Darla A. Wilson

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He had originally elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice, but due to scheduling delays that would have exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the Deputy Attorney General preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that his election to be tried in the provincial court vested his right to that mode of trial and that the direct indictment was an abuse of process aimed at avoiding a s. 11(b) Charter stay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 577 provides broad authority to prefer a direct indictment even after an election is made.

The Court further held that there was no abuse of process, as the direct indictment actually facilitated an earlier trial date, consistent with the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a violation of the accused's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application judge had found the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in her treatment of a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from the release of a Supreme Court of Canada decision that necessitated a rehearing of a change of venue motion.

The Court found the Crown had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay and deducted an additional 93 days.

This brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two complainants who attended the same special education program.

At trial, the judge dismissed a similar fact evidence application due to concerns about inadvertent tainting between the complainants and another witness.

However, the trial judge subsequently convicted the appellant without explaining why those same tainting concerns did not affect his assessment of the complainants' credibility and reliability on the trial proper.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to address the potential tainting in the credibility assessment was a reversible error, particularly given the witnesses' intellectual disabilities and memory issues.

A licensed paralegal sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal challenging the Law Society of Ontario's restrictions on the permitted scope of practice for paralegals in immigration matters.

The motion judge found the proposed intervener failed to identify how her intervention would assist the court beyond the contributions of the existing parties and three previously granted interveners.

The proposed intervener's own action against the LSO raising substantially similar issues had been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.

The motion was also brought well past the deadline for intervention motions.

Leave to intervene was denied with no order as to costs.

The appellant challenged an annual Review Board disposition that maintained a conditional discharge based on a finding of significant threat to public safety.

On appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the court admitted post-hearing psychiatric evidence showing medication discontinuation without decompensation, a revised diagnosis, and a materially lower structured risk assessment.

Applying the interests of justice framework for fresh evidence in NCRMD appeals, the court held the new record required allowing the appeal.

The court found remittal unnecessary because an absolute discharge was the only reasonable disposition on the updated evidence.

The respondents sought dismissal of the appellant's appeal under r. 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court held that an appeal from a default judgment was outside its jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory and the proper route was a motion to set aside default under r. 19.08.

The panel also noted that a party noted in default is restricted from taking further steps absent leave or consent under r. 19.02(1)(b).

Concluding the appeal was jurisdictionally barred and abusive, the court dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against the respondent homeowners after she slipped and fell on their staircase.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in excluding the first set of expert slip resistance testing, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's gatekeeping decision under the White Burgess framework, as the excluded testing differed materially from the actual conditions.

Even if the exclusion were erroneous, no miscarriage of justice resulted because the tampering theory was still advanced at trial through other evidence and the jury's verdict turned on the credibility of the parties.

The appellant was charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007 and brought a certiorari application that was dismissed.

After filing a notice of appeal from that dismissal, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot, as any decision on the certiorari ruling would have no impact on the guilty pleas, convictions, and sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant's application for a publication ban on his full name was also dismissed, as he failed to establish that court openness posed a serious risk to an important public interest.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted robbery arising from a carjacking spree and was sentenced to 2.5 years' incarceration.

He appealed on two grounds: that the sentencing judge erred in treating denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for a youthful first-time offender, and that the sentencing judge failed to account for collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that despite a misstatement of the law, the sentencing judge did not overemphasize denunciation and deterrence, as evidenced by a below-range sentence.

The court also held that immigration consequences could not be avoided without imposing an unfit sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The Law Society of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Law Society Tribunal finding that the applicant, who had a history of child sexual abuse, was of good character and could be licensed to practice law with a condition that he not be alone with minors.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision unreasonable because it failed to properly consider the overarching public interest and public trust in the legal profession.

The Court also found the licensing condition internally inconsistent with a finding of good character.

The matter was remitted to the Hearing Division for a fresh assessment.

Additionally, the Court granted the applicant's motion for an anonymization and non-publication order to protect the identity of his daughter, a victim of his past abuse.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual exploitation and related offences involving two high school students.

The central issue was whether the appellant was in a 'position of trust' under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code when the sexual touching occurred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the factors for determining a position of trust and focusing on the complainants' subjective impressions rather than the appellant's assumed role.

A new trial was ordered for the sexual exploitation counts, while the sentence appeal for possession of child sexual abuse material was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking most of their tort, constitutional, and human rights claims arising from accident benefits assessments, surveillance, and the administration of statutory accident benefits after a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the battery, intrusion upon seclusion, abuse of process, and vicarious liability claims were properly struck, and that the challenges to ss. 55 and 19(3) of the SABS were properly treated as an abuse of process because the matters had been or could have been pursued before the LAT.

However, the court found the motion judge erred in concluding that no breach of contract had been pleaded against the insurer and in treating the SABS as outside the insurance contract.

The appeal was allowed only to permit the insured appellant to amend and properly plead breach of contract and breach of good faith claims against the insurer.

The mother appealed parenting-time and child-support rulings from a family change motion after prior child-abduction findings.

The court upheld supervised parenting and child-support determinations, with only a minor variation to one paragraph of the order.

The court found the motion judge erred by treating oppression-based personal liability too narrowly and set aside dismissal of claims against the personal respondents.

It declined to grant summary judgment for the appellants due to pleading and evidentiary gaps.

The appellant challenged an order striking the statement of claim as vexatious and abusive under procedural rules.

The court rejected all grounds, including complaints about evidentiary use and refusal of leave to amend, and upheld dismissal.

After repeated non-compliance with production and undertaking orders, including a peremptory and then last-chance order, pleadings were struck.

The court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s discretionary determination and upheld the sanctions.