Jennifer Woollcombe

The applicant, Jahvar Green, charged with multiple firearms offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a firearm found in a car he was driving.

He argued arbitrary detention (s. 9) due to racial profiling and unreasonable search/use of force (ss. 7, 8).

The court found no racial profiling, as the officer did not see the applicant's race before the initial interaction.

The court also ruled that no detention occurred when the applicant fled from the officer's initial signal to stop, as there was no submission or acquiescence.

Detention began lawfully when the applicant was directed to stop in a Starbucks drive-thru.

The court further found the officer's belief that a firearm was in a satchel was objectively reasonable, justifying the search and use of force.

The application to exclude the firearm was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought sole ownership of a jointly purchased property, where he had resided since 1991 and paid most expenses, arguing adverse possession under the Real Property Limitations Act, or alternatively, proprietary estoppel, unconscionability, or unjust enrichment.

The defendants, co-owners, sought partition and sale.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for sole ownership, finding his possession was consensual and not adverse.

However, the court granted the defendants' request for partition and sale, but ordered an unequal distribution of proceeds (65% to the plaintiff, 35% to the defendants) based on unjust enrichment, recognizing the plaintiff's disproportionate financial contributions over 30 years.

The accused, Azar Sheikh, was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, drive over 80 causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following a fatal collision.

The Crown's case relied on inferences from eyewitness observations, expert toxicologist opinions regarding alcohol and MDMA levels, and accident reconstruction evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm.

However, the accused was acquitted of the "drive over 80" charges due to reasonable doubt regarding the precise blood alcohol concentration at the time of the collision, given the variability in testing methods.

The court emphasized that the accused's impairment and excessive speed were significant contributing factors to the collision, well beyond de minimis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully causing unnecessary pain to his dog by spraying it with bear spray and assaulting it, contrary to s. 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from his mother for their truth.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, specifically regarding substantive reliability as per R. v. Bradshaw.

The court found that while the trial judge made some errors in identifying corroborative evidence, the overall analysis correctly concluded that the hearsay statements were admissible due to compelling circumstantial evidence negating untruthfulness or mistake.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an urgent order for the respondent to comply with a 2016 final order regarding joint custody and access of their two children.

The respondent had unilaterally withheld the children since March 19, 2020, citing COVID-19 safety concerns and the children's alleged wishes to remain with her.

The court found the matter urgent, rejecting the respondent's "self-help" remedy.

It determined that the applicant was capable of ensuring the children's health, safety, and educational needs, and found no evidentiary basis for the respondent's allegations of manipulation or lack of support.

The court ordered the children's immediate return to the applicant and strict compliance with the existing access schedule.

The applicant, Hamza Badran, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody, calculating the total delay, deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances.

Despite a total delay exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts, the court found that significant portions were attributable to defence delay (including waivers) and discrete exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay fell just under the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was unreasonable given his lack of sustained effort to expedite proceedings.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutional validity of section 4(b) of the Juries Act (Ontario).

The applicant argued that this provincial legislation, which disqualifies individuals convicted of an indictable offence from jury service, creates an operational conflict with section 638(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which allows for challenges for cause only for those sentenced to imprisonment exceeding twelve months.

The applicant contended that the provincial law unduly narrows the jury pool and infringes on federal jurisdiction over criminal procedure.

The Crown argued that the provincial legislation is a valid exercise of power over the administration of justice and does not conflict with or frustrate the purpose of the federal law.

The court dismissed the application, finding no operational conflict or frustration of federal purpose, as the provincial and federal laws govern different aspects of jury selection and can coexist.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a Charter challenge against the jury panel, alleging violations of ss. 11(d) and 11(f) due to the Province of Ontario's jury source list compilation methods.

The applicant contended that the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) process systematically under-included non-property owners and, consequently, black individuals in Peel, creating an appearance of partiality.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the state made reasonable efforts to ensure a broad cross-section of society for jury selection.

The statistical evidence presented was deemed confusing and contradictory, and ultimately did not support the applicant's claims of under-representation of renters or black individuals.

The court emphasized that representativeness focuses on the process of casting a wide net, not on achieving proportional representation of specific groups.

The appellant, Satgur Singh, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge's findings of guilt were unreasonable, specifically regarding the identification of the appellant as the driver.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's assessment of eight alleged inconsistencies in eyewitness identification evidence.

The court found that the trial judge was alive to the inconsistencies, addressed them fairly, and reasonably concluded that the appellant was the driver.

The cumulative evidence, beyond just eyewitness description, supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Carleton Watson, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the accused, with the complainant alleging sexual assault and the accused denying any sexual activity.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, noting inconsistencies and fabrications in the complainant's testimony regarding the accused's gun, visits to her new home, and presence at her workplace.

Despite concerns about the accused's criminal record for dishonesty and some aspects of his testimony, the court found that the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 93.5 months (2,843 days).

After deducting defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances, the net delay was 35.76 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating transitional exceptional circumstances, noting the case's lack of complexity, significant institutional delay under Morin principles, and the applicant's substantial prejudice.

The application was allowed, and the charges were stayed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Joseph Irving, on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and drive over 80.

The trial judge had excluded evidence (police observations and breath samples) under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of the respondent's s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The s. 8 breach arose from police coercing the respondent to the door of his home by placing a foot on the threshold and demanding his presence, thereby revoking the implied invitation to knock.

The s. 10(b) breach was a brief delay in providing rights during investigative detention.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings on both Charter breaches and the s. 24(2) analysis, affirming that the police conduct was serious and had a significant impact on the respondent's privacy interests, thus dismissing the Crown's appeal.

The accused, Parveen Sharma, was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The complainant, a 25-year-old tenant of the accused, alleged non-consensual sexual activity on October 2 and 3, 2015.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, considering inconsistencies and corroborating factors.

The defence argued the complainant initiated sexual activity and consented.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting defence arguments regarding inconsistencies and the complainant's alleged initiation of a sexual relationship.

The accused was found guilty on both counts of sexual assault.

Following a six-day trial, the accused was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault, one count of assault, and one count of criminal harassment.

The court imposed a global sentence of seven years imprisonment, considering aggravating factors such as the brutal, invasive, and degrading nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victim due to cocaine addiction, and the profound impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the accused's lack of criminal record, consistent employment, and family support.

The court emphasized general and specific deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing principles, while also applying the principle of totality.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for driving "over 80", where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to ss. 8 and 9 breaches, finding the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion of Charter breaches but determined that the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) analysis regarding the impact of the breaches, particularly in light of the subsequent Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Jennings.

The appeal court concluded that the liberty deprivation experienced by the respondent was minimal and consistent with routine drinking and driving investigations, thus the breath samples should not have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The accused, Mahir Diabas, was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment.

The trial involved conflicting testimonies from the complainant and the accused.

The court found the complainant to be a reliable and credible witness, despite prior inconsistencies and recantation letters, accepting her explanations for these as plausible and candid.

Conversely, the accused was deemed an evasive, unresponsive, and unreliable witness, with his denials and explanations lacking credibility.

Applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.), the court found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts except one (failing to comply with recognizance), which was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial interim release under s. 522(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed on secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing an overwhelming case and public safety risk.

The court found the Crown's case for first-degree murder was not overwhelming, and the applicant posed a low flight risk (primary ground).

While acknowledging the gravity of the offense and the group attack circumstances, the court determined that a stringent release plan, including house arrest with supervision and electronic monitoring, would sufficiently mitigate public safety concerns (secondary ground) and maintain confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground).

The applicant was granted bail on a substantial recognizance with specific conditions.

Shanice Waldron was found guilty by a jury of importing 2.753 kg of cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record for identity fraud, and mitigating factors such as her youth, status as a single mother, strong rehabilitation prospects, and a history of sexual abuse leading to vulnerability.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed a range of five and a half to six and a half years.

The court imposed a sentence of six and a half years of incarceration, along with a mandatory 10-year firearms prohibition, a lifetime prohibition under s. 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, and a DNA order.

The court specifically found that the presence of her young son during the offence was not an aggravating factor.