Dennis R. O'Connor

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for over $20 million in damages for improperly placing a paving company, Osler, into bankruptcy as part of a fraudulent scheme to deprive the respondents (the Alfano family trusts) of their 87 percent equity interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of liability against Mr. Piersanti, agreeing that he orchestrated a fraudulent scheme, including concocting a fake shareholders' agreement and assigning the company into bankruptcy.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the appellants' expert witness for lacking independence and acting as an advocate.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the liability finding against Ms. Piersanti, reducing the compensatory damages to $14,391,807 based on adjustments conceded by the respondents' expert at trial, and setting aside orders requiring a related company to pay $2.5 million into court and declaring an interest in certain properties.

Skyservice Airlines Inc. went into receivership leaving unpaid airport and air navigation charges.

The airport authorities and NAV Canada obtained orders to seize and detain aircraft leased by Skyservice to recover the amounts owed.

The aircraft lessors appealed, arguing that Skyservice no longer 'owned or operated' the aircraft at the time of the applications due to the receivership, suspension of its air operator certificate, and the lessors' attempts to terminate the leases.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Canada 3000, holding that Skyservice remained the registered owner and operator in possession of the aircraft at the relevant time, and the statutory detention remedy takes priority over the lessors' property interests.

The appellant, an unsecured judgment creditor of the respondent's husband, appealed an order setting aside the transfer of the matrimonial home from the respondent to her husband.

The motion judge had found the transfer was void due to undue influence and, alternatively, that the husband held the property in trust for the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the finding of undue influence could not stand because it was not pleaded, depriving the appellant of procedural fairness.

However, the Court upheld the finding that the respondent did not intend to gift the property and held an interest by way of resulting or constructive trust, remitting the matter to determine the extent of that interest.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside an arbitrator's interlocutory orders, an order striking statements of defence, a final arbitral award, and removed the arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the application judge erred in setting aside the interlocutory orders, as the Arbitration Act does not permit judicial intervention for procedural decisions.

However, the Court upheld the setting aside of the order striking the pleadings and the final award, finding that the respondents were treated unfairly because their bankruptcy made compliance with the interlocutory orders legally impossible.

The removal of the arbitrator was also upheld.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences arising from allegations by several complainants in circumstances involving crack cocaine use and alleged coercive sexual conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the similar fact evidence was admitted, there was at least an air of reality to possible inadvertent collusion through media reports, rumours, and street communications, and the jury should have been left to assess that possibility when weighing the evidence.

The court also held that, after severing counts involving one complainant to preserve the accused’s ability to testify only on those counts, the trial judge erred in then admitting that complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence, effectively undermining the accused’s right to silence and control of the defence under ss. 7 and 11(c) of the Charter.

The combined errors required a new trial.

Several civil liberties and HIV/AIDS organizations brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The Crown opposed the interventions, arguing the appeal was fact-based and the interventions would be duplicative or prejudicial.

The court granted the motions to intervene, finding that the proposed interveners would provide unique viewpoints on the broader legal and constitutional issues without causing injustice to the parties or prejudicing the appeal process.

The applicants brought a motion to quash the respondents' appeals from two procedural orders made by a case management judge in a multi-party vexatious litigation application.

The Court of Appeal determined that the orders in question, which subjected the application to case management, quashed summonses with leave to reapply, and left fraud allegations open for future determination, were purely interlocutory.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeals, and they were quashed with costs awarded to the applicants.

In a criminal appeal subject to a continuing publication ban, the appellant challenged convictions arising from historical sexual abuse allegations by multiple complainants.

The court held that the jury trial was rendered unfair by the admission of inadmissible hearsay, bad character, extrinsic misconduct, opinion, and some prior consistent statement evidence, together with inadequate limiting and curative instructions.

Although some relationship and narrative evidence was admissible for limited purposes, the charge failed to prohibit propensity reasoning and failed to properly confine the jury’s use of several categories of evidence.

Given that the case turned centrally on credibility and reliability, the errors were not harmless and could not be cured by the proviso.

The appeal from conviction was allowed, the verdicts were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The cross-appellants (the sellers) appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding the value of business inventory sold to the respondents (the buyers).

The trial judge had awarded damages to the buyers but reduced the award by 20 percent due to contributory negligence.

On appeal, the sellers argued the buyers did not reasonably rely on the misrepresentation and suffered no detriment, while the buyers argued the finding of contributory negligence was inconsistent with reasonable reliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of reasonable reliance, detriment, and contributory negligence were supported by the evidence and could co-exist.

The parties, both sophisticated commercial entities, entered into Minutes of Settlement requiring the appellant to pay 1 million EUR over two years.

The agreement stipulated that upon default, the appellant would consent to judgment for 1 million EUR without credit for prior payments.

After paying 380,000 EUR, the appellant defaulted.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for 1 million EUR and dismissed the appellant's claim for relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the forfeited amount was neither disproportionate in law nor unconscionable in equity, as the provision was designed to incentivize compliance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding collusion between Crown witnesses, fabrication of alibi evidence, motive to lie, and exclusive motive to kill.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking to increase the 13-year parole ineligibility period to 15 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no errors in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge engaged in a comprehensive and fair assessment of the sentencing factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence of an audio tape and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, inadequate interpretation services breaching his s. 14 Charter rights, insufficient reasons, and errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test, trial counsel's performance did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge made no errors in assessing credibility or providing reasons.

The plaintiffs appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action against two paramedics and an ambulance service.

The motion judge had found that while the standard of care was a genuine issue for trial, causation was not, relying on the defendants' expert opinion that the patient's survival rate was only 2.4 percent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in relying on the defendants' expert opinion because it did not address the plaintiffs' theory of the case, which posited that the patient would have survived had she been transported to the hospital immediately while she still had a heartbeat.

The Court concluded that both standard of care and causation were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 6 years net (8 years total) for 32 convictions, including break and enter, dangerous driving, and possession of stolen property.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no causal link between his illness and his criminal conduct, and no evidence that a lengthy sentence would have a severe negative effect on him.

A corrigendum was later issued to correct an error regarding the sentence for breach of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by relying on the appellant's testimony from a pre-trial Charter voir dire to determine guilt at trial.

The appellant argued this error should result in an acquittal due to a lack of evidence linking the drugs seized to the Health Canada certificate of analysis.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding a sufficient link, and ordered a new trial based on the trial judge's error.

The applicant in an extradition proceeding brought a motion for the production of documents, to cross-examine the certifying U.S. attorney, and to examine her prior counsel.

The applicant sought to explore an allegedly untruthful statement in the Record of the Case regarding her history of drug trafficking in Canada, arguing it constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no air of reality to the assertion that the requesting state deliberately attempted to mislead Canadian courts.

The court also found no basis to order the examination of prior counsel regarding an allegation of ineffective assistance.

The appellant was convicted of robbery of a convenience store as a party to the offence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and wrongly used his utterances to police to draw an inference of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of essential evidence and concluding the circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under s. 745.6(1) of the Criminal Code for a 'faint hope' hearing to reduce his parole ineligibility.

He argued the application judge applied a higher threshold by using the phrase 'realistic probability of success' instead of 'reasonable prospect'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to resolve the semantic issue because the appellant failed to meet the statutory test given his lack of remorse, institutional misconduct, and the nature of his first-degree murder conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence and that the predicate offences did not form a pattern with his prior sexual assault convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found a clear pattern of the appellant using violence to achieve sexual objectives and an inability to control his impulses.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's monetary award for unjust enrichment, lump sum spousal support, and costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's calculation of the unjust enrichment award, which properly accounted for set-offs.

The court also upheld the lump sum spousal support order, noting the trial judge properly weighed its advantages and disadvantages, including the appellant's history of late payments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.