Dirk Derstine

On a Crown application in a murder trial, the court considered whether preliminary inquiry testimony of an unavailable inmate witness could be admitted under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the Crown proved on a balance of probabilities that the witness was absent from Canada, largely through hearsay evidence with sufficient indicia of reliability.

However, the court exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence because admission would operate unfairly to the accused, given the centrality of credibility, the witness's potential motive to shift blame, significant internal and external inconsistencies, the availability of surveillance video never put to the witness, and new evidence arising after the preliminary hearing.

The Crown application was dismissed.

The accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case on charges of second degree murder and the included offence of manslaughter arising from an inmate's suicide in custody.

The court interpreted s. 222(5)(c) of the Criminal Code, defined the elements of threat, fear of violence, and causation, and held there was some evidence on which a properly instructed jury could find that the moving party's conduct, including making and sending a noose, constituted a threat or contributed significantly to the victim's fear of violence and suicide.

Applying the directed verdict test and the circumstantial evidence framework, the court held the case should go to the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter.

The alternative theory that the moving party aided and abetted another inmate was removed from the jury for lack of evidence.

The appellants, members of the Bandidos motorcycle gang, appealed their convictions for multiple counts of first degree murder and manslaughter arising from the execution-style killings of eight fellow gang members.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in ruling that the common law defence of duress was unavailable to persons charged as parties to murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as the common law defence of duress remains available to parties to murder.

However, the Court dismissed the appeals, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because there was no air of reality to the duress defence for any of the appellants on the evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder following the death of her three-year-old child from blunt force head trauma, applied for a directed verdict on both second-degree murder and manslaughter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and expert medical testimony indicating the child suffered multiple inflicted injuries of varying ages while in the exclusive care of the accused.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude the accused committed an unlawful act causing death, and that she had the requisite intent for murder.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

During a trial for second-degree murder involving the death of a three-year-old child, the Crown sought to introduce graphic autopsy photographs.

The accused objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and would alienate the jury.

The court ruled the photographs admissible, finding they were necessary to demonstrate the nature and extent of the injuries, which was critical to the Crown's theory that the injuries were inflicted deliberately rather than accidentally.

The court concluded the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

At a preliminary inquiry into a mass shooting at the Toronto Eaton Centre, the Crown sought committal on two counts of first-degree murder.

The accused was charged with nine counts total, including two counts of first-degree murder and five counts of attempted murder.

The court found that the attempted murder charges should be reduced to aggravated assault, as there was no evidence of specific intent to kill the five survivors.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support committal on first-degree murder rather than second-degree murder for the two victims who died.

The court found that motive (revenge for a prior stabbing) combined with the deliberate and calculated nature of the shooting provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered after the trial judge quashed a CDSA search warrant and excluded drugs, firearms, and other seized evidence from an apartment searched during a nightclub drug-trafficking investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that refusal of leave to cross-examine the affiant did not bar a sub-facial challenge to the warrant, but concluded that the trial judge nevertheless exceeded the proper scope of Garofoli review by reweighing the amplified record, preferring inferences, and effectively conducting a de novo assessment.

The court reaffirmed that warrant review asks whether reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed remained on the basis of which the warrant could have issued.

The acquittals tied to the seizure at 306 Adelaide were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and challenged the constitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the mandatory minimum sentence violates s. 12 of the Charter because it is grossly disproportionate when applied to a reasonable hypothetical offender at the regulatory end of the spectrum.

The court declared s. 95(2)(a)(i) of no force or effect, but affirmed the appellant's specific sentence of time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge's presiding over both his bail hearing and trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the jury charge contained errors regarding post-offence conduct, intent, and lacked balance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and concluding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in principle given the brutal, drug-related nature of the planned robbery and killing.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

During the investigation, an undercover police officer posed as an Obeah spiritual advisor and obtained incriminating statements from two of the appellants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the undercover operation violated their Charter rights to freedom of religion and equality, constituted a 'dirty trick', and that the statements were protected by common law religious privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the appellants' participation was motivated by a desire to obstruct the justice system rather than sincere religious belief, and that the police conduct did not shock the conscience of the community.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding an in camera hearing and the refusal to sever the trial of the third co-accused.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay 17 charges, including human trafficking, against the respondent.

The trial judge found that police had fabricated evidence by planting false identification in the respondent's wallet and that an officer lied about it in testimony, constituting an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his conclusion that the egregious police conduct warranted a stay of proceedings to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.

The accused brought a constitutional application challenging the exclusion of common-law spouses from the spousal incompetency rule in s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act and the related common law.

The court considered whether the distinction between married spouses and common-law partners violated s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying evolving equality jurisprudence following Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., the court held that denying common-law partners the protections afforded to married spouses constituted discrimination based on marital status.

The court further concluded that the infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter because excluding common-law spouses was not rationally connected to the objective of protecting conjugal confidences and marital harmony.

The appropriate remedy was to read common-law spouses into s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act and the common law spousal incompetence rule.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence from several witnesses that would disclose prior criminal conduct and other discreditable acts by the accused in a murder prosecution.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, the relationship between the accused and witnesses, and consciousness of guilt, including allegations that the accused plotted to eliminate a key witness.

The court applied the established rule that evidence of disreputable conduct is presumptively inadmissible unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The court held that most of the proposed evidence formed part of the narrative explaining the motive and relationships surrounding the alleged homicide and was therefore admissible with limiting instructions.

Certain evidence, including alleged assaults on a spouse, buried firearms, and an ante‑mortem statement attributed to the deceased, was excluded as marginally relevant and of questionable probative value.

The Crown sought a ruling that statements made by the accused to police during two interviews in 2006 were voluntary and admissible at trial.

The defence argued the statements were induced by promises of protection for the accused’s family and that the failure to provide Charter cautions violated ss. 7 and 10(b).

The court held the accused was not detained in relation to the investigation and that the interviews were investigative in nature while he was incarcerated on unrelated matters.

Applying the legal detention test, the court found no inducements or promises of favour tied to providing information.

The statements were therefore found to be voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and several firearms and recognizance offences arising from a shooting at Fairview Mall during a pursuit following a shoplifting incident.

The central issue at trial was identification of the accused as the person captured on surveillance video wearing a red T‑shirt who fled and discharged a handgun during the chase.

The court assessed recognition evidence, eyewitness testimony, and extensive video and photographic evidence, admitting identification evidence from a probation officer who had frequent prior contact with the accused while excluding identification evidence from two police officers who lacked sufficient familiarity.

After comparing the video footage with the accused’s appearance in court and considering corroborating testimony from witnesses to the chase and shooting, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person in the video and that he fired a handgun at a pursuing security officer to avoid arrest.

However, the court found the Crown had not proven the specific intent required for attempted murder.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, sought to vary a s. 516(2) non-communication order to remove his common-law spouse, a material witness for the Crown, from the list of prohibited persons.

The applicant argued the order unfairly interfered with their relationship and their intention to marry.

The court dismissed the application, finding strong evidence that the spouse had previously expressed fear of the applicant, sought police protection, and that the applicant had a history of threatening and counseling the murder of other witnesses.

The court held that the societal interest in protecting witnesses and ensuring a fair trial justified the continued non-communication order.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that upheld a trial conviction.

The appellant argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the case raised no legal issues of significance to the general administration of justice and that the trial judge had given extensive, well-reasoned findings.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences after police found him in an apartment with drugs and a loaded handgun.

At trial, the judge refused to allow the defence to call a third-party witness who was expected to testify that the drugs and gun belonged to him, ruling there was an insufficient nexus between the witness and the offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapplied the test for alternate suspect evidence.

Where the defence proposes to call direct evidence from another person taking responsibility for the crimes charged, that proposed evidence itself constitutes a sufficient nexus.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for homicide, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a witness's guilty plea to manslaughter, refusing to put self-defence to the jury, and admitting a prior statement as a threat.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, noting there was no air of reality to the self-defence claim.

The court also upheld the 12-year parole ineligibility period, finding it was not manifestly unreasonable.

During a murder trial, the court held a pre-charge conference to discuss the jury instructions regarding an unsavoury witness who had confessed to killing the victim.

The draft charge included a Vetrovec warning and a list of independent supportive evidence.

Defence counsel argued that the extensive list of supportive evidence nullified the warning and made a tactical request to omit the Vetrovec warning entirely.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Brooks, the court held that a Vetrovec warning is discretionary and should not be imposed when it would prejudice the accused's case by highlighting corroborative evidence.

The court deferred to defence counsel's tactical decision and omitted the warning from the charge.