John I. Laskin

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal beating death of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement to police, failing to correct Crown closing arguments, and failing to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct and mens rea.

He also appealed the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence due to the severe aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the aggravated assault of a woman he had been dating.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in excluding the possibility that his risk to the public could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's risk could not be controlled in the community was amply supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of two complainants as similar fact evidence due to potential collusion.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge thoroughly and correctly addressed the possibility of collusion, both as deliberate concoction and as the potential impact of their discussions on the independence of their evidence.

The trial judge's finding that the evidence was not the product of concoction was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court noting the case against the appellant was overwhelming.

The appellant real estate brokerage claimed a commission from the respondents based on an exclusive listing agreement.

The respondents had entered into a lease agreement and an agreement of purchase and sale with a third party during the extended term of the listing agreement.

The appellant argued this amounted to a completed transaction or an option to purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of the claim, finding that the transaction was a lease pending a future sale, and any ambiguity in the broker-drafted agreement must be resolved in favour of the respondents.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's disposition, noting the trial judge considered all relevant principles, the seriousness of the offence, a Gladue report, and the respondent's substantial progress in addressing his alcohol problem prior to sentencing.

The respondent's post-sentence progress further confirmed the wisdom of the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings on a minor allegation.

The appeal judge had refused to order a new trial and stayed the proceedings, believing the allegations to be trivial.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the appeal judge erred by second-guessing the Crown's prosecutorial discretion.

However, the Court declined to order a new trial, noting the respondent had already appeared in court four times at personal expense, the allegation was minor, and the Crown had made its legal point.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his nieces and nephew from two separate trials.

In the first trial, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury on the risk of innocent collusion between the young complainants and the specific frailties of their evidence.

The Court also found the Crown's closing address was highly inflammatory and improperly suggested the absence of a proven motive to fabricate meant the complainants were telling the truth.

In the second trial, the trial judge erred by applying issue estoppel to prevent the appellant from challenging the nieces' similar fact evidence based on the first jury's verdict.

Both appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter.

The trial judge found the appellant unlawfully entered the victim's home and committed mischief by causing damage during entry.

However, the trial judge failed to determine whether the appellant intended to commit an indictable offence at the time of entry, which was a significant issue with a clear factual dispute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the necessary findings of fact regarding intent were not made.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on two youthful offenders who pled guilty to a home invasion robbery.

One respondent received two years less a day and the other received 21 months, both followed by three years' probation.

The trial judge emphasized the respondents' significant rehabilitative progress while on strict bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentences were lenient, the trial judge made no error in principle and the sentences were not manifestly unfit given the strong prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof and applied different standards in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's brief reasons adequately demonstrated the basis for conviction by relying on corroborating evidence, including a 'will' and sibling testimony, to believe the complainant and disbelieve the appellant.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, stating they agreed with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

Costs of the appeal and a related appeal were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his proceeding.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting that the appellant had failed to deliver a statement of claim as required by a previous order and provided no explanation for this failure.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to set aside a registrar's dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to consider that the appellant did not receive the status notice or dismissal order, moved promptly to set it aside upon learning of it, and discovered the dismissal when attempting to set the action down for trial.

The dismissal order was set aside, and the appellant was granted 30 days to set the action down for trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to provide the necessaries of life after her severely developmentally delayed sister starved to death while locked in her basement.

She was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding expert evidence, failed to properly consider the mental elements of the offences, and imposed a sentence that offended the parity principle compared to her husband's conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the mental elements properly established, and the disparity in sentences justified by the appellant's role as primary caregiver and lack of remorse.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for assault charges, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention in a maximum security facility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Board reasonably concluded the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety, it erred in principle by failing to adequately consider his cultural and linguistic isolation and whether his current placement was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application for declaratory relief as statute-barred.

The appellant argued that under s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, there is no limitation period for his application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application implicitly sought consequential relief, taking it outside the scope of s. 16(1)(a).

The Court noted that any viable claim the appellant might have would be through an application for an order to pass accounts.

The appellant appealed an order resolving a priority dispute between two secured creditors of an insolvent corporation.

The dispute involved a circular priority problem created by multiple financing agreements.

The motion judge applied a partial subordination theory, finding that the respondent intended to subordinate its interest only to a third-party lender, not to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that partial subordination produced an equitable result and that complete subordination would confer an unintended windfall on the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a store clerk, sold cigarettes to a 17-year-old test shopper without asking for identification and was convicted under the Smoke Free Ontario Act.

He appealed, arguing that the random compliance check constituted entrapment because the authorities lacked reasonable suspicion that he or the store were engaged in illegal activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the criminal law doctrine of entrapment, specifically the requirement for reasonable suspicion, does not apply to bona fide random test shopping used to monitor compliance with regulatory statutes.

The appellant franchisee appealed an order appointing a receiver over its business.

The franchisee argued that the franchisor had forgiven its debt for unpaid royalties and advertising contributions through two letters, and that the application judge erred in considering PST arrears not pleaded in the notice of application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the letters were merely proposals requiring acceptance, which never occurred.

The court also held that the PST default was properly considered as it was raised in supporting affidavits without causing prejudice, and rejected new arguments regarding jurisdiction, waiver, and estoppel.