Dirk Derstine

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on eight charges of serious assault, including physical and sexual abuse.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on all counts after a nine-day trial.

The Crown argued that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for the acquittals, providing only brief comments on the record that did not explain the decision or permit meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge promised detailed written reasons but never delivered them despite repeated requests over several months.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's brief comments constituted only the "bottom line" decision without any analysis of the evidence, contradictions between witnesses, or identification of specific evidentiary gaps supporting the reasonable doubt conclusion.

The court held that the failure to provide reasons that permit meaningful appellate review constitutes reversible error in law.

The applicant, Christie Ann Culotta, faced five counts related to impaired and dangerous operation of a vessel causing bodily harm.

Both the Crown and defence brought pre-trial applications.

The Crown sought to admit utterances and a written statement as voluntary.

The defence sought to exclude these statements and evidence derived from seized blood samples and medical records, alleging breaches of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court ruled that the applicant's utterances in the ambulance and her subsequent written statement were voluntary and admissible.

However, the court found that the sealing of additional blood vials by police, with the lab technician's involvement, constituted an unlawful and warrantless seizure in violation of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights, and this evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The court also found that the initial arrest for impaired operation lacked reasonable and probable grounds, but this did not lead to the exclusion of the statements.

The search warrant for medical records was upheld as valid.

Liban Omar was acquitted of first-degree murder but subsequently sentenced for contempt of court.

During his murder trial, Omar testified in his own defence, claiming a "mystery man" committed the murder and provided him with details, but he adamantly refused to name this individual despite court orders and warnings.

The court found his refusal to answer proper questions, while voluntarily testifying, constituted serious contempt.

The judge sentenced Omar to three years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and denied credit for the 3.5 years Omar had spent in custody on the murder charge, as that time was not "as a result of the offence" of contempt.

The defendant was convicted of defrauding the Ontario government social assistance plan of $18,636.00 over three years and pleaded guilty to defrauding a Visa cardholder of $7,944.75 while awaiting trial on the first offence.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-10) that removed the conditional sentence option for offences with a maximum term of 14 years or life imprisonment.

The defendant argued this violated sections 12 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the removal of the conditional sentence option does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after fatally shooting the victim in the chest during a dispute.

The court inferred the shooting was intentional for intimidation purposes but assumed the offender did not intend to hit the victim.

The court declined to revisit the constitutionality of the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong family support, the court imposed a sentence of six years, reduced to three years less 15 days after credit for pre-trial custody.

The defendant, Liban Omar, charged with first degree murder, sought to admit expert psychological evidence from Dr. Marc Patry regarding false confessions and "Mr. Big" operations during a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Omar's statements to undercover officers.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for expert evidence admissibility, finding that while Dr. Patry was qualified and the evidence logically relevant, it was not necessary to assist the jury.

The court concluded that the dangers of "Mr. Big" confessions could be adequately addressed through jury instructions, as established by Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in R. v. Hart and R. v. Mack, and was bound by R. v. Osmar.

The expert evidence was deemed unnecessary and therefore inadmissible.

The accused, Liban Omar, was charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by Omar to undercover police during a "Mr. Big" operation.

Applying the principles from R. v. Hart and R. v. Mack, the court found the statements to be reliable and highly probative, with their probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.

The court also found no abuse of process by the police.

Consequently, Omar's statements to the undercover officers were deemed admissible at trial, subject to editing.

The court also briefly addressed the admissibility of expert evidence on the shooter's height, finding it admissible but ultimately giving it no weight.

Liban Omar, charged with first-degree murder, was the subject of a Crown application to admit a video-taped statement made by Gavin Daley to police.

Daley, who was murdered before trial, had implicated Omar in the murder and was found in possession of the deceased's ring.

The Crown sought to admit Daley's statement as hearsay evidence under the principled approach, arguing necessity due to Daley's death.

The court found the necessity criterion met but determined that the statement lacked sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability.

Factors undermining reliability included Daley's criminal record (including for fabricating evidence), his motive to lie to avoid more serious charges (accessory to murder, cocaine possession), and the interviewing officer's actions in feeding him key information about the suspect and the murder weapon.

The court concluded that the statement was not inherently trustworthy and that its admission would be unfair to the defence.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, a Black man charged with first-degree murder, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause regarding racial bias.

The accused requested that the challenge be decided by rotating triers and that the unsworn jury panel be excluded from the courtroom during the process.

The accused explicitly declined to apply under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code, relying instead on the court's inherent common law jurisdiction.

The court reviewed the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code and conflicting jurisprudence on whether trial judges retain inherent jurisdiction to exclude unsworn jurors when rotating triers are used.

The court concluded that applications to exclude jurors to preserve impartiality fall under s. 640(2.1), which mandates static triers if granted.

However, the court declined to make an order under s. 640(2.1) and further declined to exercise any residual common law discretion to exclude the panel, finding the grounds advanced did not warrant exclusion.

The challenge for cause was ordered to proceed with rotating triers and without excluding unsworn jurors.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine, importing cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial motions alleging violations of his section 8 Charter rights.

The appellant challenged the search of a shipping container by customs officials, the issuance of a wiretap authorization, and the granting of search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the customs search was authorized under the Customs Act, the wiretap authorization met the investigative necessity requirement, and the conduct of the Justice of the Peace in issuing the search warrants did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the intent for murder by including 'recklessness' as an alternative, and erred in his Vetrovec warnings.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no realistic possibility the jury convicted based on recklessness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the Gladue factors in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of counselling to commit murder.

At trial, the judge excluded an out-of-court statement made by the accused's common law spouse, relying on the spousal incompetency rule.

The trial judge also set aside wiretap authorizations and excluded intercepted communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding the police affiant failed to disclose material facts about an informant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in applying the spousal incompetency rule to a common law spouse, the error did not affect the verdict because the statement was inadmissible hearsay.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to excise the informant's information from the wiretap application and exclude the resulting evidence due to serious police misconduct.

The offender was convicted of multiple firearms-related offences including firearm trafficking, knowing unauthorized possession, possession contrary to a prohibition order, and breach of recognizance.

The court considered constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code and to s. 719(3.1), which restricts enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

Relying in part on the reasoning in R. v. Nur, the court held that the three‑year mandatory minimum for firearm trafficking under s. 99(2) violated s. 12 of the Charter because the provision could capture licensing-type conduct with minimal moral culpability and impose a grossly disproportionate sentence.

The court rejected the challenge to s. 719(3.1) and applied limited enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The offender received a global sentence of four years and six months' imprisonment, subject to credit for time served.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of her three‑year‑old child following a prolonged pattern of physical abuse.

Medical evidence established multiple blunt‑force injuries of varying ages, including skull fractures and internal bleeding, culminating in a fatal head injury inflicted while the child was in the accused’s sole care.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that earlier injuries resulted from an accidental bookcase incident and found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had inflicted numerous prior assaults over weeks or months.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in cases involving violence against vulnerable children and abuse of parental trust, the court imposed a substantial penitentiary term.

Immigration consequences were considered but given only modest weight.

During a jury trial for second degree murder arising from the death of a young child, the defence sought to call a kinesiologist as a forensic expert to testify that the child’s fatal injuries could have resulted from a series of accidental falls.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence set out in Mohan and Abbey, the court found the proposed witness was not properly qualified and that the proposed field of "forensic kinesiology" was not a recognized scientific discipline.

The court also found the proposed opinion relied on limited anecdotal factual foundations and reflected an advocacy-driven approach rather than objective expertise.

The probative value of the evidence was minimal and its prejudicial effect significant because it purported to address the ultimate issue of accident versus homicide.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, voyeurism, and breach of probation, as well as his six-year sentence.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant choked the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her while she was unconscious, and videotaped the activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence or error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of increasing the pre-sentence custody credit to a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 25.5 months of credit.

On a Crown application in a murder trial, the court considered whether preliminary inquiry testimony of an unavailable inmate witness could be admitted under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the Crown proved on a balance of probabilities that the witness was absent from Canada, largely through hearsay evidence with sufficient indicia of reliability.

However, the court exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence because admission would operate unfairly to the accused, given the centrality of credibility, the witness's potential motive to shift blame, significant internal and external inconsistencies, the availability of surveillance video never put to the witness, and new evidence arising after the preliminary hearing.

The Crown application was dismissed.