Jennifer Woollcombe

The plaintiff, Ochea Ikpa, claimed an equitable mortgage over property previously owned by Godknows Itamunoala, based on a promissory note with a criminal interest rate.

The defendants, Tonye Itamunoala and Fiona Duckett (daughter and ex-wife of Godknows Itamunoala), who held a registered second mortgage on the property, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against them and to release the sale proceeds to them.

The court found that the defendants had no notice of the plaintiff's alleged equitable mortgage, thus it could not take priority over their registered interest.

Furthermore, the promissory note itself was deemed unenforceable as an equitable mortgage due to its manifestly illegal and usurious interest rate, entered into for an illegal purpose with troubling bargaining power dynamics.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim of fraudulent conveyance, as there was no evidence the defendants had notice of the plaintiff's claim.

Consequently, the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the quantum of the defendants' registered mortgage.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's action against Tonye Itamunoala and Fiona Duckett.

This protracted and acrimonious family law trial addressed equalization, division of matrimonial home equity, child support arrears, spousal support arrears, and prospective spousal support.

The court found the respondent lacked credibility, particularly regarding his deliberate non-disclosure of a $3 million Retirement Compensation Arrangement (RCA) Trust and his intertwined finances with a common-law partner.

The applicant was found credible.

The court awarded the applicant a significant equalization payment, pre-judgment interest, and substantial retroactive and prospective lump-sum spousal support, while dismissing the respondent's claims for occupational rent and dispositional costs.

The RCA Trust was deemed income for support purposes, not an asset for equalization.

The accused, Michael Allen, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to his six-month-old stepson, Hayden Ouellette-Meissner, after the infant sustained bilateral humeral fractures.

The defense admitted the injuries but disputed causation, arguing they were accidental.

The court heard conflicting expert medical opinions from a pediatrician specializing in child abuse (Dr. Nolan) and a pediatric orthopedic surgeon (Dr. Wedge).

Dr. Nolan found the injuries highly suspicious for inflicted injury and inconsistent with the proposed accidental mechanism.

Dr. Wedge suggested an accidental mechanism involving the infant's arms getting caught in couch cushions during a fall, though his testimony was found less persuasive and inconsistent.

The court, applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Griffin, found that while the case was highly suspicious, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the fractures, leading to an acquittal.

The accused, Lowell Somerville, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging abuse of process.

The application stemmed from police misconduct during the execution of a search warrant at his storage unit, where an officer stole a valuable Tony Montana statue and subsequently fabricated evidence.

The court found that four police officers lied under oath to conceal the theft and their knowledge of it.

The court concluded that this egregious state conduct, including theft and perjury, profoundly undermined the integrity of the justice system, warranting a stay of proceedings despite the serious drug charges faced by the accused.

Erik Strong pleaded guilty to four drug-related charges and was found guilty by a jury on a fifth, including trafficking in large quantities of cannabis marihuana, conspiracy to traffic, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors such as Strong's leadership role in a sophisticated commercial wholesale operation, the large quantities of marihuana involved, and the significant value of the enterprise.

Mitigating factors included his guilty pleas, lack of significant prior record, and significant rehabilitative efforts since his arrest.

The defence argued for a reduced sentence due to anticipated changes in cannabis legislation and alleged state misconduct, both of which the court rejected.

The court also considered credit for onerous bail conditions.

A global sentence of 3 years (1095 days) was imposed, reduced by 78 days for pre-sentence custody and harsh bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years, 287 days.

A fine of $25,000 plus a $7,500 victim surcharge was ordered, along with forfeiture of seized cash, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused, Deanna Passera, was found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine.

Prior to sentencing, she filed a constitutional challenge to sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provisions, which govern the commencement of sentences and credit for pre-sentence custody, violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

She contended that the legislative scheme resulted in offenders detained pending trial serving a lengthier period in custody before parole eligibility compared to identically situated offenders released on bail, thereby being overbroad, arbitrary, and grossly disproportionate.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the legislative scheme, when considered holistically with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, was not unconstitutional.

It held that Parliament's intent was to create reasonable parity at the statutory release date and that any disparity in parole eligibility was justified by public safety and rehabilitation objectives.

The court then proceeded to sentence Ms. Passera to six years imprisonment for importing 1.994 kg of cocaine, crediting her 1.5:1 for 992 days of pre-sentence custody (1488 days) and an additional 90 days (3 months) for harsh lock-down conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 613 days.

Allen Taylor appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's decision to exclude only the second breath sample under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The appellant argued both breath samples should have been excluded and that the remaining evidence was insufficient for conviction.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in not excluding both breath samples, applying the principles from R. v. Pino regarding evidence obtained prior to a Charter breach.

However, the court upheld the impaired driving conviction, finding that even without the breath samples, the remaining eyewitness and police observation evidence was compelling and sufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

A.R. was charged on a ten-count indictment with three counts of assault, two counts of uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, and six counts of sexual assault, all in relation to his former spouse, L.R., their baby, C.R., and L.R.'s mother, J.S. The trial involved extensive testimony from the complainants and examination of text messages.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of L.R.'s evidence, citing issues with disclosure of text messages, timing of allegations, and perceived exaggeration.

The court carefully assessed the credibility of L.R. and J.S., finding their evidence credible and reliable despite some defence arguments.

The court found the accused guilty on all ten counts, concluding that the Crown proved the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, Jasvinder Shoker, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding impairment and erred in finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach concerning his right to counsel.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of impairment, noting sufficient indicia despite some inconsistencies.

Regarding the Charter issue, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that no breach occurred, as the appellant had agreed to speak with duty counsel if his preferred lawyer was unavailable and expressed no dissatisfaction with this arrangement at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, Michael Wong and Michael Singh, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for drug production and trafficking.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay from the date charged to the anticipated end of trial, subtracting defence-attributable delay.

The total delay for Mr. Wong was 29 months and for Mr. Singh was 28 months and three weeks, both falling below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court also considered potential exceptional circumstances, such as jurisdictional issues and the striking of guilty pleas due to a misapprehension about conditional sentences, but ultimately found no breach of section 11(b) and dismissed the applications.

Tristen Mignot brought an application to exclude evidence (gun, ammunition, and drugs) obtained during a search, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for the search warrant and improper execution.

The court found that the Information to Obtain a Warrant (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions, failing to establish reasonable grounds for the search of the residence at 1 Celestial Crescent.

Consequently, a s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

While the execution of the warrant itself was deemed reasonable, the court balanced the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct against the impact on the accused's privacy interests and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court concluded that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence, thus excluding it.

John Paul Budarick appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding that Constable Crowhurst had the subjective belief required to make a blood demand under s. 254(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, and whether the trial judge erred in concluding there was no s. 10(b) Charter violation when police did not offer a second opportunity to consult counsel after making a blood demand following a breath demand.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on either ground.

The appellant, Matthew Connors, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The trial judge found him guilty after rejecting the evidence of a defence witness, Kayla Cochrane, and accepting the consistent evidence of four Crown witnesses.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge erred in assessing Ms. Cochrane's evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of Ms. Cochrane's credibility and reliability, noting her failure to provide a timely police statement and her obvious bias.

The court also found the verdict reasonable given the accepted evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application alleging a s. 8 Charter breach and seeking to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant.

As a preliminary step, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and several sub-affiant police officers regarding the Information to Obtain supporting the warrant.

The court reviewed the governing test from Garofoli and Pires and emphasized that cross-examination is permitted only where it is reasonably likely to assist in determining whether the issuing justice had sufficient grounds.

Most proposed areas of questioning were rejected as speculative, irrelevant, or risking disclosure of confidential informant identities.

Limited cross-examination was permitted on specific issues relating to informant independence, the meaning of “successful result” in relation to informant compensation, certain TPS disclosure materials, and errors in the ITO.

The appellant appealed an arbitration award determining retroactive and prospective child support and costs following a dispute arising from a separation agreement.

The arbitrator had found that the payor parent failed to provide adequate financial disclosure and imputed substantial income based on corporate earnings, discretionary expenses, and adverse inferences under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The arbitrator ordered retroactive child support back to 2009 and prospective support based on table amounts, together with significant arbitration costs.

The court held that the arbitrator committed no reviewable error in interpreting the separation agreement, imputing income, attributing corporate pre‑tax income, or awarding retroactive support, and deferred to the arbitrator’s factual and credibility findings.

However, the court found the arbitrator’s reasoning on costs insufficient and reduced the costs award.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that the delay to trial violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total time from charge to anticipated trial was nearly two years.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court analyzed the length of delay, reasons for delay, waiver, and prejudice.

Although the court found approximately 15.5 months of Crown and institutional delay, this remained within the 16–18 month guideline for matters proceeding through two levels of court.

While the accused experienced some prejudice due to bail conditions and separation from family, the court concluded the prejudice attributable to delay was not significant enough to outweigh society’s interest in trying a serious drug importation offence.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a claim alleging damages arising from personal service of motion materials at the plaintiff’s residence.

The plaintiff alleged harassment, emotional distress, and the inclusion of a purported “death threat letter.” The court found the allegations to be unsupported, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Assuming without deciding that a tort of harassment could exist, the court held that a single lawful attendance to serve legal documents could not constitute outrageous conduct or establish the required elements of the tort.

Summary judgment was granted and the action against the defendant was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought over $52 million in damages alleging that casino operators and a Crown gaming agency fixed casino games using computer technology, failed to disclose risks to players, and over-served alcohol.

The casino operators moved for summary judgment while the gaming regulator moved to strike the claim.

The court found the plaintiff produced no evidence supporting allegations that electronic games were predetermined or non-random and accepted uncontroverted evidence explaining the operation of random number generators and regulatory oversight.

Claims relating to failure to disclose and over-service of alcohol also lacked evidentiary support.

The regulator’s motion to strike was granted because statutory gaming regulators owe duties to the public at large rather than private duties of care to individual gamblers, and the pleadings disclosed no recognized cause of action.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the police failed to make the formal breath demand as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, constituting a s. 8 Charter breach, but admitted the certificate of analysis under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued that the failure to make the demand promptly should disentitle the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity and that the certificate should have been excluded.

The court held that the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) remains available even if the demand was not made as soon as practicable, and that the proper remedy for any breach lies under the Charter exclusion analysis.

Applying the Grant framework, the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence was entitled to deference and disclosed no error.

The applicant, a grandson of the deceased who died intestate, sought a declaration that bank and investment accounts held jointly between the deceased and her surviving son formed part of the estate.

The respondent son argued that the accounts were joint with right of survivorship and therefore passed to him outside the estate.

Applying the presumption of resulting trust articulated in Pecore v. Pecore, the court held that the respondent failed to rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence of the deceased’s intention to gift survivorship rights.

The evidence consisted largely of the respondent’s self‑serving assertions and unsupported bank correspondence, while documentary banking records and other objective indicators of intention were absent.

The court concluded the jointly held funds reverted to the estate and were to be distributed pursuant to the intestacy regime under the Succession Law Reform Act.