Jamie Cecilia Klukach

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder following the shooting deaths of his estranged wife and her new partner.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including testimony from the appellant's girlfriend, hearsay statements from the deceased expressing fear of the appellant, and evidence of the appellant's controlling behaviour during the marriage.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec caution regarding his girlfriend's testimony and by admitting the hearsay and bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the jury instructions or the admissibility of the evidence.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that similar fact evidence was improperly admitted and that the jury charge was inadequate regarding potential 'tainting' of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the similar fact evidence admissible, particularly given the defence evidence concerning semen stains.

The court also held the jury charge was adequate, noting the lack of objection from the defence at trial.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 243 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits concealing the dead body of a child whether it died before, during, or after birth, arguing the provision is impermissibly vague in its application to a child that died before birth, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 243 meets the minimum standard of precision required by the Charter when interpreted to apply only to a fetus that would likely have been born alive.

The Court adopted a likelihood standard from R. v. Berriman, finding the provision gives fair notice and sufficiently limits enforcement discretion.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and indecent assault charges arising from historical child abuse allegations.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating mere opportunity for indirect contact as giving rise to an air of reality to collusion, and by misanalyzing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed similar fact evidence.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held the judge adopted an impermissibly formulaic comparison of similarities and dissimilarities and overstated reasoning prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The errors materially affected the acquittal, and a new trial was ordered.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering and theft over $5,000, as well as his sentence of five years' imprisonment.

He argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that fresh evidence failed to displace the presumption of trial counsel's competency and that there was ample DNA evidence linking the appellant to the stolen car and crime scene.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was justified by the appellant's extensive criminal record and pattern of criminal behaviour.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The complainant had repeatedly refused sex before finally saying 'okay' after the appellant persisted.

The Court of Appeal held that the complainant's final 'okay' was ambiguous in the context of her prior refusals, triggering the appellant's obligation to take steps to ascertain whether there was a reasonable basis for his belief in consent.

As the appellant took no such steps, the appeal was dismissed.

The Court held that under s. 16(3) of the Canada Evidence Act, an adult witness with mental disabilities is competent if they can communicate evidence and promise to tell the truth.

Requiring abstract understanding of truth-telling obligations was rejected.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the counts relating to one complainant from those relating to two others, and by not designating him a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the pending similar fact application when denying severance and correctly applied the test for dangerous offender designation, noting the appellant's lack of insight and unsuitability for anti-androgen medication.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the imposition of an adult sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that an adult sentence was necessary to achieve accountability for the horrific crime while allowing for potential rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on statements made by the appellant during a 'Mr. Big' operation, cell phone records, and a tacit admission to a friend.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by permitting prohibited propensity reasoning, ruling that the defence violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no impermissible propensity reasoning, upholding the Browne v. Dunn ruling as fair, and concluding the hearsay instruction caused no prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after stabbing a man during an altercation.

On appeal, he challenged the Crown's re-examination of a key witness and the trial judge's jury instructions on provocation, post-offence conduct, and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict of first degree murder was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the legal definition of planning and deliberation, particularly given the tenuous factual basis for first degree murder.

The court set aside the first degree murder conviction and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault against a developmentally challenged adult.

At trial, the judge ruled that the complainant was not competent to testify under section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act because she could not understand the duty to speak the truth.

The trial judge also excluded the complainant's hearsay statements to her teacher and the police, finding them unreliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's competence ruling was entitled to deference and that Parliament had intentionally created different competence standards for children under 14 and adults with developmental disabilities.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the hearsay statements.

The appellants, husband and wife, were convicted of second degree murder in the death of their seven-year-old son, who died following months of severe physical abuse.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh medical evidence regarding the cause of death and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on aiding and abetting, out-of-court statements, and propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the fresh evidence did not meet the required cogency threshold to affect the verdict, particularly given the tactical decision not to call such evidence at trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upheld the 18-year parole ineligibility period for the stepmother.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that designated the respondent as a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The respondent had a serious criminal record for sexually-motivated offences and was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD).

The sentencing judge accepted defence expert evidence that the respondent's FASD symptoms could be treated, allowing him to participate in sex offender programs and reducing his risk of re-offending to an acceptable level in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's preference for the defence expert's evidence or her exercise of discretion.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and uttering threats.

Years later, he appealed his convictions, seeking to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence to establish he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR-MD) at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the fourth criterion of the Palmer test.

The court concluded that the appellant's own writings demonstrated he knew his conduct was morally and legally wrong, meaning the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after choking the victim during consensual sexual activity.

At trial, the appellant admitted culpability for manslaughter but argued he lacked the requisite intent for murder.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the only possible verdicts were second degree murder or manslaughter, removing the option of an acquittal.

On appeal, the appellant argued this violated his right to a jury trial, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the meaning of 'reckless' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly respected the appellant's tactical decision to admit manslaughter, and that the jury instructions on intent, read as a whole, did not constitute reversible error.

The appellant appealed his sentence for sexual offences against a ten-year-old child, arguing that the pre-sentence report contained improper, emotive language that tainted the sentencing process.

The Court of Appeal agreed the probation officer exceeded proper bounds but found no indication this affected the trial judge's careful and measured assessment.

Given the appellant's prior record for a similar offence and his continued denial, the sentence was deemed fit and necessary for the protection of society.

The appeal was dismissed.