Dennis R. O'Connor

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge found that the respondent, a potential investor, reasonably relied on assertions from the CEO of the appellant private company regarding its present value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings on misrepresentation and reliance, and upholding the damages calculation as reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order striking out portions of their statement of claim.

The struck portions alleged that the respondent bank owed a duty of care to the appellants, who were not its customers, to inquire into its customer's activities to ensure the accounts were not used for fraudulent purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the facts pleaded did not give rise to a recognized duty of care, nor did they warrant recognizing a new duty of care under the Anns/Kamloops principles.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the principle in Browne v. Dunn to discount his evidence and in finding him evasive during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a breach of the Browne v. Dunn principle, as the complainant was not cross-examined on significant contradictory details later testified to by the appellant.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on consent and post-offence conduct, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The complainant testified she was passed out during the sexual contact, while the appellant claimed she initiated it.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury instructions and held there was ample evidence to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for resisting arrest, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a lawful arrest without addressing whether the police used excessive force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's actions of pulling his hands and hiding them under his stomach constituted forceful opposition.

The court also held that because the issue of excessive force was not argued at trial as it was on appeal, the trial judge did not err in failing to specifically address it.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he breached a non-competition provision in a Shareholders Agreement.

The appellant argued this finding was inconsistent with the trial judge's conclusion that he did not breach a fiduciary duty when he left his employment and took a specific client's business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was no inconsistency because the Shareholders Agreement required the appellant to relinquish his shares to avoid the non-competition provision, which he failed to do.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80' and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by using his breathalyzer readings to assess the credibility of his 'evidence to the contrary' (the Carter defence).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Boucher against using breathalyzer results to assess credibility applies only when the Crown relies on the presumption of accuracy.

Because the Crown called the breath technician and relied only on the presumption of identity, the trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer readings in assessing the evidence as a whole.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of production of marijuana and bribery.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) due to the respondent's language difficulties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence for the marijuana charge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bribery charge, holding that the statements offering money to police constituted the actus reus of a new offence and did not flow causally from the Charter breaches.

A new trial was ordered for the bribery charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, failed to give reasons for rejecting his evidence, failed to self-instruct on a Vetrovec warning for his ex-wife's testimony, and erred in conducting an unassisted handwriting comparison.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or his cautious approach to the handwriting comparison.

The Crown's cross-appeal on sentence was allowed on consent, adding probation conditions and a SOIRA order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on statements made by the appellant during a 'Mr. Big' operation, cell phone records, and a tacit admission to a friend.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by permitting prohibited propensity reasoning, ruling that the defence violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no impermissible propensity reasoning, upholding the Browne v. Dunn ruling as fair, and concluding the hearsay instruction caused no prejudice.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding a claim to Casino Rama profits, the successful respondents sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity scale, citing the appellant's conduct and shifting theories.

The Court of Appeal declined to award elevated costs, finding the appellant's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $250,000 for the Chiefs of Ontario and OFNLP, and $75,000 for Ontario.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of theft over $5,000.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, primarily expert cell phone tracking data showing the appellant's phone was in frequent contact with his accomplice's phone and near the locations of the thefts.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by using evidence from each count as similar fact evidence for the other, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not use similar fact reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that the appellant was the accomplice.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including possession of over one kilogram of cocaine, and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the gap principle, as his last conviction was 11 years prior.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the criminal record and failed to weigh rehabilitation prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to 5.5 years.

The appellants, major creditors of a bankrupt estate, appealed a Superior Court decision that varied a registrar's taxation of the trustee's final Statement of Receipts and Disbursements.

The registrar had drastically reduced the trustee's fees to $1, disallowed significant legal disbursements, and ordered the trustee to personally pay solicitor and client costs due to misconduct.

The Superior Court judge restored many of the fees and disbursements, finding the registrar exceeded his jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the registrar did have jurisdiction under s. 152(6) of the BIA to review previously taxed solicitor accounts.

The Court fixed the trustee's fees at $49,464.44, allowed $100,000 for the estate solicitor's fees, and ordered the trustee to personally pay half of the appellants' costs of the taxation hearing on a solicitor and client scale due to his misconduct.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following the hearing of two appeals.

The Van Breda respondents and the Charron respondents were each awarded costs fixed at $45,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondents Hola Sun Holidays Limited and Bel Air Travel Group Ltd. were each awarded costs fixed at $10,000.

No costs were ordered for or against the interveners.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision confirming the validity of a Trust Agreement.

She argued the agreement defeated her interests in the matrimonial home under the Family Law Act, lacked certainty of subject matter, was signed under duress, and that the trial judge was functus officio when issuing supplementary reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the property was not a matrimonial home when the agreement was executed, the trust subject matter was certain, the trial judge was not functus officio as no order had been entered, and there was no basis to interfere with the finding that duress was not established.

The appellant appealed an order regarding child support for her daughter.

She argued the application judge erred in characterizing an $8.6 million payment to the respondent as a retiring allowance rather than severance, in treating stock option payments, in failing to impute income for property transfers to the respondent's wife, in failing to gross up income for UK tax rates, and in denying private school expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings and application of the Child Support Guidelines.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal and the value of his shares under a shareholders' agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the respondent's shares had not been validly purchased upon his termination and that he was entitled to participate in the proceeds of the company's subsequent sale.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to reduce wrongful dismissal damages for failure to mitigate.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the award for dividends on Class B preferred shares because the respondent's option agreement explicitly precluded dividend rights until the option was exercised.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for breach of a contract to operate an off-track betting facility.

The trial judge had found the agreement was perpetual and awarded damages for an 11-year period without deducting the cost of sales from the loss of profits calculation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in her analysis of whether the contract was perpetual and in her calculation of damages.

A new trial was ordered to determine the appropriate notice period and recalculate damages.

The appellant appealed the decision of a status hearing judge who dismissed her 2004 action for delay under Rule 48.14(13) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The status hearing was held five years after the statement of defence was filed.

The Court of Appeal found that the status hearing judge was entitled to accept the history of the action as described in the defence affidavit and that his order dismissing the action was justified.

The appeal on the merits and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.