached to a respondent's interest in trailers.

The court held that the respondent acquired rights in the trailers only upon repurchase, after the lien arose but before it was registered, engaging s. 10(1) of the Repair and Storage Liens Act and giving the respondent priority.

The court also rejected reliance on s. 63(11) of the Personal Property Security Act, noting that the PPSA does not apply to a statutory lien and that prior appellate authority had already limited the effect of that provision in this dispute.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff insurance broker appealed the trial judge's refusal to award pre-judgment interest and costs after successfully suing a former producer for the purchase price of her book of business.

The defendant cross-appealed the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement and the dismissal of her counterclaim for withheld commissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding ample support for the trial judge's interpretation.

The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by depriving the successful plaintiff of costs and interest simply because the agreement was poorly worded, especially since the plaintiff had made an offer to settle for the amount the defendant claimed was owed.

TaxSave appealed a motion judge's decision treating its claim for 50% of a tax refund as an ordinary unsecured claim under Gilmore Printing's CCAA plan of arrangement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the claim was a contingent claim expressly carved out of the plan and not compromised.

TaxSave was entitled to its full 50% share of the refund, as there were no other claimants to the fund and other creditors had been satisfied.

The appellant was injured in a collision between his all-terrain vehicle and the respondent's pickup truck on a gravel road.

A jury found the appellant 100% liable and assessed damages at $566,634.

The appellant appealed the liability finding, and the respondent cross-appealed the damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal found the jury's verdict on liability unreasonable, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed the respondent failed to leave one-half of the road clear, creating a prima facie case of negligence.

The court ordered a new trial on liability only and dismissed the cross-appeal regarding damages.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment and for leave to deliver a statement of defence.

The motions judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that it was a collateral attack on a final order and should have been appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge erred in finding he lacked jurisdiction, as the proper remedy to set aside a default judgment is under Rule 19.08.

However, the Court of Appeal declined to set aside the default judgment, finding that the appellant failed to put forward a good defence on the merits due to an entire agreement clause in the personal indemnity he signed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Fraser and two co-accused were tried for second-degree murder following a street fight.

Fraser admitted to stabbing the victim but raised defences of intoxication.

The co-accused were acquitted, while Fraser was convicted.

Fraser appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and intent.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the co-accused, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could not be convicted of manslaughter if Fraser was convicted of murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed Fraser's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to use evidence of Fraser's flight from the scene.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed because, although the trial judge erred in law regarding party liability for manslaughter, the Crown failed to show the error may well have affected the verdicts for the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s pre-Lifchus jury charge failed to properly distinguish proof beyond a reasonable doubt from proof on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the substantial compliance approach from post-Lifchus Supreme Court authorities, the court held that the charge, read as a whole and in the context of the full trial, adequately conveyed the very high criminal standard of proof.

The court found no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the burden or standard of proof and no serious concern about the validity of the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, including the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine.

During the trial, hearsay evidence regarding the seizure of buy money from the appellant was admitted in anticipation of a Crown witness who was ultimately not called.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and instructed the jury that there was no evidence of buy money being found on the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued a mistrial should have been declared and that the jury charge was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no tactical prejudice and concluding that the jury charge adequately addressed the issue and was arguably generous to the appellant.

The appellant, a young person, appealed a conviction for uttering a threat arising from an incident in a school parking lot.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons suggested a misapprehension of material defence evidence and a failure to apply the W.(D.) framework when assessing whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Applying the unreasonable verdict principles articulated in Biniaris and Burke, the court found the conviction unsafe and unsupported by the evidence.

Given the unfairness of requiring a new trial on only one of the two related incidents, the court substituted an acquittal.

The appellant school board expropriated a portion of the respondents' land for a school site.

The respondents sought compensation for the market value of the land and for lost developer's profit as disturbance damages.

The Ontario Municipal Board awarded market value but denied the claim for lost developer's profit.

The Divisional Court reversed, awarding the lost profit as disturbance damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the school board's appeal, holding that lost prospective developer's profit is not compensable as disturbance damages under the Expropriations Act, and restored the OMB's award.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judge's order fixing spousal and child support arrears at $15,000 instead of the $50,000 claimed.

The trial judge had reduced the arrears on the basis that the wife did not pay tax on the support payments and would receive a windfall, and that she had delayed in enforcing the arrears.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in her tax analysis, as the lump sum payment of arrears would still be taxable in the wife's hands.

The Court also found that the wife's delay in enforcement did not amount to acquiescence.

The arrears were fixed at $50,000.

The respondent, a bingo hall manager on a First Nation reserve, was acquitted of keeping a common gaming house after continuing operations despite the revocation of a provincial gaming licence.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that criminal law could not be used to enforce compliance with a provincial regulatory scheme.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to recognize that the prohibition of gambling except as provincially regulated is valid criminal law.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that reduced its damages for a breached commercial sublease due to a failure to mitigate, and dismissed its claims against the individual respondent for inducing breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had no obligation to renegotiate the sublease to mitigate damages, increasing the judgment against the corporate respondent.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the personal claims against the individual respondent, finding he acted in good faith as the directing mind of the corporation, which breached the lease simply due to a loss of revenue.

The award of solicitor-and-client costs to the individual respondent was also upheld due to unsubstantiated allegations of fraud.

The appellant, a retired lawyer, sued the respondent alleging he was assaulted by other inmates while incarcerated for contempt of court.

The respondent successfully moved to dismiss the action for delay after the appellant failed to comply with a previous court order requiring him to provide an affidavit of documents, attend discovery, and set the action down for trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the appellant's failure to comply was intentional, not satisfactorily explained, and gave rise to a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.