Jennifer Woollcombe

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge.

Counsel had intended to make a joint submission for a sentence of six months less time served.

The trial judge stated he was prepared to accept the joint submission but mistakenly imposed an additional sentence of six months.

The Crown conceded the error, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the sentence and imposing a sentence of time served.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondents by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave careful consideration to the competing interests in what was a difficult sentencing problem.

Finding no error in principle, the Court deferred to the trial judge's assessment and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he did not make an informed waiver of his s. 10(b) Charter rights because he was not told the details of the complainant's allegations.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings of fact supported the conclusion of an informed waiver, and that the appellant was not entitled to know the details of the allegations before waiving his right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the jury charge on consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

At trial, she sought to exclude her breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing her s. 10(b) right to counsel was breached because a video camera was present in the room where she spoke to duty counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding no evidence the camera was on or monitored, and that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable belief that her privacy was compromised.

The summary conviction appeal court and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding the appellant did not prove her Charter rights were infringed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on a previous incident of consensual sex, which violated s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The case was not fought on the issue of consent, as the respondent's position was that the alleged act of anal intercourse did not occur.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a used car dealer, was convicted of fraud and possession of stolen property relating to the sale of stolen and revinned vehicles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the doctrine of wilful blindness.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the wilful blindness doctrine and failed to consider significant evidence probative of his state of mind.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge correctly articulated the wilful blindness doctrine, he failed to address a large body of potentially significant evidence that pointed away from a finding of wilful blindness.

This deficiency in the reasons foreclosed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for historical sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider inconsistencies and emphatic denials in the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, intelligible, and responsive to the issues raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that conditional sentences are rarely appropriate for the sexual violation of a vulnerable person by an adult in a position of trust.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction on three grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge's jury charge on reasonable doubt was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the charge did not strictly comply with Lifchus, the jury would not have misunderstood the standard of proof given the W.(D.) instruction on the alibi defence.

The court also found no merit to the argument that cross-examination was improperly curtailed.

The appellant appealed his life sentence imposed by the trial judge for a serious attack.

The trial judge had imposed the life sentence based on a finding that the appellant was a dangerous person, despite the absence of a pre-sentence report or expert evidence, and the Crown having sought a definite sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a life sentence without clear evidence to support the finding of dangerousness.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a definite term of 15 years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed her sentence.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence above what the Crown suggested, stating she should go to the penitentiary for two years, without adequately considering her difficult family circumstances.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence too harsh and reduced it to time served, while upholding the trial judge's decision not to impose a conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of wilfully promoting hatred against Muslims through pamphlets and a recorded telephone message.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that wilful blindness satisfied the mens rea requirement for the offence under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the defence of good faith expression of religious opinion under s. 319(3)(b) was improperly rejected.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that wilful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge and satisfies the stringent mens rea requirement for wilfully promoting hatred, and that the appellant's statements went beyond the good faith expression of religious belief.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and related offences, as well as his six-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in providing jury instructions in instalments, misdirecting on reasonable doubt, admitting expert and bad character evidence, and refusing a mistrial after inflammatory Crown remarks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's corrected instructions on reasonable doubt were sufficient, the evidence was properly admitted or cured by instructions, and the sentence was appropriate given the violent and degrading nature of the offences committed while on probation.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual offences involving children.

Prior to jury selection, he applied to challenge potential jurors for cause, arguing that the nature of the charges gave rise to a realistic possibility of juror partiality.

The trial judge rejected the application and the accused was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused failed to establish a widespread bias in the community arising from the nature of the charges that would be incapable of being set aside by jurors despite trial safeguards.

The appellant, a youthful first offender with no criminal record, appealed the manner of service of a nine-month custodial sentence.

The only issue was whether the custodial term should be served in the community.

The court held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's refusal to identify a co-perpetrator as aggravating and by speculating about future criminal influence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed, with the sentence to be served conditionally from the date of judgment.

The appellant appealed from a summary conviction appeal court decision dismissing his conviction appeal and partially allowing his sentence appeal.

Before the Court of Appeal, he argued that the trial judge unduly intervened and that the record, read as a whole, showed the trial judge was not satisfied of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that most interventions were innocuous and aimed at clarifying ambiguities, and that no legal error arose from the rejection of that ground.

The court also found the record demonstrated the trial judge rejected the primary defence and was satisfied the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

The Crown brought applications to quash two appeals purportedly brought as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applications were based on recent amendments to the Criminal Code that eliminated the right to appeal without leave where an acquittal is overturned by a court of appeal and a new trial ordered.

The appellants argued their right to appeal had accrued before the amendments came into force.

The Court held that the right to appeal as of right is only acquired when the court of appeal renders its judgment.

Since the conditions precedent were not fulfilled before the amendments took effect, the appeals were quashed.