Jamie Cecilia Klukach

The respondents were charged with wilfully promoting hatred against the Roma people after participating in a demonstration outside a motel housing Roma refugee claimants.

The trial judge acquitted the respondents, finding the Crown failed to prove that the term 'gypsies' used in the demonstration was interchangeable with 'Roma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered new trials, holding that the trial judge erred in law by focusing solely on the interchangeability of the terms rather than considering the totality of the evidence, and that he should have taken judicial notice of dictionary definitions linking the two terms.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal by a jury.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in excluding the respondent's statement based on his right to silence, in permitting the defence to lead evidence of a statement to police regarding post-offence conduct, and in failing to give a stronger jury charge concerning the victim's hospital statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge erred in excluding the statement, the Crown failed to show the verdict would not necessarily have been the same, as the statement had little probative value and the case ultimately depended on identification evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. principles and adequately explain the reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and had ample evidence to convict.

The Crown appealed the sentence, and while the Court agreed the sentence constituted an error in principle, it declined to set it aside as the sentence had already been fully served.

Both the appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The respondent attended a church service to protest same-sex marriages and intentionally pushed the pastor when he asked her to stop disrupting the service.

The trial judge acquitted her of assault, applying the principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles), and the summary conviction appeal court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the application of the de minimis principle to undisputed facts is a question of law alone, and that the respondent's intentional push in the context of disrupting a church service was not a trifling matter.

A finding of guilt was entered and the respondent was granted an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The central issue at trial was eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's charge to the jury failed to adequately address the specific frailties of the identification evidence, including discrepancies in descriptions and failures to identify the appellant in photo line-ups.

The trial judge also erred in failing to properly review the defence evidence and in his application of section 24(2) of the Charter when admitting conscriptive evidence regarding the appellant's prior use of aliases.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual assault and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview a nurse and cross-examine the complainant on a statement that supported the defence of consent.

The court quashed the sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The court also reviewed the five-year concurrent sentence for aggravated assault, reducing it to four years in light of fresh evidence showing the appellant's progress with rehabilitation, while noting the serious domestic context of the offence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial for first degree murder.

The preliminary hearing judge had committed the appellant based on the theory that the murder occurred during a sexual assault or unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal found there was no evidence of anal intercourse, as only a trace amount of the deceased's own sperm was found, and no evidence of unlawful confinement.

The appeal was allowed, the committal for first degree murder was quashed, and the appellant was ordered to stand trial for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his 22-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting a co-accused's videotaped K.G.B. statement for the truth of its contents, specifically challenging the application of the balance of probabilities standard to the issue of voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof and made no errors in finding the statement voluntary.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly found a conditional sentence would not adequately address denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and discharging a firearm with intent to wound, as well as his sentence.

He argued that Crown counsel's editorial comments and inflammatory language during cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's instructions to the jury adequately addressed the Crown's inappropriate comments.

The Court also found the verdicts were not unreasonable or inconsistent, and the trial judge did not err in principle in sentencing.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that exchanges between the trial judge and counsel during closing arguments revealed a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the trial judge's comments were discourteous or unnecessary, they did not suggest bias but rather an appreciation of the formidable evidence against the appellant.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge misused the licence plate evidence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to mischief to property and cruelty to animals after videotaping the torture and killing of a cat.

He was sentenced to 90 days intermittent on the cruelty charge and a consecutive 18-month conditional sentence for mischief.

The Crown appealed, seeking an additional 10 months of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly focused on the cruelty to the cat, which carried a maximum penalty of six months, and that the total sentence adequately reflected the seriousness of the conduct.

The appellant, who was 14 years old at the time, was convicted of sexually assaulting a seven-year-old child while babysitting.

The complainant did not disclose the incident until months later, after her father, who was separated from her mother and harboured animosity toward the appellant, suggestively questioned her.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the defence's theory, which focused on the reliability of the child's account given the father's suggestive questioning, rather than deliberate fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered, as the father's unreliability made it impossible to properly assess the reliability of the complainant's disclosure.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of charges against the respondents for wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group, Roma.

At trial, the evidence showed the respondents targeted 'gypsies', and the trial judge refused the Crown's late requests to amend the information, take judicial notice of dictionary definitions equating Roma and gypsies, or reopen the case.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary rulings and noting that even if Roma are a subset of gypsies, the terms are not interchangeable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the appeal did not raise a question of law alone and there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, threatening death, and obstructing justice after slashing two victims with an Exacto knife in their home.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting his statements to police, excluding evidence of a victim's complete criminal record, refusing to allow comment on a victim's failure to testify, and permitting his own criminal record to go to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year term was justified given the serious nature of the assaults and the appellant's lengthy criminal history.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery based solely on the uncorroborated evidence of a single eyewitness.

The eyewitness had a limited opportunity to observe the robber, gave a problematic description, and made a tenuous identification from a photo line-up.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal, finding the identification evidence too weak to safely found a conviction.

MacPherson J.A. dissented, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for perjury, which related to his testimony about his prior criminal record.

The trial proceeded on a shared misapprehension by counsel and the trial judge that the appellant had five prior convictions, when he actually had at most four, and possibly only three.

The Court of Appeal held that this error was crucial, particularly given that the jury acquitted the appellant of one closely connected charge while convicting him of another.

Finding the verdict unsafe, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board directing his detention at a mental health facility with limited community access and a driving prohibition.

The disposition was made despite expert evidence indicating the appellant's risk of violence from alcohol abuse could be managed through supervised administration of antabuse while living in the community.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the expert evidence and did not explain why the imposed conditions satisfied the criteria under section 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new hearing was ordered.

The appellant Fraser and two co-accused were tried for second-degree murder following a street fight.

Fraser admitted to stabbing the victim but raised defences of intoxication.

The co-accused were acquitted, while Fraser was convicted.

Fraser appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and intent.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the co-accused, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could not be convicted of manslaughter if Fraser was convicted of murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed Fraser's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to use evidence of Fraser's flight from the scene.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed because, although the trial judge erred in law regarding party liability for manslaughter, the Crown failed to show the error may well have affected the verdicts for the co-accused.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual offences involving children.

Prior to jury selection, he applied to challenge potential jurors for cause, arguing that the nature of the charges gave rise to a realistic possibility of juror partiality.

The trial judge rejected the application and the accused was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused failed to establish a widespread bias in the community arising from the nature of the charges that would be incapable of being set aside by jurors despite trial safeguards.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shaking death of his infant stepdaughter.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence of a prior shaking incident to rebut the appellant's defence of innocent intention.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury was improperly instructed on the similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge failed to adequately relate the similar fact evidence to the legal issue of intent under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.