Eleanore A. Cronk

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment.

The moving party conceded that the order did not preclude the responding party from advancing its arguments regarding s. 36(4) of the Competition Act or abuse of process as substantive defences at trial, and agreed not to advance an argument of res judicata.

Based on this concession that the order was interlocutory rather than final, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and awarded costs to the moving party.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligence action against a surveying company regarding a boundary dispute.

The motion judge found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant knew of the encroachment and had sufficient information to sue more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the action was out of time and rejecting the appellant's procedural arguments regarding the timing of the summary judgment motion.

The self-represented appellant appeared for the hearing of her appeal, but the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) revealed that its materials had never been served on her.

The Court of Appeal found it would be unfair to proceed and adjourned the appeal.

Due to the late adjournment caused by the OCL's failure to serve its materials, the court ordered the OCL to pay costs thrown away of $1,000 to both the appellant and the respondent.

The appellant claimed she suffered pregnancy complications after a police officer wrongfully confiscated her car in August 2009.

She pursued a police complaint and was informed of the outcome in November 2012.

She commenced a negligence action in October 2013.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period began to run on the date of the incident, as the appellant knew the material facts giving rise to her claim at that time.

The appellants purchased a vehicle with a malfunctioning air conditioner and sued the selling dealer, the supplying dealer, and various individuals for over $400,000.

After settling with the selling dealer for a full refund plus additional compensation, the appellants continued their action against the supplying dealer and its manager.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims, finding no contractual relationship, no evidence of negligence, and that any damages were already fully compensated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant commenced a negligence action against the respondent dentists for substandard dental implant procedures.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying the discoverability test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was discoverable when the appellant's new dentist explained the nature of the problem and advised he would have conducted the procedure differently, which occurred more than two years before the action was commenced.

The appellants sued the respondent for damages after allegedly finding a mouldy piece of chicken in a box of cereal.

The parties reached a settlement to dismiss the action without costs, but the appellants later attempted to resile from the agreement, claiming it was accepted in haste and under stress.

The motion judge enforced the settlement against the adult appellants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to establish grounds, such as mistake or significant compromise, to justify setting aside the settlement.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice and snow on the driveway of a rented residential property.

He sued the landlord and later added the tenant as a co-defendant.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against both defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the tenant, finding the claim was statute-barred because the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that he discovered his claim on the date of the accident.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the landlord, finding genuine issues for trial concerning the interplay between the lease terms, the Occupiers' Liability Act, and the landlord's maintenance obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act.

A young person appealed convictions for sexual offences involving another young person, principally arguing that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial after receiving a post-verdict letter reporting an additional disclosure by the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that mistrials are an exceptional remedy and that the trial judge properly applied the Palmer fresh-evidence framework in concluding the reported statement would not reasonably have affected the result.

The court also rejected challenges to the trial judge's treatment of credibility, finding the reasons thoughtful, even-handed, and sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a mid-trial Rule 21 motion decision interpreting their late father's will and codicil.

The trial judge found that the trusts created by the will, which granted a life interest to the testator's widow, did not preclude her from accumulating wealth from the trust funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation, finding the testator intended to provide generously for his widow without requiring her to conserve the estate for the remainder beneficiaries.

The Court also rejected the appellants' argument that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the mid-trial motion, noting they had consented to the procedure, though the Court cautioned against mid-trial Rule 21 motions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of unsavoury Crown witnesses, misapprehended evidence regarding a co-accused's guilty plea, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or treatment of the evidence.

The appellant also appealed his three and one-half year sentence, arguing it was unfit following the Supreme Court's decision striking down the mandatory minimum.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the offence fell at the 'true crime' end of the spectrum and the sentence was fit given the paramount principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following the stabbing death of his girlfriend.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on an eyewitness who was highly intoxicated at the time of the offence.

The appellant was also found in a near-comatose state of alcohol intoxication at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the eyewitness's reliability and the appellant's extreme intoxication related to reasonable doubt and the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, sought a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal his son's law firm was handling.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the son's interest was neither remote nor insignificant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by conflating the analyses under sections 3 and 4(k) of the Act.

Applying the reasonable elector test, the Court concluded that the appellant's deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it could not reasonably be regarded as likely to influence his participation in council matters.

The appellant sued an employment agency after paying a fee for a promised job that never materialized.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondents credible.

After the initial appeal was dismissed, a television program broadcast an undercover investigation exposing the respondents' deceptive practices.

The appellant moved to re-open the trial to adduce this fresh evidence, but the motion judge dismissed the request.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's reasons inadequate and holding that the fresh evidence met the test for re-opening the trial as it was cogent, previously unavailable, and could have affected the trial's outcome.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence arising from a conviction for possession of child pornography, and also challenged the length of a ten-year long-term offender supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge imposed an illegal custodial sentence because the sentence, when combined with pre-sentence custody expressly treated as additional time, exceeded the then-applicable five-year statutory maximum under s. 163.1(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Re-sentencing afresh, the court imposed a fit sentence of 4.5 years' imprisonment and granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5:1 under Summers, leaving 16 days remaining.

The challenge to the ten-year supervision order was dismissed because the record amply supported the appellant's very high risk of reoffending and need for close supervision and gradual reintegration.

The appellant sought to enforce an ICC arbitral award against the State of Libya by garnishing its embassy bank accounts in Canada.

Libya moved to quash the garnishments, claiming diplomatic immunity, which the motion judge granted.

The appellant appealed, but Libya had a pending motion in the Superior Court to set aside the underlying recognition and enforcement order.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die on the basis of prematurity, finding that the pending motion could render the appeal moot.

The Court also continued a stay order freezing the bank accounts, finding a real risk that the funds would be removed if the stay was lifted.

The appellant appealed an order striking her Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim against Ryerson University and Timothy Sly without leave to amend.

The claim alleged breach of contract, negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, discrimination, and educational malpractice relating to an exam and grading.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to plead the requisite elements of the causes of action, that discrimination is not an independent tort, and that the educational malpractice claims fell within the university's internal academic decision-making discretion.

The claims against the personal respondent were also struck as they did not allege conduct outside his employment duties.

The appellant appealed a conviction on one count of gross indecency following a jury trial involving historic sexual abuse allegations, arguing the verdicts on two counts were inconsistent and that the jury charge inadequately addressed credibility and an asserted motive to fabricate.

The court held the jury instructions were proper, the verdicts were logically reconcilable because the counts related to distinct incidents with differing evidentiary features, and the motive-to-fabricate instruction already captured the possibility of honest mistake.

On sentence, the court found one aspect of the conditional sentence unduly restrictive and varied the house arrest term to permit limited absence from the residence with prior written supervisory consent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the sentence appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and driving without insurance after driving his motorcycle while intoxicated and crashing, resulting in the death of his passenger.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in treating his guilty plea, assessing aggravating factors, and calculating pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the pre-sentence custody calculation and increased the credit, but otherwise dismissed the appeal, finding the six-year sentence fit given the gravity of the offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing 1.37 kg of heroin and was sentenced to 10.5 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient reasons for rejecting his claim of duress, erred in finding he was a principal rather than a courier, and imposed an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's credibility findings were supported by evidence, his characterization of the appellant's role was appropriate, and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the quantity of heroin and the appellant's role.