M. Dean

The accused was charged with murder and brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on late disclosure and abuse of process.

The Crown failed to disclose critical DNA evidence identifying the victim's brother's DNA on a mask recovered at the scene, which had been in police possession since January 7, 2025, but was not disclosed until September 9, 2025, on the eve of trial.

Additionally, the Crown failed to timely disclose cell tower evidence and corresponding witness statements necessary to establish the accused's identity as the suspect.

The court found serious violations of the accused's section 7 Charter rights and determined that the Crown's pattern of negligence, apathy, and late preparation constituted an abuse of process that undermined the integrity of the justice system.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the only appropriate remedy.

The accused, Laureano Bistoyong, was charged with second-degree murder in the stabbing death of his cousin, Mark Bistoyong.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown did not accept the plea, arguing for murder intent.

The court found that the Crown proved the requisite mens rea for murder, specifically that the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether the victim died or not.

The court rejected the defence of provocation, finding no air of reality to it due to a significant time lapse between the alleged provocation and the stabbing.

Laureano Bistoyong was found guilty of second-degree murder.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm, the defence applied for a mistrial after the Crown disclosed two screenshots mid-trial.

The defence had already aggressively cross-examined key Crown witnesses, suggesting they were lying about the existence of these screenshots because they had not been disclosed.

The court found that the late disclosure significantly prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence, as the defence's tactical approach was based on the non-disclosure.

Concluding that no lesser remedy such as an adjournment or jury instruction would suffice, the court granted the mistrial.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the accused applied to reopen the evidentiary portion of the trial to cross-examine the Crown's principal witness, a Vetrovec witness, about new second-degree murder charges laid against him after he testified.

The court applied the Hayward test and dismissed the application, finding the proposed fresh evidence was not sufficiently relevant to material issues, would cause undue delay, and was unnecessary given the witness's character had already been thoroughly impeached at trial.

The applicant, on trial for first-degree murder, sought disclosure of police records relating to recent murder charges against a key Crown witness.

The records were held by a different police force and Crown office than those prosecuting the applicant.

The court determined that the third-party records regime under O'Connor applied, rather than the first-party Stinchcombe regime, because the prosecuting Crown did not have possession of the records and they were not 'obviously relevant' to the applicant's case.

Applying the O'Connor test, the court found the records were likely relevant to the witness's credibility and ordered their production to the defence.

The accused, Jeremy Hall, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application (KGB application) to admit two police statements from a deceased witness, Tracey Friesz, for their substantive truth.

The defence argued for both procedural and substantive reliability of the statements.

The Crown conceded necessity but disputed reliability, highlighting Friesz's motive to protect her then-boyfriend, her history of dishonesty, and the lack of corroborative evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that procedural reliability was not established due to the absence of an oath and ineffective warnings, and substantive reliability was not met as the statements were not inherently trustworthy, given the declarant's motive to lie and lack of corroboration.

The court concluded that the probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to admit a recanted police statement from a material witness (Carol Ann Eaton) for substantive use in a first-degree murder trial against Jeremy Hall, under the "KGB application" framework.

The defence opposed, arguing lack of procedural and substantive reliability due to alleged coercion and the witness's recantation and claimed memory loss.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that procedural reliability was established through the sworn, video-recorded statement and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination of the witness at trial, despite her claims of coercion and memory lapse.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding police misconduct and the witness's credibility.

The applicant, charged with fraud over $5000 for allegedly collecting social assistance overpayments, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings pending state-funded counsel.

The applicant argued the case was complex and he lacked the means to retain private counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding the case was primarily fact-based and not sufficiently complex to warrant state-funded counsel at the preliminary inquiry stage, without prejudice to renew the application if committed to trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code for allegedly raping the complainant on October 15, 2016, during an access visit to their infant daughter.

The complainant did not report the allegation until January 2017, after the accused's counsel wrote to her complaining about denial of access.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's testimony and digital evidence (photographs and text messages) showing bruises on the complainant's body.

The defence contended the digital exhibits were forgeries created by the complainant using her computer graphics skills.

The court found the accused not guilty of sexual assault, finding a reasonable doubt as to whether the contact was non-consensual.

However, the court found the accused caused bruising to the complainant but could not convict on assault causing bodily harm due to the wording of the information and reasonable doubt regarding mens rea.