Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a finding that she breached a condition of her conditional sentence by failing to report to a drug rehabilitation program.

She argued the appeal was moot, the hearing did not commence within the 30-day statutory limit under s. 742.6(3) of the Criminal Code, and the judge erred in finding a breach.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal was not moot, the hearing commenced within the required time when the judge took jurisdiction, and the obligation to attend the program was continuous.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The appellants submitted costs submissions, while the respondent provided no response.

The court fixed costs in the amount of $20,000 plus disbursements and G.S.T.

The respondent operated a public parking garage as a legal non-conforming use under a new comprehensive zoning by-law.

The new by-law contained performance standards identical to those in the former by-law.

The respondent introduced valet parking, which contravened these performance standards, and was convicted of breaching the by-law.

The conviction was quashed on appeal, but the Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that subjecting a legal non-conforming use to performance standards identical to those in place when the use was acquired does not prevent the use of the property within the meaning of the Planning Act.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple sexual offences against nine child complainants spanning three periods over three decades, arguing that evidence from earlier family-based abuse should not have been admitted as similar fact evidence on later allegations involving unrelated children.

The court held that similar fact evidence need not show striking similarity where identity is not in issue and credibility is central.

In the context of a multi-count indictment, the trial judge was entitled to find a sufficient pattern of opportunistic sexual predation and distinctive sexual conduct to give the evidence significant probative value outweighing prejudice.

The limiting instruction properly guarded against prohibited bad character reasoning.

The conviction appeal and the related dangerous offender appeal were dismissed.

The appellant's statement of defence was struck and he was subsequently noted in default.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking to set aside both the order striking his statement of defence and the noting of default.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction, arguing the appellant must first move to set aside the noting of default under rule 19.03.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, holding that a defendant must exhaust remedies in the court of first instance before an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decisions to strike his statement of claim and declare a mortgage registered to his mother as not binding on a partnership.

The appellant also alleged bias on the part of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the statement of claim and the bias allegations, finding no substantial wrong and that the trial judge's conduct did not amount to bias.

However, the Court varied the judgment regarding the mortgage, directing that its validity and priority be determined in future proceedings when the property is sold, as the mortgagee was not a party to the action.

The appellants, a former trustee in bankruptcy and a bank, appealed a decision determining several questions of law regarding the administration of summary bankruptcy estates.

The former trustee sought fees in excess of the prescribed tariff for extraordinary work performed, while the bank sought priority for funds advanced to keep the bankrupt estates' administration running.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the court has no jurisdiction to award trustee fees in excess of the statutory tariff for summary administration estates.

The court also affirmed that any withdrawals for overhead must be credited against the trustee's fees, that the Guardian appointed by the Superintendent has priority over the former trustee for its fees, and that any shortfall in the consolidated trust account must be borne by the fee claimants rather than the creditors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his four-year sentence.

The offences arose from an altercation at a party where the complainant was attacked with broken beer bottles.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the absence of a witness, the response to a jury question, and the use of the complainant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting that the charge as a whole properly conveyed the burden of proof.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding that the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his co-accused's conditional sentence was justified by their differing levels of involvement and personal circumstances.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal claim against the individual respondent, a corporate officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statement of claim failed to plead material facts giving rise to an independent claim against the officer in his individual capacity.

The allegations of inducing breach of contract and tortious misrepresentation were deemed insufficient to establish personal liability.

The appellants appealed an order settling a prior order that approved the sale of a bankrupt company's assets, including a trademark licence agreement and shares, to Stanfield's Limited, as well as a vesting order.

The appellants argued the sale should not have been approved prior to determining entitlement to the interest in the licence agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had jurisdiction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to order the sale prior to determining entitlement, especially given evidence that the value of the licence agreement was deteriorating.

The dismissal of the appellants' cross-motion for an adjournment was also upheld.

The appellant, a youth, was convicted of sexual interference and breach of probation involving a 5-year-old complainant.

The trial judge framed the central issue as a credibility contest between the complainant and the appellant, ultimately rejecting the appellant's testimony on the basis that he had a motive to lie to avoid conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt, and by erroneously assuming the appellant's testimony was inherently suspect, which violated the presumption of innocence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against his former partner's son.

The appellant argued the trial judge made several errors, including improperly using neutral evidence to buttress the complainant's credibility, applying an uneven standard to criminal records, improperly using a prior consistent statement, and misapprehending evidence regarding inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or evidence.

The appellant husband appealed a motion judge's finding that a binding settlement had been reached in a divorce proceeding.

The parties had exchanged correspondence regarding an equalization payment, the payment of the children's lawyer's fees, and the handling of life insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the parties had reached a consensus ad idem on all essential terms, noting that the husband's self-serving affidavit did not raise a triable issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent wife.

The appellants, a bank and its assignee, appealed a trial judgment finding they improperly used the respondent developer's confidential business information during the assignment of a defaulted loan, causing a lost opportunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the bank had an unqualified right to assign the debt.

Furthermore, the Court found that the trial judge erred in awarding damages based on a 'lost opportunity' theory that was neither pleaded nor supported by the evidence.

The cross-appeal by the respondent was dismissed, and the action against the appellants was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application to vary support.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in rejecting the appellant's medical evidence, which indicated he was unable to work full-time.

Given the conflicting evidence regarding the appellant's ability to work, the motion judge should have ordered the trial of an issue.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the trial of an issue ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the respondent condominium corporation relief to enforce a parking by-law and rules.

The appellant argued the by-law was invalidly passed, unreasonable, and selectively enforced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding evidence supported the by-law's validity, reasonableness, and consistent enforcement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the quantum of parking fines, reducing the arbitrary $6,000 award to the proven amount of $2,440.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two counts of sexual interference and one count of sexual assault involving young adolescent victims.

The court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the serious and repeated sexual violations, the sentencing judge's improper attribution of blame to the victims, and the respondent's repeated breaches of court-imposed release conditions.

The respondent's admitted attraction to young men, absence of a relevant treatment plan, and poor compliance history made him a poor candidate for a community-based sentence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment less credit for time served under the conditional sentence, resulting in 6 months' incarceration.

The appellant landlords leased commercial space to the respondent, who subsequently assigned the leases.

The assignee became insolvent and repudiated the leases pursuant to s. 65.2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The landlords sued the original tenant for rent arrears.

The motion judge dismissed the actions, finding the repudiation terminated the leases for all purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a repudiation under s. 65.2 only affects the obligations of the insolvent assignee and does not terminate the lease or release the original tenant from its primary liability to the landlord.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

During cross-examination, the Crown questioned the appellant about his association with two individuals who had been convicted of drug importing, despite no evidence linking them to the appellant's charges.

The trial judge failed to caution the jury against drawing an adverse inference of guilt by association.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper cross-examination and lack of a limiting instruction resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.