Nathan M. Ross

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation of costs following an underlying motion.

The court considered a pre-litigation settlement offer made by the responding party, Lise Partanen, to the moving party, Edward Sorozan Jr., which was more favourable than the outcome achieved by Mr. Sorozan Jr. Despite not being a formal Rule 49 offer, the court gave it significant weight.

The court ordered Mr. Sorozan Jr. to pay Ms. Partanen $2,500 in costs, balancing the principle of indemnity, reasonable expectations, and the unique circumstances, including the early settlement offer.

The court addressed competing claims to life insurance proceeds between the deceased's spouse and son, following the insurer's payment of disputed funds into court.

The son moved for payment to him, while the spouse cross-moved for payment to her.

The court inferred the existence of a lost beneficiary designation form naming the spouse as the sole beneficiary, based on circumstantial evidence including a superseded prior designation, a subsequent "Retiree Group Life Insurance Record" confirming the spouse as sole beneficiary, and the deceased's consistent testamentary intentions.

The court dismissed the son's motion and granted the spouse's cross-motion, ordering the funds paid to her.

The moving party (Ontario) sought an order that no costs be awarded for a motion to strike, while the responding parties (plaintiffs) sought $4,500 in costs.

The court noted that success on the motion was divided, as the plaintiffs' most recent claim was not struck, but Ontario had taken many steps to move the matter along in response to the plaintiffs' repeated amendments to their pleadings.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) and the principle that costs are normally not awarded where success is divided, the court ordered no costs.

The moving party, the Ontario Provincial Police, brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike out paragraphs of the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs' claims arose from an allegedly unlawful eviction overseen by the police, resulting in claims for misfeasance in public office and intimidation.

The court applied the test for striking pleadings, reading the facts generously, and concluded that the amended statement of claim disclosed reasonable causes of action.

The motion was dismissed.

The Attorney General commenced a civil forfeiture application under ss. 3 and 8 of the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 seeking forfeiture of $104,877 USD seized from an individual at Toronto Pearson International Airport.

The respondent opposed the application and brought a motion under s. 5(1) of the Act requesting payment of legal and expert expenses from the seized funds.

The court held that the respondent’s second motion for legal expenses was not barred by res judicata and that the expert accounting report constituted a reasonable legal expense, but the payment was capped by the statutory 15% limit under O. Reg. 91/02.

On the merits of the forfeiture application, the court found on a balance of probabilities that the funds were either proceeds or an instrument of unlawful activity, relying on circumstantial evidence including the packaging, concealment, inconsistent explanations, and lack of credible lawful source.

The respondent failed to establish status as a legitimate or responsible owner and the interests of justice exception did not apply.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order evicting them from a residential property.

The eviction was based on an N12 notice for a purchaser's own use.

The tenants appealed on several grounds, including that the LTB member erred in interpreting section 72 of the Residential Tenancies Act and violated procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found that the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit and intended to delay eviction, as the grounds were either baseless or impermissible appeals of findings of fact.

The motion to quash was granted and the stay of eviction was lifted.

The applicant, a mature university student, alleged discrimination on the basis of age, creed, race, and ethnic origin, as well as reprisal, against the university and several staff members.

The allegations stemmed from academic disputes, timetable issues, and a subsequent campus ban following the applicant's disruptive behaviour.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application in its entirety, finding no reasonable prospect that the applicant could link the respondents' conduct to any prohibited ground or establish an intention to reprise.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge violated his equality rights under section 15 of the Charter by requiring him, as a gay man, to ascertain the complainant's sexual orientation to avail himself of the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not impose a special obligation based on sexual orientation.

Instead, the trial judge correctly applied the standard law, concluding the appellant was wilfully blind or reckless in assuming consent without inquiry.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Chief of Police and the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) regarding a complaint against two police officers.

The Chief of Police declined to deal with the complaint because it was filed more than six months after the incident.

The applicant then requested a review by OCCPS, but missed the 30-day statutory deadline.

OCCPS determined it lacked jurisdiction to extend the time limit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, confirming that legislative amendments removed OCCPS's discretion to extend the deadline and finding the Chief's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The respondent co-operative brought a motion to quash the applicant member's application for judicial review of a decision to terminate her membership and occupancy rights.

The court held that the Co-operative Corporations Act provides an adequate and appropriate alternative forum for challenging eviction decisions, offering extensive protections including a hearing before the Superior Court of Justice.

Finding no basis that judicial review would provide a better avenue of relief, the court granted the motion to quash the application.