Jennifer Woollcombe

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the use of his DNA, which was on file from a 1995 sexual assault conviction, violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that individual items of evidence, including DNA findings, need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a convicted offender loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying information derived from lawfully obtained DNA.

The court also found no error in the jury charge, as the trial judge properly instructed the jury to consider all evidence cumulatively to determine if the essential element of identity was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault in 1995 based on the testimony of a single witness.

After a remand from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The Court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to use available evidence that could have undermined the credibility of the Crown's sole witness, including evidence of a motive to lie and failure to report the incident.

The Court admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, concluding that the ineffective assistance resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence after pleading guilty to assault causing bodily harm, assault, and three counts of breaching release orders.

He argued his guilty pleas were invalid because they were coerced and uninformed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed based on the trial record and fresh evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence at the expense of rehabilitation.

The sentence was varied to time served (nine months) followed by two years of probation.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its application for certiorari.

The preliminary inquiry justice had discharged the respondent on a charge of first degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal held that the justice's sufficiency determination, even if arguably incorrect, did not constitute a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the verdicts were unreasonable and inconsistent with their acquittals on other counts, that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and shifted the burden of proof, and that they received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the qualitatively different evidence on each count, correctly applied the W.(D.) principles, and that the ineffective assistance claim fell short of the required threshold.

The appellants, members of the Hells Angels, were convicted of extortion and extortion in association with a criminal organization after threatening a victim over an alleged debt while wearing club colours.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the terms 'facilitation' and 'in association with' are well-understood and not impermissibly vague or overbroad.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants deliberately invoked their membership in the organization to inspire fear, and affirmed the sentence imposed.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and advised of her right to counsel at the roadside, including the right to free legal advice 'right now'.

She declined to call a lawyer and was not re-advised of her rights upon arriving at the police station.

The trial judge convicted her, but the summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal, finding the roadside caution misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the use of the word 'now' properly conveys the immediacy of the right to counsel and does not require the officer to specify that the call will be made from the police station.

The appellant was convicted of arson after representing himself at trial.

He had been denied legal aid and his Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was dismissed by the trial judge, who held that such orders were reserved for cases posing unique challenges.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too stringent a test.

The case was complex, involving expert witnesses and similar fact evidence, and the appellant lacked the capacity to defend himself effectively.

The Court held that the erroneous denial of counsel resulted in an appearance of unfairness, constituting a miscarriage of justice without the need to prove actual prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the nature of a prior conviction and gave inadequate weight to rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offences, the fact that the appellant was on probation and subject to a firearm prohibition at the time, and the paramount objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, which had allowed a Crown appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found nothing in the case warranting leave to appeal and denied the application.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered on December 6, 2005, and a sentence imposed on February 3, 2006, by a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal in a brief endorsement.

The Crown appealed a nine-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting his developmentally delayed wife.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the absence of extraneous violence as a mitigating factor and by failing to properly consider the respondent's history of prior sexual abuse against the victim.

The Court held the sentence was demonstrably unfit, allowed the appeal, and increased the sentence to two years less a day, while also correcting the SOIRA order to 20 years.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub.

The Crown's theory was that the shooting was in retaliation for a previous stabbing incident.

At trial, the judge admitted out-of-court statements made by the deceased victim to his mother shortly before his death, which implicated the appellant's brother in a prior attempt on the victim's life.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the statements met the threshold reliability requirement under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct test and properly considered the relevant factors, including the absence of a motive to fabricate and the availability of the mother for cross-examination.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury at the conclusion of the Crown's case, which relied entirely on circumstantial evidence including motive, opportunity, forensic evidence, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by weighing the evidence piecemeal and usurping the function of the jury rather than taking the Crown's case at its highest.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the respondent's cell probe comments did not amount to an adoption of a co-accused's entire recanted statement, and by refusing to admit the respondent's criminal record for violence after the defence adduced evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The Crown also argued defence counsel made inflammatory remarks in closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and concluding that while defence counsel's remarks about race were inappropriate, they did not meet the heavy onus required to overturn a jury acquittal.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how his alcohol consumption related to the issue of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that alcohol consumption was a minor feature of the defence's case, which primarily relied on expert evidence regarding a major depressive episode.

The court found that the trial judge had referred to the alcohol evidence several times in the charge, and the lack of objection from experienced trial counsel indicated the instructions were fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed acquittals on charges of possession and distribution of child pornography arising from videotaped sexual activity between the respondent and a 14-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to make a necessary factual finding on whether the respondent threatened to show the tapes to the complainant's family and friends, an issue central to whether the Sharpe private-use exception remained available.

If such threats were made, the material would not be intended solely for private use.

The court rejected a categorical rule that loss of exclusive physical possession automatically defeats the exception, holding the question is fact-specific.

A new trial was ordered on the possession and distribution counts only.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a committal for second degree murder and substituting a committal for manslaughter in the death of a 34-month-old child.

The reviewing judge had found insufficient evidence of the subjective intent required for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the reviewing judge erred by looking at the medical evidence in isolation and failing to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence, which could support an inference of the requisite intent.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellant's conviction for first degree murder was previously substituted with a conviction for second degree murder by the Court of Appeal.

The parties agreed the Court should fix the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the appellant sought 12 years.

The Court considered the aggravating circumstances of the cold-blooded shooting over a drug debt, balanced against the appellant's significant rehabilitation during eight years in custody.

The Court fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 12 years.