Jennifer Woollcombe

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence, including a loaded handgun and drugs, after finding that the police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights by seizing his cell phone during an investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officer was justified in seizing the cell phone for officer safety and evidence preservation, as the accused was heard telling someone 'they're here now'.

The Court found no s. 8 breach and further held that even if a breach occurred, it was not serious and the evidence should not have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence explaining that intercepted communications relied upon by the Crown actually referred to a prior shooting, an explanation he deliberately withheld at trial for tactical reasons.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit the fresh evidence, finding it not sufficiently compelling to overcome the finality principle.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to excluded exculpatory statements and jury instructions on hearsay and party liability.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the issue of planning and deliberation.

The appeal was dismissed, but the first degree murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for second degree murder was substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two charges of sexual assault against two young family members.

The appellant argued the trial judge did not properly deal with inconsistencies in the complainants' testimony and erred in relying on the evidence of a nurse practitioner regarding the causes of one complainant's sexually transmitted infection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that there was abundant evidence supporting the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal shooting at a nightclub.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the deceased in revenge for a prior stabbing incident.

At trial, the Crown relied on eyewitness identification and out-of-court statements made by the deceased to his mother, which were admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Chartier instruction regarding eyewitness identification and by admitting the hearsay statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a Chartier instruction was not required as there was direct recognition and supporting evidence, and that the trial judge did not err in finding the hearsay statements met the threshold reliability criterion.

The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation and refused to produce his driver's licence, ownership, and insurance.

The police officer arrested him for failing to identify under the Highway Traffic Act, and a scuffle ensued.

The appellant was convicted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the arrest was unlawful because the officer did not make a separate request for alternative identification as required by section 33(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Because the arrest was unlawful, the appellant was entitled to resist, and the convictions were quashed.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's testimony and identification evidence, and challenging the admissibility of his statement under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave comprehensive reasons and properly addressed the frailties in the evidence.

The Court also held that the appellant was precluded from raising the section 7 Charter issue for the first time on appeal, as it had not been raised at trial and the statement's voluntariness had been conceded.

The appellants were convicted of various weapons offences and crimes of violence related to the collection of drug debts.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the segregation of evidence, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

However, the sentence appeals for three of the appellants were allowed, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider the principle of rehabilitation and mitigating factors, resulting in reduced sentences.

The appellants were charged with second degree murder after a fire they allegedly set for insurance proceeds resulted in a death.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged them on the murder charges, finding no subjective foresight of death.

The reviewing judge quashed the discharge on certiorari, finding the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge erred by failing to consider the available inference that the appellants, as reasonable persons, would have foreseen the likelihood of death.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years and four days for sexual touching and three counts of breach of recognizance.

The offences involved touching a young boy over his clothes, committed while the appellant was subject to an order prohibiting him from being alone with children.

The trial judge had considered a medical report indicating a likelihood of future abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that while a significant sentence was necessary for public protection, the total sentence was excessive given the low gravity of the specific offence and the fact that the medical report was not filed as an exhibit.

The court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence for sexual touching from three years to two years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge violated his equality rights under section 15 of the Charter by requiring him, as a gay man, to ascertain the complainant's sexual orientation to avail himself of the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not impose a special obligation based on sexual orientation.

Instead, the trial judge correctly applied the standard law, concluding the appellant was wilfully blind or reckless in assuming consent without inquiry.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break-ins following a jury trial.

During the trial, a police officer testified about unrecorded and ambiguous statements made by the appellant.

Although the trial judge and counsel agreed by the end of the case that the appellant had not admitted involvement, the trial judge failed to clarify this to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that because the Crown's case was not overwhelming, there was a real risk the jury interpreted the statements as an admission.

The appeal from conviction was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant operated a website containing audiovisual material and written stories depicting violence against women.

He was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that adult nudity alone could amount to explicit sex for the purposes of obscenity.

The court ordered a new trial for the audiovisual counts but upheld the conviction for the written stories, which clearly depicted explicit sex and violence.

The sentence was varied to a $2,000 fine.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, who were charged with first-degree murder in the death of their infant daughter.

The trial judge stayed the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, largely caused by the failings of the Crown's pathologist.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in including pre-charge delay in his calculation as a remedy for the cremation of the child's remains.

However, the Court upheld the stay, concluding that the post-charge delay of 55 months for one respondent and 42.5 months for the other was unreasonable and severely prejudiced their liberty and security interests.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused, finding no evidence of non-consent, despite the complainant's testimony that he did not want to engage in the activity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the direct evidence of lack of consent, and thus exceeded his jurisdiction.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after failing to properly investigate and secure a knife found at his son's school.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife handle was made of metal.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge commits a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari if they fail to consider the whole of the evidence as required by section 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a black man, was convicted of robbing an East Indian pizza delivery man.

At trial, the judge permitted a challenge for cause based on the appellant's race but refused to allow a question addressing the interracial nature of the crime.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was entitled to challenge the jury for cause based on the interracial nature of the crime, even though both the accused and the victim were members of visible minorities.

The denial of this right impaired the appearance of fairness and the integrity of the trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's brother's evidence as corroborative, given his admission that he was not in the room during the alleged incident.

The trial judge also erred in finding the mother's evidence corroborative, as it was effectively exculpatory.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of sexually assaulting a passenger who was confined to a wheelchair.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating he found the accused's evidence incredible based on the complainant's believability.

The summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence as required by Sheppard.

The appellant appealed his perjury conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to allow him to re-elect trial by judge and jury after a mistrial.

The appellant claimed a substantial change in the Crown's case justified overriding the Crown's refusal to consent to the late re-election.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no substantial change in the Crown's case and noting the attempted re-election was out of time without a satisfactory explanation.