John I. Laskin

The appellant real estate agent sued the respondent vendor for unpaid commission and brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of the sale, held in trust by the vendor's solicitor, paid into court pending trial.

The master granted the motion, but the Divisional Court allowed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, clarifying that while Rule 45.02 does not require a plaintiff to claim a proprietary right to a specific fund, the plaintiff must claim a legal right to the fund.

Because the appellant's claim was for damages for breach of contract rather than a legal right to the specific trust funds, the test for payment into court was not met.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that a prior order declaring the jurisdiction of the Ontario court was a final order, rather than a temporary one.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the parties had consented to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court for all purposes.

The appeal was dismissed, along with a motion to introduce fresh evidence, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking crack cocaine.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The trial judge was unable to identify the appellant from surveillance photographs but relied on the opinions of police officers who identified the appellant in court.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in relying on the officers' opinions, as they had no special knowledge or advantage over the judge in comparing the photographs to the appellant.

The in-dock identification was inherently frail, and the verdict could not be supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action alleging that the defendant railway company misclassified first line supervisors as managerial employees to avoid paying overtime under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge certified the action but significantly redrafted the common issues, rejecting the plaintiff's proposed misclassification issue due to a lack of commonality.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly rejected the misclassification issue because individualized assessments of job duties were required.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in certifying a reframed common issue about the minimum requirements for managerial status, as it suffered from the same lack of commonality.

The certification order was set aside.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The summary conviction appeal judge had held there was insufficient evidence that the approved instrument analyzed the breath samples, rendering the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly relied on circumstantial evidence—specifically the instrument's readings—to infer that an analysis had occurred.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply the applicable statutory presumption and by exceeding the permitted standard of appellate review.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a robbery committed at an ATM, based on a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence showing that his treating psychiatrists had ruled out schizophrenia and that his symptoms were likely caused by a substance-induced psychosis.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the NCRMD verdict amounted to a miscarriage of justice since self-induced intoxication cannot support such a verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a conviction for robbery was entered with a sentence of one day's imprisonment, given the seven years the appellant had already spent in custody.

The appellant Ministry appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of a record containing the first three characters of Ontario postal codes and the corresponding number of registered sex offenders residing in each area.

The Ministry argued the record was exempt from disclosure under s. 14 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming it could lead to identifying offenders' whereabouts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Divisional Court that the Commissioner's conclusion was reasonable, as the Ministry failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its concerns.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with cocaine dissolved in wine bottles.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the knowledge requirement and in admitting opinion evidence from a border services inspector regarding her ticket purchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the inspector's testimony about cash payments and short-notice bookings was inadmissible, highly prejudicial opinion evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently received Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and Hospitals of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOP) disability benefits.

The defendants brought a motion to determine whether these benefits were deductible from any tort award for loss of income or loss of earning capacity under s. 267.8(1)2 of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge ruled they were not deductible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the benefits fall within the private insurance exception at common law, and the statutory addition of 'loss of earning capacity' did not clearly and unambiguously change this rule.

Furthermore, the benefits were paid in respect of the plaintiff's disability, not 'in respect of the incident' as required by the statute.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence to argue his guilty plea was involuntary because a co-accused allegedly threatened to kill him if he did not plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal, finding the appellant's claims lacked credibility and were contradicted by the record, including his own letter of apology and the withdrawal of charges against the co-accused.

The appellant succeeded on appeal in obtaining a new trial on damages for one of its breach of contract claims against the respondent.

In this costs endorsement, the Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $50,000 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal.

For the trial costs, the court found that despite the appellant's limited success on appeal, the respondent remained the overwhelmingly successful party at trial, having defeated five of six claims totaling $121 million.

The court reduced the trial judge's costs award to the respondent to reflect the appellant's partial success and the removal of a Rule 49 substantial indemnity consequence, awarding the respondent $753,076.37 in trial costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action against the respondent and declaring the individual appellant a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, as the corporate appellant was in receivership and the individual appellant lacked authority to bring a claim on its behalf.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the vexatious litigant declaration, holding that under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, such an order can only be made on an application, not on a motion in an action.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 and failed to appear for her trial date.

The trial judge arraigned her in absentia and entered a not guilty plea, relying on a filed designation of counsel.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction, finding a violation of the accused's right to be present.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the designation of counsel made the accused legally present.

Furthermore, even if her physical presence was required, the curative proviso applied because the error was a procedural irregularity that caused no prejudice.

The appellant, a chronic bank robber, committed nine 'note pass' bank robberies while unlawfully at large on a temporary absence pass.

He was serving the remaining nine years of a previous 12-year sentence.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence consecutive to the remaining nine years, resulting in a global sentence of 23 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the 14-year sentence was appropriate on its own, the global sentence of 23 years violated the totality principle and was unduly long and harsh.

The sentence was varied to 11 years concurrent, to be served consecutively to the remaining nine years, resulting in a global sentence of 20 years.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after discharging his trial counsel near the end of the Crown's case.

The trial judge refused the appellant's request for a lengthy adjournment to retain his former preliminary inquiry counsel, finding the request was a sham designed to secure a 'mouthpiece' who would follow unethical instructions.

The trial judge then appointed the discharged trial counsel as amicus curiae.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions, finding no error in the refusal of the adjournment or the appointment of former counsel as amicus curiae.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences arising from an intended armed robbery.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on his evidence regarding an innocent association, failing to instruct the jury on the knowledge element of the section 95 charge (knowing the gun was loaded), and failing to stay the section 94 conviction based on the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding the innocent association evidence was of no consequence, the omission of the knowledge element caused no substantial wrong given the context of an intended armed robbery, and the trial judge correctly concluded that Kienapple did not apply.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering a death threat, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence and erred in applying the third stage of the W.D. analysis.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's boasting or the complainant's description of his post-assault behaviour.

The trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence and accept the complainant's evidence to find the charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.

The Peel Regional Police received a complaint regarding historical sexual assaults allegedly committed by a former police officer in 1981 or 1982.

The Special Investigations Unit (SIU) commenced an investigation, and the police force challenged the SIU's jurisdiction on the basis that the officers had retired and the alleged offences occurred prior to the SIU's creation in 1990.

The application judge dismissed the jurisdictional challenge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that section 113(5) of the Police Services Act grants the SIU jurisdiction to investigate alleged criminal offences committed by persons who were serving police officers at the time of the conduct, regardless of their current employment status.

The Court also held that the provision is procedural in nature and therefore applies retrospectively to offences committed before 1990.