John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his willingness to take Lupron to control his risk of reoffending, and improperly admitted expert reply psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record and the expert evidence was admitted on consent.

The appellant hospital appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board granting the respondent an absolute discharge after she was found not criminally responsible for wilful mischief endangering life.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Review Board misapprehended the expert psychiatric evidence regarding the respondent's risk of acting on delusional beliefs and failed to consider evidence from the respondent's sister and the hospital treatment team.

The disposition was set aside and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a serious home invasion, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the amount of pre-sentence custody was part of the joint submission and that the sentence, which was at the very low end of the range, appropriately reflected one-for-one credit alongside other mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed the imposition of an $8,000 fine, arguing it was excessive and that the trial judge failed to make sufficient inquiry into his ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in this regard, though it affirmed that a fine reflecting the seriousness of the offence was appropriate.

The appeal was allowed and the fine was reduced to $6,000, with one year to pay.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent for injuries sustained after slipping on an icy patch in a laneway.

The trial judge found the laneway was used as both a vehicular roadway and a pedestrian passageway, and applied the gross negligence standard applicable to sidewalks.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach or his finding of gross negligence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the appellant failed to meet the test for leave and that the argument had little merit.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that allowed the Crown's appeal from an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the test for granting leave had not been met and none of the grounds raised warranted granting leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus of the offence had been made out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's analysis fully supported the finding of dangerous driving.

The appellant was convicted of tax evasion after failing to disclose income or pay taxes from 1993 to 1997, based on his belief that federal income tax was unconstitutional.

He appealed his conviction and his sentence of one year in jail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding he had the requisite mens rea and the trial judge properly handled a juror issue.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by treating the absence of a conditional sentence in tax evasion cases as an absolute rule and by mischaracterizing aggravating factors.

The jail sentence was varied to a one-year conditional sentence.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal by the appellant regarding an order granting the media access to a video exhibit from the appellant's concluded bail hearing.

The moving party argued the matter was criminal in nature, meaning jurisdiction lay with the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that because the criminal proceedings were fully concluded and the order did not affect any ongoing criminal matter or the appellant's fair trial rights, the proceeding was civil in nature and properly appealed to the Court of Appeal under the Courts of Justice Act.

The moving party, Lehman Brothers International (Europe), sought to stay an order refusing to permanently stay the Ontario action pending its motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved the beneficial ownership of publicly traded securities held under brokerage contracts containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the moving party failed to show a serious issue to be adjudicated, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, particularly given the responding parties' undertakings and the ongoing concurrent litigation in New York.

The parties reached a settlement in the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered that the matter be resolved according to the draft order filed.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the guardianship of the respondent.

The motion judge had mistakenly treated a motion for a time-limited appointment to obtain medical assessments as an application for permanent guardianship, believing he lacked the power to grant the former.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, noting the judge had the necessary power under s. 58(2)(a) of the Substitute Decisions Act.

The parties agreed to mediate the matter.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision to invoke Rule 52.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to overturn a jury's finding of negligence against the respondent doctor.

The jury had found that the respondent's delay in transferring the appellant to another facility caused his paraplegia.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that while the respondent breached the standard of care by delaying the transfer, the appellants failed to adduce any expert evidence proving that an earlier transfer would have resulted in a timely diagnosis and surgery to prevent the paralysis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against the Crown.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the claims even if they were not statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The Court noted that the section 15 Charter claim was too vague and lacked evidence to permit meaningful analysis.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondent, though the Crown undertook not to enforce the order due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

The appellants appealed a judgment finding Oren Nirenberg personally liable for inducing Zurich Insurance to breach its contract with the respondent.

The parties had a joint venture to share commissions from group insurance policies sold to Seneca College employees.

Nirenberg directed Zurich to forward all commissions to his company instead of the respondent, which Zurich did.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that Zurich's failure to pay the respondent was a breach of contract, and Nirenberg intentionally induced that breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and heroin, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The contraband was found during a warrantless search of her knapsack after police responded to a 911 call about a hostage situation.

The Court of Appeal found that the search violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights, as it was not justified by exigent circumstances or the Waterfield doctrine.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith in a chaotic situation and the law regarding police powers in such circumstances was uncertain.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the Crown improperly cross-examined and argued about the complainant's motive to fabricate, and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with an acquittal on an incest charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave a proper curative instruction regarding the Crown's conduct and that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as it was open to the jury to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding his evidence not credible.

The trial judge's primary reason for rejecting the appellant's credibility was a finding that the appellant deliberately failed to disclose his complete criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found this was not a fair basis for rejecting the evidence, as the incomplete record was due to an inadvertent error by both Crown and defence counsel, and the appellant readily admitted the missing convictions during cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based on strong DNA evidence linking his blood to the crime scene.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of the appellant's pre-trial statements, specifically by failing to give an O'Connor instruction and by incorrectly stating that prior inconsistent exculpatory statements were not evidence unless adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in omitting the O'Connor instruction given the independent evidence of concoction.

While the court agreed the trial judge erred in his instruction on prior inconsistent statements, it applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming DNA evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.