Dennis R. O'Connor

The appellant appealed his sentence for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her approach to rehabilitation.

The appellant had stabbed the victim four times.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to consider the appellant's failure to recognize the connection between his extensive use of alcohol and marijuana and the offence.

The plaintiffs, former federal public servants, sued the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) for negligent misrepresentation after resigning to join a private company, Loba, and transferring their pensions to the Loba Plan, which was later revoked by the CRA.

The trial judge found the AGC liable for failing to disclose known risks about the Loba Plan and apportioned liability 80% to the AGC and 20% to the Loba Parties (third parties).

The AGC appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of duty of care, misrepresentation, and causation against the AGC.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding apportionment, finding the trial judge erred in her fiduciary analysis of the Loba Parties.

The Court adjusted the apportionment of liability to 60% for the AGC and 40% for the Loba Parties.

A separate appeal by one plaintiff regarding the calculation of his damages was dismissed.

The appellant requested an adjournment of his appeal, which was dismissed due to his failure to appear despite ample notice.

The appeal itself was dismissed as moot because the appellant had already filed a fourth statement of claim that conformed with the order under appeal, and the respondents had filed a statement of defence.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of $6,600.

The appellants sought to set aside a paragraph of the trial judgment finding oppression against one of the corporate appellants.

The Court of Appeal declined the request, noting the issue was not raised during oral argument and that there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of oppression independent of a specific loan.

The appellants' request was dismissed.

The appellant, a store clerk, sold cigarettes to a 17-year-old test shopper without asking for identification and was convicted under the Smoke Free Ontario Act.

He appealed, arguing that the random compliance check constituted entrapment because the authorities lacked reasonable suspicion that he or the store were engaged in illegal activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the criminal law doctrine of entrapment, specifically the requirement for reasonable suspicion, does not apply to bona fide random test shopping used to monitor compliance with regulatory statutes.

The appellant, a Canadian resident, was sought for extradition to the United States on charges of failing to remit state sales tax collected at two New York car dealerships.

At the extradition hearing, the appellant sought disclosure of thousands of vehicle sales forms to challenge the investigator's claim that he had signed them.

The extradition judge refused disclosure and ordered committal, and the Minister of Justice subsequently ordered surrender.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that the extradition judge correctly applied the law on disclosure and reasonably concluded that the presumptive reliability of the Record of the Case had not been rebutted.

The application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender decision was also dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment based on a jury verdict granting the respondent insured's claim for coverage under an automobile insurance policy.

The insurer argued there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that the insured satisfied her obligation to notify the insurer of a material change in risk when her son obtained his G2 licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the jury to conclude that a reasonable person in the insured's circumstances would not have known the insurer would regard the licence change as a material change requiring notification to maintain coverage.

The court also rejected the insurer's argument that the trial judge unduly intervened in the examination-in-chief of a witness.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the motions judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter analysis after finding an unlawful arrest.

The appellant contended that the motions judge's finding of good faith was inconsistent with her finding that the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge accepted the officers' evidence that they believed they had authority to arrest, and it was open to her to consider the high crime area in assessing police conduct under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge improperly considered the actions of others and failed to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge sentenced the appellant solely for his own conduct and properly considered the request for a conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to order the respondent to register under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by relying on impermissible speculation about the impact of registration on the respondent.

The respondent failed to meet the high statutory threshold of demonstrating that the impact of registration would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

A 20-year SOIRA registration order was imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach when police seized drugs from his home without a warrant.

The police had attended a domestic dispute, and the appellant's common law spouse volunteered the drugs to them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the breach was inadvertent and minor, and that the trial judge did not err in balancing the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof or provided inadequate reasons.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside a destruction order for a pit bull under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The appeal judge had interpreted section 4(8) of the Act as requiring the court to find that destruction was necessary for the protection of the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary and natural meaning of section 4(8) is clear and unambiguous: once a pit bull is found to have bitten or attacked, the court is mandated to order its destruction.

The original destruction order was reinstated.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of six years, less pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit given the respondent's incorrigibility, his prior firearms convictions, and his illegal presence in Canada following a deportation order.

The Court allowed the appeal and increased the sentences to 7.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the breach, less pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant was not a flight risk, but opposed bail on public interest grounds.

The applicant's appeal grounds relate to the trial judge's refusal to order disclosure of police investigations into two key police witnesses, one of whom was subsequently charged with perjury.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding sufficient merit in the appeal grounds to temporarily suspend enforcement of the sentence, and ordered the appeal to be case managed for expeditious resolution.

The respondent was largely successful on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant challenged both a conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident between inmates in a correctional facility and a subsequent dangerous offender designation resulting in an indeterminate sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and held there was no basis to disturb the credibility findings.

The ineffective assistance claim failed because, even assuming incompetence, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was established.

On sentence, the court held that a long-term offender determination does not displace ordinary sentencing principles for the predicate offence and upheld the finding that the appellant met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation and could not be managed in the community by less intrusive means.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, noting that the relevant legislation had been amended, meaning the case would not provide guidance for future cases.

Furthermore, the court found no need to elaborate on the principles applied by the summary conviction appeal judge under the previous legislation.

The appellant appealed a 2008 disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his continued detention in a medium security ward.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The Court declined to remit the matter for the imposition of conditions, finding the issue moot because the Board was already conducting a multifaceted hearing that would address the appellant's current circumstances and conditions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order permitting the respondent to purchase his interest in the matrimonial home at a price fixed by the court.

The Court of Appeal found procedural unfairness because the respondent failed to serve an amended notice of motion indicating her intention to seek this specific relief, and the appellant was not present when the issue was argued.

Because the house had already been re-sold, the Court did not set aside the sale but ordered that the respondent held the appellant's interest in trust and must account to him for his share of the proceeds.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the lower court.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.