Dirk Derstine

The appellant was convicted of three counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after driving impaired the wrong way on a 400-series highway.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment and forcing him to proceed unrepresented after his counsel was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant was manipulating the system to delay the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the nine-year imprisonment term due to the severe aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences following a traffic stop.

At trial, the appellant argued the stop was motivated by racial profiling and challenged the admission of the firearm under the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the racial profiling claim and admitted the evidence despite finding a section 8 breach.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's frequent and unnecessary interjections during the cross-examination of police witnesses compromised trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's interventions disrupted the defence's ability to effectively cross-examine key witnesses on the central issue of racial profiling, creating the appearance of an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned in accordance with the filed Notice of Abandonment.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect in accordance with R. v. Handy.

The trial judge's assessment was entitled to great deference and was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial judge's numerous and discourteous interventions during the trial rendered it unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the interventions undermined defence counsel's integrity and interfered with his ability to cross-examine police officers effectively.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple sexual offences against nine child complainants spanning three periods over three decades, arguing that evidence from earlier family-based abuse should not have been admitted as similar fact evidence on later allegations involving unrelated children.

The court held that similar fact evidence need not show striking similarity where identity is not in issue and credibility is central.

In the context of a multi-count indictment, the trial judge was entitled to find a sufficient pattern of opportunistic sexual predation and distinctive sexual conduct to give the evidence significant probative value outweighing prejudice.

The limiting instruction properly guarded against prohibited bad character reasoning.

The conviction appeal and the related dangerous offender appeal were dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and other offences.

At his third trial, the Crown sought to introduce his personal diary as part of its case-in-chief.

The trial judge excluded the diary, ruling its admission would violate the accused's Charter rights against self-incrimination by tactically compelling him to testify.

The Crown called no further evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the diary was created prior to state intervention and its admission did not create a legal compulsion to testify.

The Court also found no abuse of process in the Crown's decision to call no evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his common-law spouse.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought a life sentence based on the 'Hill principle', attempting to introduce evidence of untried and uncharged violent acts against the victim and a former spouse to demonstrate a pattern of violence.

The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible and, based on a joint submission, imposed an eight-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while evidence of untried offences can be admitted to show background and character, it cannot be used to increase a sentence beyond what is proportionate to the convicted offence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the evidence or the sentence imposed, particularly given the Crown's position at trial.