Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge failed to separate evidence between the counts and that there was insufficient evidence the weapon used was a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The court held that while mandatory minimums applied, imposing consecutive minimum sentences resulted in an unduly long total sentence.

The sentence was reduced from eight years to six years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the suggestion the appellant did not leave the scene with the intent to flee civil or criminal liability was totally destroyed by the evidence.

The Court held that regardless of whether the trial judge was correct in her treatment of the presumption, the result would necessarily have been the same.

The appellant appealed convictions for uttering a forged document, breach of recognizance, and fraud under $5,000, as well as a nine-month custodial sentence.

The court rejected the challenge to the identification evidence, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the courier manager's identification despite an initial mistaken photo lineup selection.

The Crown conceded that the full offence of uttering had not been made out because the document was not dealt with by the intended recipient as genuine.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part by substituting a conviction for attempting to utter a forged document and reducing the sentence on that count to three months concurrent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and common assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors of law and was not required to provide detailed self-instruction in her reasons.

The court upheld the three-year sentence for sexual assault but allowed the sentence appeal in part to delete an illegal two-year probation order that followed the penitentiary sentence, substituting a concurrent six-month sentence for the common assault.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and forcible confinement based primarily on eyewitness identification by the complainant.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended the alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her application of the W.(D.) framework by compartmentalizing the evidence and misapprehended several key pieces of defence evidence.

Concluding that the identification evidence displayed numerous indicia of unreliability and the alibi evidence was strong, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his reasons by inappropriately considering what would happen to the complainant if the accused were not convicted, and by framing the credibility assessment as a contest of whether the complainant or the accused was 'guilty' of fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

IARW Insurance Company Limited settled a claim against its insured, Trenton Cold Storage Limited, and sought contribution from St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which had issued an umbrella excess liability policy to Trenton.

The trial judge found both insurers liable to share the settlement and costs equally.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that IARW's policy provided primary coverage, while St. Paul's policy was a true umbrella policy providing only excess coverage.

As IARW's primary limits were not exhausted, St. Paul had no obligation to contribute to the settlement or the defence costs.

The appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed.

The appellant management consulting firm appealed a trial judge's assessment of damages against three former employees who breached their fiduciary duties by secretly soliciting the appellant's clients before resigning.

The trial judge had awarded $30,324 based on a twelve-month grace period, past profit margins, and a 25% contingency deduction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his approach.

The Court held that the former employees misappropriated specific contracts, and the appellant was entitled to its expected net profit from the expected gross revenues without deductions for general overhead or arbitrary contingencies.

Damages were varied to $260,000.

The appellant pedestrian was struck by a vehicle and sued for damages.

At trial, the judge ruled on the section 266(3) Insurance Act threshold motion while the jury was deliberating, finding the appellant not credible and dismissing the action.

The jury subsequently returned a substantial damages award.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge was required to wait for the jury's verdict and follow its implicit credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislature left the threshold determination to the judge, who is not bound by the jury's verdict, and the timing of the ruling is within the judge's discretion.

The appellant, an armoured car service employee, was convicted of theft from an automated banking machine.

The trial judge relied on the finding that the appellant had been issued both combinations to the machine.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, as the Crown had conceded at trial that the exhibit did not prove the appellant received both combinations.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and restitution orders, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant challenged a judgment awarding damages for historical sexual abuse, arguing the action was out of time, barred by laches, and that damages were excessive.

The court applied the discoverability approach to limitation periods in sexual battery claims and held that time began to run when the respondent realized the causal connection between the abuse and her injuries through sufficient professional counselling.

The court held laches did not arise once the action was found timely.

While punitive damages were not supportable on the trial reasons given the prior criminal sanction, the $20,000 award was sustained as aggravated damages based on the degrading and terrorizing circumstances of the abuse.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was found not guilty of second-degree murder by reason of insanity in 1978.

Over the years, he gained increased access to the community but was returned to in-patient status after testing positive for drugs.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his detention with only staff-accompanied access to the community.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred by shifting the focus from public protection to punishing the appellant for drug use.

The Court held the evidence did not establish the appellant was a significant threat to public safety and ordered an absolute discharge.

The appellants appealed an order amending a consent judgment regarding the submission of plans for the removal of support beams.

The motion judge amended the judgment to reflect the mutual intent of the parties, as the original language did not accomplish the goal of filing plans that would satisfy the City of Toronto's requirements for a building permit.

The Court of Appeal found the rectification was justified and dismissed the appeal, extending the deadline for submitting the plans on consent.

The respondents openly sold direct-to-home satellite systems with access cards that could decode United States satellite programming signals.

The police obtained and executed search warrants at the respondents' business premises, seizing extensive inventory and records.

The respondents successfully applied to quash the warrants and for the return of the seized property.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly heard the application rather than deferring to the trial court, correctly concluded that the affiant failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure, and correctly determined that the alleged offence under s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act was not an offence known to law due to statutory ambiguity regarding foreign signals.

The appellant corporation entered into a personal services contract with the respondent company.

The contract, drafted by the appellant's principal, contained a termination clause providing for compensation if the respondent unilaterally terminated the agreement.

The respondent's principal signed the contract without reading the termination clause.

The respondent later unilaterally terminated the agreement.

The trial judge held that the appellant's principal owed a duty to bring the termination clause to the respondent's attention and rectified the contract by striking the clause.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no such duty existed as the respondent's principal was an experienced businessman who was advised to read the contract.

The Court also held that rectification was inapplicable as there was no mutual intention regarding unilateral termination.

The appellant company sought payment of a $5 million key-man life insurance policy following the death of its principal from colon cancer.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the deceased materially misrepresented his medical history at the time of application and failed to disclose a change in insurability before the policy was delivered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the failure to disclose relevant medical information rendered the policy voidable by the insurer under section 183 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant was injured in a bicycle-motor vehicle collision and notified the respondents' insurer of her intent to sue.

The insurer scheduled independent medical examinations under s. 258.3(1)(d) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant refused to attend.

The respondents obtained a court order compelling her attendance.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the statutory scheme does not confer jurisdiction on the court to compel a plaintiff to undergo a medical examination before an action is commenced.

The only penalty for non-compliance provided by the legislature is that the court may consider it when awarding costs under s. 258.3(9).

The appeal was allowed and the order compelling the examination was set aside.

The appellant builder appealed a trial judgment that allowed the respondent purchasers to refuse to close a real estate transaction and recover their $20,000 deposit.

The trial judge found that changing the location of the attached garage from the side to the front of the house was a fundamental change, and that the builder failed to clearly convey this change to the purchasers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellant was tried for attempted murder.

When the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge and others misheard the foreman say 'Not guilty as charged' instead of 'Guilty as charged'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty and the jury was discharged.

Moments later, the error was discovered.

The trial judge recalled the jury, conducted an inquiry, and corrected the verdict to guilty.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to change the verdict after discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's mishearing of the verdict was an accidental slip that could be corrected, and that the inquiry did not violate the appellant's Charter rights or section 649 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of alibi evidence and by admitting hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating he was 'not satisfied' the alibi witnesses were reliable, without considering if their evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding cell phone records through a police officer without meeting the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial for both appellants, declining to apply the curative proviso.