Eileen E. Gillese

The appellant, a dental school graduate, appealed the dismissal of his application for an injunction to compel the National Dental Examining Board of Canada to grant him a "Special Appeal" of his failed written exams.

The motion judge had struck the application, finding no reasonable cause of action as the Board's by-laws did not provide a substantive right to a "Special Appeal" for written exam failures.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the by-laws, when read as a whole, did not establish such a right, and therefore, the application for injunctive relief failed.

The appellant, B.S., appealed his conviction for indecent assault and the imposed sentence of 18 months' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's reliability and credibility, and the rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, particularly in light of the appellant's Indigenous status and the absence of a Gladue report at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility and reliability, and upholding the custodial sentence as appropriate given the nature of the offence against a vulnerable child.

The appellants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision on costs, which had awarded partial indemnity costs of $450,000 to Pembina Pipeline Corp. and $500,000 to BluEarth Renewables Inc. The Court of Appeal for Ontario denied leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's costs award was a discretionary decision entitled to deference.

The court concluded that there was no error in principle and the award was not plainly wrong, as the motion judge had properly considered factors such as the respondents' success, the complexity of the proceeding, the amounts at stake, and the conduct of the litigation.

This is an appeal from a judgment granting partial summary judgment in favour of the respondent, Learmont Roofing Ltd. The appellants, Learmont Construction Ltd. et al., argued that the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues for trial and in granting partial summary judgment without considering the risk of inconsistent findings with ongoing counterclaims.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in these arguments, agreeing that no genuine issues for trial were raised and that the counterclaims were not intertwined with the trust claim in a way that would lead to factual inconsistencies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside her deceased mother's will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, suspicious circumstances, and undue influence.

She also sought leave to appeal the partial indemnity costs order made against her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the will's validity, finding no reversible error in the application judge's findings that the mother had the requisite capacity and the will was not surrounded by suspicious circumstances or undue influence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the costs order, set it aside, and ordered that the appellant bear her own costs of the application, while the respondents' costs are payable from the estate, as the grounds raised by the appellant, though unsuccessful, were not frivolous and warranted court scrutiny.

The moving party, Lynda Van Delst, sought an order from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to quash Thomas John Hronowsky’s third appeal concerning an equalization payment.

The court granted the motion, finding the appeal to be an abuse of process.

The decision highlighted Mr. Hronowsky's history of protracted litigation, non-compliance with previous court orders, and the mootness of his primary ground of appeal, which collectively prevented Ms. Van Delst from enforcing valid court orders.

The appellant, A.J.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving a child complainant.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge erred in foreclosing re-examination on the appellant's intellectual disability, and whether the trial judge and Crown improperly relied on the complainant's undisclosed diary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his treatment of re-examination, as the defence was permitted to raise the issue and the judge reasonably exercised discretion in not considering it further due to lack of supporting evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's use of the diary, which was treated as narrative evidence, and concluded that any improper use by the Crown did not affect the trial's outcome or overall fairness.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his 77-page statement of claim as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01, alleging malicious prosecution against his ex-partner and others after criminal harassment charges were withdrawn via a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's discretionary decision, finding no misdirection or clear error, and affirmed that the claim and the appellant's communications constituted an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Michael Beaudin, severely injured in a dirt bike motocross competition, sought statutory accident benefits from Travelers Insurance.

Travelers denied coverage, arguing the dirt bike was not an "automobile" under the Insurance Act and Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) because it was exempt from the Off-Road Vehicles Act (ORVA) insurance requirement.

The core issue on appeal was whether the ORVA exemption for closed course competitions applied only if the competition was sponsored by a motorcycle association.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the ORVA exemption applies only to sponsored competitions.

Consequently, the dirt bike was not exempt and was considered an "automobile," entitling Beaudin to benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper Crown submissions regarding tailoring evidence, an erroneous two-step deliberation instruction to the jury, and improper Crown submissions on motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds but concluded that these errors, individually or collectively, did not undermine the safety of the verdict given the overall fault-free trial and clear instructions on burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in principle or manifest unfitness in the sentence.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellants, Greta Energy Inc. and Great Grand Valley 2 Limited Partnership, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against Pembina Pipeline Corporation and BluEarth Renewables Inc. The case involved the sale of bundled assets, some subject to Rights of First Refusal (ROFRs).

The appellants alleged that the respondents manipulated asset prices in bad faith to prevent the exercise of ROFRs, breaching duties of good faith and honest performance, inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the respondents did not breach their duty of good faith, did not owe a fiduciary duty, did not conspire, and did not induce breach of contract, as their actions were commercially reasonable and not intended to "eviscerate" the ROFRs.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) declaration.

The OLRB had declared Enercare Home & Commercial Services Limited Partnership, Ganeh Energy Services Ltd., and Beaver Energy Services Ltd. to be related employers under section 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, but not Perras Mechanical Services Ltd. The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decision unreasonable for failing to consider bargaining history and collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the reasonableness standard of review as set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, and restored the OLRB's original decision.

This appeal concerns the Divisional Court's quashing of three Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions, which had declared Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes (TTCMH) and Brickpol Masonry Corporation (Mr. Turkiewicz's former business) a single employer under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, bound TTCMH to a collective agreement, and awarded damages to the Unions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred in its application of the reasonableness standard of review, as articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov.

The Court of Appeal held that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, as the Board properly considered the erosion of bargaining rights as a valid labour relations purpose for the related employer declaration, adequately addressed the hiatus between businesses, and made a reasonable damages award.

The appeal was allowed, and the OLRB decisions were restored.

The appellant, Ellyn Law, appealed a motion judge's order that its retainer agreement with the respondents, Alexander L. Bimman and 2182474 Ontario Inc., was valid and capped fees at 30% of recovery, disallowing certain additional fees and disbursements.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the validity and enforceability of the retainer agreement, clarifying that while lawyers can challenge their own agreements under s. 24 of the Solicitors Act, there is a presumption of fairness and reasonableness that requires exceptional circumstances to rebut.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in disallowing a disbursement for an external law firm (Chitiz Pathak LLP) as it was reasonably necessary to resolve the underlying action.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the impact of possible inadvertent tainting on the complainant’s evidence, by rejecting the appellant’s testimony based on an unreasonable inference, and in refusing to consider the appellant’s mental disability in assessing his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the potential for inadvertent tainting, that any errors in inference regarding the appellant's testimony were harmless, and that the trial judge appropriately dealt with the intellectual disability evidence for testimonial accommodation but not for credibility assessment as it was not admitted for that purpose.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering his detention.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant public threat and in not adequately applying Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal granted fresh evidence motions from both parties but dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable.

The court affirmed that the appellant remained a significant threat due to unstable mental health, risk of medication non-compliance, and substance abuse, which could lead to re-offending.

The refusal of a conditional discharge was also deemed reasonable, as no adequate community treatment plan was in place, despite the consideration of Gladue factors.

The appellant, Don Mills Residents Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its application seeking a declaration and injunction to compel the City of Toronto and C/F Realty Holding Ltd. to construct a community centre as per minutes of settlement.

The application judge found the minutes were not a binding contract and specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the minutes of settlement, in the context of land-use planning, were not a binding contract but rather a planning instrument under the Planning Act, revisable in the public interest.

The court also found no legal obligation on the City to build the centre, as that obligation rested with C/F Realty Holding Ltd.

The appellant, Adel Arnaout, appealed from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed after a second dangerous offender hearing.

He sought to set aside the designation and substitute a determinant sentence with a long-term supervision order, or alternatively, a fresh hearing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's findings that a pattern of behaviour was established by the letter bomb incidents alone, that the conduct satisfied the brutality requirement under the Criminal Code, and that it was not reasonably possible to control the appellant's behaviour in the community, deferring to the sentencing judge's preference for expert psychiatric evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal addressed whether two insurers, AIG and Lloyd's, had a duty to defend a mutual policyholder (the City of Timmins) in a progressive property damage claim.

The key issues were the role of "premature" evidence in duty to defend analysis, the interpretation of an "Expected or Intended Injury" exclusion clause, and whether a "crystallizing event" (an AMEC Report) triggered this exclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the AMEC Report was "premature" evidence and not a "crystallizing event" that would negate Lloyd's duty to defend.

The court affirmed that the underlying claim was based on negligence, not intentional conduct, and therefore the exclusion clause did not apply, triggering Lloyd's duty to defend.

The appellant, Professional Court Reporters Inc. (PCR), appealed a summary judgment decision concerning a sublease default by the respondents, Pistachio Financier Corp. and Real Crowd Capital Inc. o/a R2.

PCR sought damages for lost profit, post-judgment interest at a contractual rate, and costs on a higher scale, all of which were denied or limited by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to deny lost profits, finding insufficient evidence to establish a loss.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding post-judgment interest and costs, ruling that contractual terms for interest and costs should be enforced absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present.