Eileen E. Gillese

Traders General Insurance Company moved to review a single judge's decision denying it leave to appeal an order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying dispute involved a bad faith claim assigned to the respondents by a discharged bankruptcy trustee following a motor vehicle accident judgment.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to review the single judge's decision because the judge had mistakenly declined jurisdiction by failing to address the merits of the leave motion.

Applying the Pine Tree Resorts test, the Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised prima facie meritorious issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, who pleaded guilty to sexual interference.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by departing from the parties' agreement on ancillary orders, specifically a section 161 prohibition and probation terms, without applying the Anthony-Cook joint submission standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement on ancillary orders did not constitute a joint submission on the core sentence, as the parties disagreed significantly on the length of custody.

The Court also held that the trial judge's discretionary orders were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and breaches of probation, as well as his 40-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge unevenly scrutinized his credibility compared to the complainant cab driver, and that the sentencing judge failed to apply the jump principle and give appropriate weight to his rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the increased violence of the robbery justified the sentence and the judge properly considered the appellant's rehabilitation efforts, except the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant, a young Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The sentencing judge rejected her s. 15 Charter challenge to s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded a conditional sentence for her offence, and imposed a 17-month custodial sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the provisions violated s. 15 by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders and s. 7 by being overbroad.

The provisions were struck down, and a sentence of time served was substituted.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the respondents sought full indemnity costs, relying on an unresponded settlement offer and rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, noting that costs generally follow the event on a partial indemnity basis unless there is sanctionable conduct during the appeal.

Finding no such conduct, the court awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $11,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision granting sole custody of the child to the respondent mother, ordering him to pay child and spousal support, and awarding trial costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to determine an exact separation date, in awarding spousal support given his high student debt, and in not ordering parallel custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the best interests of the child framework or the spousal support guidelines, and noting the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's debt and the history of intimate partner violence.

The moving party sought to dismiss the appeal or require the responding party to post security for costs.

The responding party had failed to pay a previous costs order of $2,000 and failed to appear for the scheduled appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal declined to dismiss the appeal outright for a single unpaid costs order but ordered the responding party to pay $19,000 into court as security for costs, plus the outstanding costs and the costs of the motion, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that he owned a two-thirds share of a property.

The property was originally owned by his mother-in-law, who transferred it to herself and her daughter (the appellant's late wife) as joint tenants.

The appellant argued the property was a matrimonial home and the joint tenancy was severed upon his wife's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the transfer raised a presumption of resulting trust which was not rebutted.

Because the daughter held the property on resulting trust, she did not have an interest in the property under the Family Law Act, precluding it from being a matrimonial home.

The appellant lawyer sought the proceeds of his client's after-the-event insurance policy to cover disbursements incurred in a motor vehicle action.

The client was a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the contingency fee agreement was unenforceable because it lacked court approval and was signed by the incapable client without the litigation guardian's involvement.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's motion for a charging order, finding the appellant merely acted as an insurance intermediary and did not recover or preserve property in the litigation.

Following an appeal where success was divided, the parties made submissions on costs.

The appellant sought partial indemnity costs of $12,500, while the respondents sought $7,170 and no change to the motion judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs for the appeal due to the divided success, but reduced the costs awarded below from $6,000 to $3,000, payable only to the corporate respondent.

Mark Couper appealed a judgment ordering him to pay legal fees and disbursements to Rueters LLP.

The appeal was based on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the applications judge, an alleged error in finding Rueters had good reason to withdraw as counsel without court approval, and the invalidity of a compromise compensation agreement (CCA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that Rueters had good reason to withdraw (client caused breakdown, no prejudice, no court approval needed as client agreed), and that the CCA was valid and enforceable (new issue not raised below, and found fair and reasonable).

The appellant, Randolph Burns, appealed a motion judge's order striking out his statement of claim against two corporate employees (Lauren McLean and Anna Oslizlok) without leave to amend, and granting RBC Life's request for a discovery order.

The appeal concerned the adequacy of claims pleaded against corporate employees for torts allegedly committed in the course of their employment.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge correctly determined that the statement of claim failed to plead specific material facts to support individualized claims against the employees, but erred in denying leave to amend.

The appeal was allowed in part, granting Mr. Burns leave to amend his statement of claim.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay against two respondents under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge found the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for a four-year delay, rejecting their "wait and see" approach tied to another delayed action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the motion judge's discretionary decision and reiterating that failure on the first part of the two-part test (acceptable explanation) is sufficient for dismissal.

This is an appeal from convictions for first degree murder (Marcus Alexis) and manslaughter (Brian Funes) arising from an armed robbery and fatal shooting.

Alexis appealed on grounds of jury instruction errors regarding constructive first degree murder and the relation of evidence to legal issues.

Funes appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in leaving party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code with the jury, arguing it was not available on the evidence.

The Court dismissed Alexis's appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate.

Funes's appeal was allowed, his conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 21(1) liability for manslaughter, which was not supported by the evidence.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents (a law firm and individuals) for alleged breach of solicitor-client privilege.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the action based on issue estoppel, a decision the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the three-part test for issue estoppel was met.

The Master in an earlier, unrelated proceeding had squarely addressed and decided the privilege issue, finding it waived, and that decision was final due to the appellant's withdrawal of the appeal.

The appellant, Mr. Lotey, appealed an order striking out his statement of defence for failing to comply with documentary production obligations over a three-year period.

His law firm also sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to personally pay the costs of the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Lotey's appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 30.08(2) given the deliberate and continuous failure to produce relevant documents.

The Court also denied the law firm leave to appeal the costs order, finding the firm was complicit in the flagrant disregard of the Rules and court orders.

The applicant, Lo-Ming Lum, brought two motions before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

These motions arose from an earlier action she initiated, which was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious by the Superior Court, with an order barring her from further proceedings without leave.

The motions sought to set aside an order by a single Divisional Court judge and to obtain leave to appeal another interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions, affirming that appeals from a single Divisional Court judge lie to a panel of the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The court also issued an order under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the applicant to obtain leave from a single judge of the Court of Appeal before taking any further steps or proceedings related to this action in that court, citing her disregard for prior orders and procedural misuse.

The appellant, a commercial tenant, commenced a Superior Court action against its former landlord and another tenant for breach of contract and various torts.

The motion judge struck the claim as an abuse of process because the issues were substantially the same as two small claims actions the appellant had already commenced against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the actions were substantially the same and constituted an abuse of process.

The court also upheld the motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant, Jasfa Brown, appealed his convictions for firearm and drug offences and the imposed sentence.

He challenged the validity of his guilty plea and the amount of enhanced credit for harsh presentence custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the guilty plea.

Regarding the sentence, the court upheld the sentencing judge's discretion in awarding four months of Duncan credit, despite acknowledging it was at the lower end compared to recent case law concerning conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

However, leave to appeal the sentence was granted, and the $600 victim fine surcharge was set aside in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant was convicted of possessing MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated due to unlawful continued detention and search.

The trial judge found the initial detention and pat-down lawful, but the search of the appellant's knapsack unlawful, admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's continued detention was lawful, emphasizing the totality of circumstances and the reasonable suspicion held by police in a dangerous situation.

Consequently, the appeal against conviction was dismissed, though a mandatory victim fine surcharge was quashed.