Dr. Klassen

Following convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault against a child, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The court applied the statutory framework in s. 753(1), with particular focus on s. 753(1)(a)(ii), and found a virtually unabated pattern of sexually abusing children over decades, interrupted mainly by custody, psychiatric detention, or strict supervision.

The court held that the predicate offences formed part of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating a substantial degree of indifference to the reasonably foreseeable consequences to others.

A dangerous offender designation was therefore imposed, with sentencing to be scheduled separately.

In a judge-alone first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit discreditable conduct evidence from former sexual partners, acquaintances, and material found on the accused's electronic devices to support an inference of violent sexual propensity relevant to the alleged murder during sexual assault or unlawful confinement.

Applying the similar fact evidence framework, the court held that the proposed evidence showed, at most, an interest in BDSM activities including choking, with significant consensual components, and did not establish a specific propensity to engage in non-consensual violent sexual conduct as alleged.

The court found the inferential chain from prior consensual or mixed sexual practices to the charged non-consensual homicidal conduct was logically flawed and insufficiently probative of the actus reus of first-degree murder.

The application was dismissed, and the court added that any limited probative value would in any event have been outweighed by prejudice through distraction from the core trial issues.

The applicant sought to set aside a 1984 separation agreement, challenge a spousal support waiver, obtain retroactive spousal support, and recover damages for alleged physical and sexual abuse occurring before and during the marriage.

The court held that the governing support-set-aside provision was s. 18(4) of the Family Law Reform Act, and found the waiver was not unconscionable given the asset division, the parties’ circumstances at the time, and the applicant’s understanding of the agreement.

In the alternative, the court found the agreement would not be set aside under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act because there was no failure to disclose significant assets, the applicant understood the agreement, and no contractual basis for rescission was established.

The tort claims were also dismissed because the court rejected the applicant’s credibility, preferred the respondent’s evidence, and found the alleged assaults were not proven on a balance of probabilities.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the termination of an employee who purchased marijuana while on duty in a City vehicle.

The union alleged the employee was disabled due to marijuana addiction and required accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's conclusion that the union failed to prove a disability on a balance of probabilities was reasonable, largely due to the employee's lack of credibility and uncorroborated evidence.

The appellant challenged both a conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident between inmates in a correctional facility and a subsequent dangerous offender designation resulting in an indeterminate sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and held there was no basis to disturb the credibility findings.

The ineffective assistance claim failed because, even assuming incompetence, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was established.

On sentence, the court held that a long-term offender determination does not displace ordinary sentencing principles for the predicate offence and upheld the finding that the appellant met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation and could not be managed in the community by less intrusive means.

The appellant appealed his conviction for enticing a person under 14 years of age and his subsequent designation as a dangerous offender.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, specifically regarding the element of 'enticing' and the subjective intent to deprive a parent of possession.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant challenged the finding that the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence, the admission of evidence regarding prior acquitted conduct, and the dangerous offender designation over a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, the application of the legal elements, or the conclusion that the appellant's psychopathy and pedophilia posed an ongoing danger requiring an indeterminate sentence.

The offender was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, wearing a disguise with intent, and uttering threats.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The trial judge instead designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 15-year sentence consecutive to his current sentence, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Both the Crown and the offender appealed.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in relying on statistical evidence of age-related decline in risk to find a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community.

The offender argued the 15-year sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and that the totality principle does not require a shorter sentence if it would preclude a long-term offender designation in favour of an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent after the trial judge terminated a dangerous offender application and sentenced him to a conventional term.

The trial judge had excluded a psychiatric assessment report based on perceived power imbalances, lack of independence, and late disclosure of materials.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in excluding the report, as there was no evidence of collaboration between the Crown and the assessing psychiatrist, and the respondent suffered no prejudice from the late disclosure.

Given the complete record and the respondent's high risk of violent reoffending, the Court of Appeal declared the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including sexually assaulting two 14-year-old boys, and was designated a dangerous offender by the trial judge.

On appeal, the appellant argued he should have been designated a long-term offender, asserting his risk could be managed in the community with chemical castration and strict supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The court noted the appellant's unwillingness to take sex-inhibiting drugs and the unavailability of the required level of community supervision.

The defendant in a civil action for damages arising from a double homicide appealed a Master's decision finding insufficient evidence that he was a person under a disability.

The defendant's former counsel had withheld psychiatric reports from the Master due to concerns about solicitor-client privilege.

On appeal, the court admitted the psychiatric reports as fresh evidence, holding that the traditional due diligence criterion for fresh evidence should yield where compelling psychiatric evidence exists and the interests of justice require its admission to protect a vulnerable person.

The appeal was allowed and the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as litigation guardian.

The young person appealed the decision of the application judge refusing a transfer to Youth Court pursuant to s. 16(9) of the Young Offenders Act.

The application judge found that the young person constituted a danger to the public based on a risk assessment, personal history, and involvement in a serious offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's evaluation and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of spermatozoa, threats to the victim's children, and sexual sadism.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding sexual assault, forcible confinement, post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and the treatment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the admission of evidence or the jury instructions, concluding that the charge read as a whole properly instructed the jury on all issues, including the insanity defence and reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

Constable Favretto was dismissed by a Hearing Officer for discreditable conduct after pointing his firearm at a fellow officer while in a dissociative state caused by workplace harassment.

The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services varied the penalty to a demotion, finding the Hearing Officer failed to properly weigh provocation and rehabilitation.

The Divisional Court reinstated the dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the officer's appeal, holding that the Divisional Court failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review to the Commission's decision, which was supported by a tenable explanation.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal stabbing of his friend.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, arguing the deceased had suffered a psychotic breakdown and attacked him.

On appeal, the appellant raised ten grounds of error, including improper jury instructions on self-defence, reasonable doubt, and motive, as well as erroneous evidentiary rulings regarding hearsay and expert testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence, the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, and the jury instructions were overall adequate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to prohibit cross-examination on his prior testimony at a co-accused's trial, in admitting psychiatric evidence of his predisposition to violence, and in instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly ruled that cross-examination would be vetted under s. 13 of the Charter, properly admitted the psychiatric evidence after the defence opened the door, and accurately instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to mischief to property and cruelty to animals after videotaping the torture and killing of a cat.

He was sentenced to 90 days intermittent on the cruelty charge and a consecutive 18-month conditional sentence for mischief.

The Crown appealed, seeking an additional 10 months of incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly focused on the cruelty to the cat, which carried a maximum penalty of six months, and that the total sentence adequately reflected the seriousness of the conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the finding that he was a dangerous offender.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on evidence of his assault on police officers at the time of arrest and failed to properly summarize the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misdirection and noting the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge gave undue weight to an expert's opinion that relied on other experts not called as witnesses.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the expert was entitled to rely on the material and the dangerous offender finding was fully supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, challenging the admission of similar fact evidence, the finding that the assault was sexual in nature, and the refusal to exclude seized pornographic material under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the prior misconduct evidence was properly admitted, that the assault was objectively sexual in nature based on the words accompanying the force, and that the trial judge did not err in admitting the seized evidence despite an overbroad warrant paragraph.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, the court held that the dangerous offender finding was unchallenged and that the trial judge erred in imposing a determinate sentence without evidence that the offender could be rehabilitated within a fixed period.

The determinate sentence was set aside and replaced with an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown appealed an order transferring a 17-year-old charged with second degree murder from ordinary court to youth court under the Young Offenders Act.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent had shown likely rehabilitation within the seven-year dispositional period, given psychiatric evidence of schizophrenia and possible conduct disorder.

The court held that the youth court judge misconstrued and misapplied the psychiatric evidence by making a definitive finding excluding conduct disorder despite significant evidentiary gaps.

Because the respondent failed to establish likely rehabilitation within the statutory period, the transfer order was set aside and the matter was directed to remain in ordinary court.