Jamie Cecilia Klukach

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse and one count of threatening bodily harm against his daughter.

On appeal, the appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to use evidence of the appellant's prior convictions for assault of his wife to determine whether the wife testified out of fear, and second, that the trial judge's review of the appellant's evidence was brief and unbalanced.

The Court of Appeal found no error in either ruling and dismissed the appeal.

Both defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over three years, they published a community newspaper called Your Ward News that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorified Nazism, denied the Holocaust, and counselled violence against women.

The court imposed consecutive sentences: James Sears received one year incarceration (six months on each count, the procedural maximum for summary conviction); Leroy St. Germaine received a 12-month conditional sentence (six months on each count served consecutively, with house arrest conditions).

The court declined to impose probation on either defendant, finding such restrictions would unduly curtail Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-year period, the defendants published and edited a community newspaper that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorifying Nazism, denying the Holocaust, and demonizing both groups.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence, the application of consecutive versus concurrent sentencing, aggravating and mitigating factors, community impact, and the scope of probation conditions.

The court imposed a one-year jail sentence (six months on each count served consecutively) and declined to impose probation restrictions on publishing activities, finding such restrictions would violate Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his trial after conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought to introduce affidavit evidence regarding ineffective assistance and proposed witnesses.

The court applied the test from R. v. Arabia and R. v. Kowall, considering both the Palmer fresh evidence criteria and whether the application was an attempt to reverse tactical decisions made at trial.

The court found that the decision to call no defence evidence was a deliberate tactical choice made by trial counsel based on professional judgment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the test for re-opening and that trial counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder entered by a jury following a trial before Justice Bruce G. Thomas.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) an error in jury selection involving the substitution of static triers on the second day of jury selection without statutory authority; (2) the trial judge's error in leaving section 231(6) of the Criminal Code (constructive first degree murder based on criminal harassment) as a basis for conviction when the evidence was insufficient; and (3) inadequate jury instructions on the elements of section 231(6).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while errors occurred, they caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence supporting a conviction for planned and deliberate first degree murder.

The defendant brought an application four months after conviction and four days before sentencing to re-open the trial and/or declare a mistrial.

The application raised multiple grounds including ineffective counsel, abuse of process, apprehension of bias, constitutional challenges regarding freedom of expression and jury trial rights, and inadequate reasons for judgment.

The court applied the Palmer test for admissibility of fresh evidence after conviction and found most issues lacked merit.

However, regarding the failure to call a defence, the court determined it could not assess the application without hearing from the defendant and counsel, and without a proffer of the evidence sought to be adduced.

The court allowed the application to proceed by way of affidavit evidence to ensure no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Diane Werendowicz, who was sexually assaulted and strangled in 1981.

The appellant's DNA matched semen found on the victim.

The case proceeded through four trials: the first resulted in conviction (later overturned on appeal), the second and third ended in hung juries, and the fourth resulted in conviction.

The Crown's key evidence included a 911 call traced to a phone booth near the appellant's workplace, voice identification evidence, and DNA evidence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the call tracing evidence, voice identification evidence, and other matters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and fair.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of sexual assault charges.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his sister-in-law on two occasions without her consent.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding his testimony that the sexual activity was consensual to be credible.

The trial judge negatively assessed the complainant's credibility based on her post-assault behaviour, which included continued association with the accused and failure to flee or call for help.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on stereotypical views about how sexual assault victims should behave.

The court determined that this legal error was material to the verdict because the trial judge's belief in the accused's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The defendants, the editor and publisher of the community newspaper Your Ward News, were charged with two counts of wilful promotion of hatred against Jews and women under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called expert witnesses to contextualize the anti-Semitic and misogynistic content of the publication.

The court found that the newspaper repeatedly and consistently dehumanized Jews and women, employing extreme vilification, Holocaust denial, and advocacy of violence.

The court rejected the defence that the content was merely satirical or anti-Marxist, concluding that both defendants were fully aware of the hate propaganda and intended to promote it.

Both defendants were found guilty on all counts.

A reference from the Minister of Justice concerning convictions entered in 1987 for break and enter, assault causing bodily harm, and overcoming resistance by strangulation.

The case turned entirely on eyewitness identification evidence from the victim, which suffered from significant frailties including a procedurally flawed courtroom identification.

Fresh evidence revealed that the victim and a police officer involved in the identification procedure were in a personal relationship that was not disclosed to the defence.

The court found that fairness required disclosure of this relationship and that there was a reasonable possibility the non-disclosure impacted the trial outcome.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

Two appellants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in an armed robbery of a drug dealer's residence in Barrhaven.

During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed the resident.

The first appellant was convicted of first degree murder; the second appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the first appellant's conviction was upheld.

However, the second appellant's conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered due to errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for party liability to murder under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after a head-on collision on Highway 17 that killed the other driver.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of expert opinion evidence from a police accident reconstruction officer, arguing the evidence was tainted by bias and that the Crown failed to disclose draft reports.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while there were concerns about the expert's independence, the trial judge properly circumscribed the scope of admissible evidence and that any disclosure violation did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his conviction for first degree murder in the killing of a victim on June 20, 1981.

The applicant had been tried four times for the offence: the first conviction was set aside on Charter grounds, the second and third trials resulted in hung juries, and the fourth trial resulted in conviction.

The applicant had been on bail for many years during the proceedings and had complied with all bail conditions.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: (1) the appeal is not frivolous; (2) the applicant will surrender into custody; and (3) detention is not necessary in the public interest.

The court found all three criteria satisfied and granted bail pending appeal, increasing the recognizance to $750,000.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12.5 years for manslaughter.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider his self-induced intoxication and that the sentence was clearly unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the trial judge properly considered the intoxication and the sentence fell within the acceptable range for aggravated manslaughter.

However, based on the intervening Supreme Court decision in Summers, the court allowed the appeal solely to grant enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-sentence custody, reducing the net sentence to 10 years and 5 months.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing their mid-trial application to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and in failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of her prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was unnecessary as the prior consistent statements were responsive to the defence's allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and accessory after the fact to murder.

At trial, the Crown called the common-law spouses of two of the appellants as witnesses and introduced out-of-court statements made by one of the spouses shortly after the shooting.

The appellants appealed, arguing the spousal incompetency rule should be extended to common-law spouses under s. 15(1) of the Charter, and that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that while failing to extend the spousal incompetency rule to common-law spouses violates s. 15(1) of the Charter, the limitation is justified under s. 1.

The court also upheld the admission of the out-of-court statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed historical sexual offence convictions arising from abuse alleged to have occurred more than 30 years earlier.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge erred in dismissing a pre-trial application for a stay based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court reallocated portions of the delay, found approximately 26 months of institutional and Crown delay, and held that although actual prejudice was not established, significant prejudice had to be inferred from the length of the delay and the inadequate justification for it.

Balancing the appellant’s Charter interests against the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court concluded that a stay should have been ordered.

The evidentiary complaints about the recorded police interview were rejected.

In a first degree murder appeal arising from a joint trial with antagonistic defences, the appellant's counsel was required to withdraw mid-trial and no replacement counsel could be found despite extensive efforts.

The trial judge refused severance or a mistrial and instead appointed amicus curiae with an expanded mandate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge asked the wrong question, relied on unsupported considerations, failed to consider highly relevant factors, and thereby unreasonably exercised discretion under the interests of justice standard.

Amicus was not an adequate substitute for counsel in a complex murder trial, and the resulting loss of representation deprived the appellant of a fair trial and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years for breaching a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by failing to report and travelling to restricted areas without committing any substantive offences.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence disproportionate, noting it gave undue emphasis to deterrence and inadequate emphasis to rehabilitation and reintegration, contrary to the principles in R. v. Ipeelee.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to four years concurrent on both counts.

The 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for counselling and encouraging her boyfriend to kill the victim.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that two videotaped statements to police were inadmissible under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and appealed her adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant was not detained during the first interview and had validly waived her right to counsel in the second.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly concluded that a youth sentence would not provide sufficient long-term supervision to protect the public given the appellant's psychological profile and risk of reoffending.